# Doc---Kentucky---Round 2

# 1NC

## Offcase

### 1NC---Japan DA

#### New antitrust is applied globally---offends allies

Herbert Hovenkamp 03. Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa. “Antitrust as Extraterritorial Regulatory Policy,” 48 Antitrust BULL. 629 (2003).

Today few of us are sympathetic with the view that the common law exists apart from and somehow transcends the jurisdiction of the courts that make it. Nevertheless, there is a powerful sense in which the rules of antitrust law are regarded as "natural," while explicitly regulatory rules are considered to be purely local, territorial, or political. This view is given considerable support by a powerful neoclassical economic model that views markets as natural, in the sense that they exist separate and apart from state policy making. 32

Within this model antitrust law is a kind of background umpire that does not make first instance choices about price, quantity, quality, new entry and the like, but that does limit the anticompetitive exercise of market power. Antitrust operates as a kind of "macro" version of contract law. The common law of contracts is designed to facilitate and protect the utility of individual private bargains; antitrust is designed to do much the same thing, but for markets as a whole. Under this conception a well defined set of antitrust principles always operates in the background, so to speak, permitting private bargaining to proceed without interference in the great majority of instances, but intervening when competitive processes go awry. Further, widespread agreement exists both inside and outside the United States on a set of core principles pertaining to such things as naked price fixing, market division agreements, and the like. Within this core, problems of extraterritoriality have largely been limited to the technical ones of devising appropriate jurisdictional rules and remedies.

In contrast, the power to regulate is different. Under the traditional view of regulation the power to set price, quantity, quality, or the right to enter a market emanates in the first instance from the government. Further, although there is widespread economic agreement on fundamental principles, regulatory design is much more specific to the sovereign-more likely to reflect the demographics, industrial or employment base, or politics of the particular state imposing the regulation.

For example, nearly all of the 50 states of the United States have an antitrust law. With relatively few exceptions, however, the substantive coverage of these antitrust laws is the same, and mimics federal law. Many states have court decisions or even legislative enactments stating that federal antitrust law should govern the interpretation of that particular state's antitrust law as well. 33 The result is that the coverage of state antitrust law is remarkably similar from one state to the next. But one can hardly say the same thing about each state's regulation of land use, power generation and distribution, taxicabs, liquor pricing, and the like. Whatever homogeneity regulatory theory might produce, the politics of regulation virtually guarantees jurisdiction-specific outcomes.

But homogeneity in antitrust policy also begins to break down when antitrust law moves beyond its fundamental neoclassical concern with cartels or well-defined exclusionary practices, and into areas where its role is more controversial or marginal. This is often the case when the antitrust laws are applied in recently deregulated markets. For example, a common antitrust problem that arises in deregulated industries falls under the general rubric of unilateral refusals to deal. In order to encourage competition, newly deregulated firms may be forced to share their facilities, information, intellectual property, or other assets with new rivals. Devising reasonable "nonregulatory" rules governing refusals to deal in such markets has always extended the antitrust laws to the margin of their competence.

Increasingly, American courts seem willing to apply antitrust law to markets regulated by foreign nations under circumstances where regulatory laws themselves would never reach. For example, neither Congress nor a state legislature would very likely attempt to regulate the customer service or information provision practices of a foreign national's telephone company. But both federal and state courts have done precisely that under the guise of antitrust enforcement.3 4

Antitrust policy makes this thinkable as a result of the confluence of two sets of doctrines. First is the expansive reach of our antitrust laws to practices that have a substantial effect on United States commerce. Second is the very narrow conception of comity that applies in antitrust cases.

As a general matter, comity concerns in the international conflict of laws requires the court to consider the competing interests of domestic and foreign sovereigns. 35 After a half century of debate over the meaning of comity in international Sherman Act adjudication, the Supreme Court gave the doctrine an extraordinarily narrow meaning in the Hartford Fire case.36 That case involved an alleged insurance boycott in which Lloyd's of London participated as reinsurer. Lloyd's conduct-agreeing with some United States insurers not to write reinsurance policies for other United States insurers who wanted to write policies with broader coverage-was neither forbidden nor compelled by British law. To the defendant's claim of comity the Supreme Court replied that the provisions of the Sherman Act governing jurisdiction over transactions in foreign commerce were mandatory. As a result, a federal court could not simply decline jurisdiction on the basis of some general balancing of interests. 37 Rather, "comity" permits a federal court to decline jurisdiction only when there was a "conflict" between the law of the foreign sovereign and United States law. Further, "conflict" was defined not under choice of law principles, but more absolutely, as occurring only when the foreign law compelled the conduct at issue. 38

Perhaps significantly, the activity of the London reinsurers was very likely reachable under United States antitrust law even under ordinary interest analysis principles. British law was found by the Supreme Court to be indifferent to what the London reinsurers were doing. Further, what they were doing was agreeing not to insure against liability for particular toxic pollution risks in the United States, and risk of liability is of course measured in relation to the physical environment and legal regime in which the injury occurs. 39 As a result, the London reinsurers were selling a product especially targeted for United States markets and allegedly participating in a boycott designed to keep broader coverage insurance policies out of that market.

But Hartford Fire's definition of comity is significantly problematic under deregulation. To the extent a foreign sovereign deregulates a public utility or common carrier, that firm enjoys greater discretion to make its own decisions. As a result, considerations of comity may no longer preclude a Sherman Act suit. What makes this especially problematic is the way that the Sherman Act has been used in the United States as a kind of replacement for the regulatory agency. Under comprehensive agency regulation a filed tariff plus regulatory oversight would have governed numerous acts by regulated firms, including pricing, entry into new markets, interconnection obligations and other duties to deal.40 Government relaxation of regulatory restrictions has given firms some discretion over these things but in the process has substituted the antitrust courts as governmental supervisor. In some situations this causes little difficulty because regulation may have been misapplied to a competitively structured industry to begin with.41 In other situations, such as long-distance telecommunication, a competitive environment has developed because of changes in technology, and topto-bottom price and product regulation is no longer necessary.42

But in a third class of situations the application of the antitrust laws is much more "regulatory" and more difficult to defend. These are the cases where unilateral conduct of the kind that was historically supervised by the regulatory agency now comes under antitrust jurisdiction. For example, under the essential facility doctrine a federal court of general jurisdiction may be asked to apply antitrust law to determine the scope of a formerly regulated firm's duty to interconnect with rivals. The circuit courts have applied the doctrine frequently in the telecommunications industry,43 but also to railroads" and natural gas pipelines.4 5 Problematically, supervising interconnection requirements involves the court in highly technical questions about the scope of the duty to deal and perhaps even about the price at which the deal must be made. In these cases we have not really "deregulated" at all; rather, we have simply substituted regulation by a government agency for regulation by a court, often through the highly inefficient and uncertain process of a jury trial. To do that in a purely domestic situation is ill-advised enough, but to do it abroad by taking advantage of the expansive jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act is completely unjustified.

IV. Extraterritorial antitrust and foreign deregulation

As expansive as the regulatory power asserted by the United States sometimes becomes, it does not generally interfere directly into foreign governments' regulation of their own highly regulated industries. But to a large extent modem antitrust has inherited the regulatory attitude expressed by the Western Union decision discussed above. For several reasons, the idea that the United States Antitrust laws are jurisdictionally exceptional can produce overreaching that is offensive to foreign prerogatives. First, the United States antitrust laws are extremely general and make no distinction between ordinary competitive firms and public utilities or common carriers; the same rules purport to apply to all business firms. Second, the jurisdictional language of the antitrust laws is both mandatory and general to the same extent-that is, the "affecting foreign commerce" language of the basic Sherman Act and the export commerce language of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act 6 do not distinguish between regulated and ordinary competitive firms. And third, the limiting doctrines of international law-namely Act of State, foreign sovereign compulsion, foreign sovereign immunity, and comity-do not distinguish among types of firms or types of antitrust complaints. They apply equally to both price fixing, which is at the core of antitrust concern, and to the essential facility doctrine, which lies at or outside its margin.

#### Ends the US-Japan economic alliance

Takaaki Kojima 02. Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2001-2002. “International Conflicts over the Extraterritorial Application of Competition Law in a Borderless Economy”. https://datascience.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/kojima.pdf

We are witnessing increasingly widespread and penetrating economic globalization today. As a result of trade liberalization, import restrictions or regulations on trade and investment have decreased substantially, and trans-border business activities face less barrier. At the same time, the role of trans-border business activities, especially those by so-called multinational or global enterprises, have become increasingly important and even dominant in some sectors.

As far as the territorial scope of business activities are concerned, state borders are more or less diminishing to become almost borderless; as for legal regimes, however, sovereign states retain in principle exclusive jurisdiction over their territories and nationals under international law. Business activities are regulated by the domestic laws of sovereign states or by international agreements concluded among sovereign states. The pertinent question is how to coordinate “borderless” business activities within the existing legal regimes governed by sovereign states. In the field of trade law, the measures of each state are restricted by international agreements, in particular under the GATT/WTO regime. In the field of competition law, such an international regime is lacking and the domestic laws of each state regulate private restraints of trade in the relevant markets.

Serious jurisdictional conflicts have transpired in the last several decades between the United States and other states over the so-called extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws on anticompetitive conducts abroad. This problem has also caused diplomatic frictions between the United States and other states, as it concerns state sovereignty. In this essay, the author will review the historical development of international conflicts caused by the extraterritorial application of competition law and attempt to examine the options available to circumvent or solve these conflicts. The main focus will be U.S. antitrust law and its relation with other jurisdictions, mainly the European Union and Japan, considering the grave implications to competition law and policy as well as to the world economy. 2

II. Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws

Problems concerning the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws have been discussed in many publications. Of the U.S. antitrust laws, the Sherman Act applies to “commerce … with foreign nations ” (Section 1) without qualifying provisions concerning its territorial scope as “within the United States” (Section 2) or “in any section of the country” (Section 3) as specified in the Clayton Act. In the past, U.S. courts interpreting the Sherman Act of 1890 and other antitrust laws commonly followed the traditional territorial principle with regard to its jurisdictional reach. In the American Banana case (213 U.S. 347 (1909)), where all the acts complained of were committed outside the territory of the United States, including the defendant’s alleged inducements of the Costa Rican government to monopolize the banana trade, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that acts committed outside of the United States are not governed by the Sherman Act. In this case, the territorial principle in the classic sense was applied.

In later decisions such as the American Tobacco case (221 U.S. 106 (1911)) and the Sisal case (274 U.S. 268 (1927)), jurisdiction was exercised over the defendants on the ground that although the agreements in question were concluded by foreigners outside the United States, jurisdiction was limited to what was performed and intended to be performed within the territory of the United States. In these cases, the territorial principle was applied more flexibly, but it has been observed that this application cannot be argued other than as a sensible and reasonable deployment of the objective territorial theory. 3

An entirely different approach was taken in the Alcoa case (148 F.2d. 416 (1944)), in which foreign companies outside the United States had concluded the agreements. The Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held it settled law that any State may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders. It went on further to state that the agreements, although made abroad, were unlawful if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them.

This theory of the intended effect (the effects doctrine) elaborated in the Alcoa case was criticized by many as an excess of jurisdiction under public international law. For instance, R.Y. Jennings noted that “in this new guise it apparently comprehends the exercise of jurisdiction over agreements made abroad, by foreigners with foreigners provided only that the agreement was intended to have repercussions upon American imports or exports,” 4 while F.A. Mann argued that “the type of effect within the meaning of the Alcoa ruling has nothing in common with the effect which by virtue of established principles of international jurisdiction confers that right of regulation.” 5 Neverthele ss, since the Alcoa case, U.S. courts have continued to follow the new jurisdictional formula of the effects doctrine.

In response to excessive application of U.S. antitrust laws, especially with respect to courts’ orders to produce documents such as subpoena duces tecum located abroad, a considerable number of states have issued diplomatic protests. Australia, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and New Zealand have even enacted blocking legislation. 6 The protesting states maintain that taking evidence abroad, including an order to produce documents, is an exercise of extraterritorial enforcement of jurisdiction that, under international law, requires the consent of the state where the evidence is located. The United Kingdom has been one of the strongest opponents to U.S. claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The U.K. government stated for instance that “HM Government considers that in the present state of international law there is no basis for the extension of one country’s antitrust jurisdiction to activities outside of that country of the foreign national.” 7 The Protection of Trading Interest law was enacted in 1980, which provides to extensively thwart the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. The U.K. government invoked the provisions in the Laker Airways case (1983 W.L.R. 413) in 1983.

Having faced the antagonistic reactions of other states, U.S. courts began to show some restraint in assuming extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the Timberlane case (549 F.2d. 9 th Cir. (1976)), the court concluded that it had jurisdiction over alleged anticompetitive conducts in Honduras but refrained from asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction after having applied three tests: first, whether the challenged conduct had had some effect on the commerce of the United States; second, whether the conduct in question imposed a burden on U.S. commerce; and third, whether the complaint’s interests of and links to the United States were sufficiently strong vis-à-vis those of other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act enacted in 1976 applies to foreign conduct that has a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, The U.S. enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have adopted this jurisdictional rule of reason formula since the Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations of 1988. However, divergent views exist as to whether the third test of balancing the interests of other states is a rule of international law or just a comity. 8 Furthermore, not all U.S. courts have consistently applied the test of balancing interests. 9

In 1993, the Supreme Court decision in the Hartford Fire Insurance case (113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993)) reaffirmed the effects doctrine, stating that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States. The Court then took a restrictive view on the test of balancing interests, stating that the only substantial question is whether there is a true conflict between domestic and foreign law, and held that no such conflict seemed to exist because British law did not require defendants to act in a manner prohibited by U.S. law. 10

Japan maintains the territorial principle and rejects the effects doctrine, stating that the effects doctrine cannot be regarded as an established rule of international law. In the view of the Government of Japan, the extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic laws (including U.S. antitrust laws) based on the effects doctrine is not allowed under general international law. 11 In the Nippon Paper case, where a Japanese company was prosecuted under the Sherman Act, the Japanese government submitted a brief of amicus curiae where it stated, inter alia, that the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to a conduct of a Japanese company engaged in business in Japan is unlawful under international law. 12 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal decision, which assumed the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act to a criminal case for the first time (118 S. Ct. 685 (1998)).

#### Alliance key to prevent Chinese challenges to the LIO---recovery now but not guaranteed

Shihoko Goto 21. deputy director for geoeconomics and senior associate for Northeast Asia at the Wilson Center. "When Trade No Longer Hampers U.S.-Japan Ties". 4-20-2021. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/when-trade-no-longer-hampers-us-japan-ties

The April 16th meeting between President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga marked several milestones: not only was it the first foreign leader’s visit to the Biden White House, but it was also the first visit to the United States by Yoshihide Suga as the Japanese prime minister. It was also the first in-person summit meeting between the United States and Japan since the outbreak of a global pandemic. It marked a number of firsts in terms of content too, not least that it was the first time since the 1980s in which trade was not a sore point of contention between the two sides. Instead, trade relations projected as a way forward for further bilateral cooperation in confronting the China threat.

That isn’t to say trade relations between Japan and the United States are now smooth sailing. The U.S. trade deficit with the world’s third-largest economy runs to nearly $68 billion, and although the two sides signed a merchandise trade deal in 2019, the Japanese auto industry remains a point of contention for the United States. Indeed, Japan’s auto exports account for about $54 billion, or close to 80 percent, of the overall trade deficit. Meanwhile, the Biden administration is not expected to lift tariffs on steel and aluminum anytime soon, nor is it expected to make efforts to join the CPTPP in the near future, much to the frustration of Tokyo.

Yet instead of trying to negotiate a breakthrough on the trade front, the Biden-Suga meeting focused on bilateral economic relations based on their shared threat of dealing with China’s ambitions to challenge the regional status quo. Until recent months, Tokyo had aspired to maintain solid relations with China whilst furthering ties with the United States, most notably by endeavoring to decouple economic interests with Beijing from the security threat that China has increasingly been posing upon Tokyo. After the joint 2+2 joint security meeting in Tokyo in March, however, the two countries declared that China’s behavior is “inconsistent with the existing international order, presents political, economic, military, and technological challenges to the Alliance and to the international community.”

Since then, Tokyo has moved even closer to Washington publicly in pushing back against China, as the bilateral statement noted “the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,” marking the first time since 1969 that Japan and the United States publicly referred to Taiwan which remains a core interest for China. In short, Japan’s hedging against the United States and maintaining a balancing act between China and the United States is now over. Not only is its security interests even more closely aligned with that of the United States, Japan’s economic interests are now more intertwined with that of the United States than ever.

Rather than focusing on the trade balance, Tokyo and Washington’s economic relations will concentrate more on economic resilience and maintaining free and fair economic rules of engagement in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the two countries are expected to work more closely together on competing against China in emerging technologies, from 5G to AI and information sciences.

For Japan, one of the biggest takeaways from the Biden-Suga meeting will be that the days of Japan posing an economic threat to the United States are now over. It will also be putting increasing pressure not only for Tokyo to be prepared to fight back against China on the economic as well as security fronts together with Washington, but it will also push Tokyo to step up its own efforts to compete in the innovation economy that goes beyond manufacturing.

#### ILO is sustainable and prevents great power war---preventing Chinese aggression is key

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If China is indeed the future, if China is primed to “rule the world,” if China remakes the international order in its image, it won’t be pretty. A future dominated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be demonstrably worse than the world we know. Just look at how Xi Jinping’s regime treats its own subjects—and plays its current role on the global stage.

NO RIGHTS

Those predictions aren’t outlandish. China already is the world’s top manufacturing nation, top exporting nation and second-largest economy. The PRC was the only major economy to emerge from 2020 claiming GDP growth (if we are to trust Beijing’s books). In the pandemic’s wake, China dislodged the U.S. as the world’s primary destination for foreign direct investment. PRC-backed firms are leaders in the global 5G and AI race. On the strength of a 517-percent binge in military spending since 2000, China bristles with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, deploys a high-tech air force, has a growing and openly hostile presence in space, is doubling its nuclear arsenal, and boasts a 350-ship navy (now the world’s largest). Beijing’s growing cultural reach is evident in everything from its influence over Hollywood, to its puppet-master relationship with the NBA, to its 480 Confucius Institutes (designated by Washington as “part of the Chinese Communist Party’s global influence and propaganda apparatus”).

As President Joe Biden concludes, China is “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

Xi is doing exactly that. But the China challenge starts inside the PRC.

Xi is pursuing what he calls the “China Dream,” which enfolds goals such as sustained economic development, military power modeled after and matching that of the U.S., ideological conformity, “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and “complete unification of our country.” Making Xi’s “China Dream” come true is turning into a nightmare for his subjects.

Before leaving his State Department post, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described what Xi is doing to Uighur Muslims as “genocide,” noting that Beijing has “forced more than a million people into internment camps in the Xinjiang region” and detailing “torture, sexual abuse…rape, forced labor…and unexplained deaths in custody.” As he took the baton from Pompeo, Secretary of State Antony Blinken agreed, affirming that “The forcing of men, women and children into concentration camps, trying to, in effect, re-educate them to be adherents to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide.”

The U.S. government isn’t alone. The Uighur Muslim region, according to a UN human-rights watchdog, “resembles a massive internment camp…a no-rights zone.” More accurately, all of China is a no-rights zone.

Xi’s China is a place where Christian churches are smashed and followers of Christ are sent to reeducation camps; Buddhist temples are bulldozed; Uighur men are packed into freight trains, Uighur women are forcibly sterilized and Uighur babies are forcibly aborted; and bishops and Nobel Peace Prize laureates die in prison. Under Xi, “Religious persecution has increased…with four communities in particular experiencing a downturn in conditions—Protestant Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and both Hui and Uighur Muslims,” Freedom House reports. Amnesty International adds that “hundreds of thousands of people” are subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention in China, many of them for “peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of belief.”

There’s a brutal logic to Xi’s brutal response to religious activity. The common denominator of most every religion is that there’s something above, something beyond, something bigger, more enduring and more important than the state. That notion represents a mortal threat to the legitimacy and durability of Xi’s regime, which is founded on the premise that people exist to serve the state—not to use their God-given gifts to serve others and God.

Xi’s capacity to control is growing ever more insidious. The PRC’s new “social credit system” is using mega-databases to monitor and catalogue every aspect of life of China’s 1.3 billion people—financial transactions, civil infractions, social-media postings, online activity—and then reward or sanction Xi’s subjects by feeding all that information to the National Development and Reform Commission, banking system and judicial system. PRC subjects with good social credit scores enjoy waived fees, lower utility bills, promotions and expedited overseas-travel approval, while those with poor social credit scores can be fired from their jobs, expelled from school, blocked from universities, or barred from accessing transportation.

An Orwellian surveillance state, more than a billion people denied religious freedom and other human rights, uncounted numbers tortured in reeducation camps, physicians jailed for following the Hippocratic Oath—that’s the kind of future and the kind of world Xi wants to build. As dissident leader Xu Zhangrun observed in the wake of Beijing’s criminal mishandling of COVID-19, “A polity that is blatantly incapable of treating its own people properly can hardly be expected to treat the rest of the world well.”

NO LIMITS

That idea—the notion that the PRC is incapable of treating the world any better than it treats its own—is not particularly profound. After all, this is a regime that over the decades has erased some 35 million of its subjects and tortured millions more. Regimes like this see no limits on their power. Since they believe nothing is above the state, they rationalize everything they do in the name of the state, the revolution, the Supreme Leader, the Dear Leader, the Core Leader (Xi’s new title). With no moral constraints on what they do, they believe their ends always justify their means.

That backwards worldview informs every aspect of decision-making in the PRC. This doesn’t mean Washington should refuse to talk with Beijing. But we must be ever vigilant when dealing with Xi. A regime that can justify imprisoning, torturing and killing its own people for peacefully practicing their faith can and will justify anything: seizing foreign lands, annexing international waterways, absorbing free peoples, stealing proprietary information, leveraging a pandemic to gain geopolitical advantage, breaking treaties. The godless USSR did those sorts of things, and so has the godless PRC.

“It is difficult to imagine that a government that continues to repress freedom in its own country,” President Ronald Reagan said of the USSR, “can be trusted to keep agreements with others.” And here we are yet again.

Experts in policy analysis, academia and military-security affairs conclude that Xi’s response to COVID-19 “was in breach of international law.” It pays to recall that COVID-19 was a local public-health problem that metastasized into a global pandemic due to Beijing’s incompetence or intention (either cause is reason not to entrust the future to Xi); that Xi’s regime lied about human-to-human transmission; that Xi’s regime willfully allowed millions to leave the epicenter in Wuhan for destinations around the world; that Xi’s regime carried out a premeditated plan to hoard 2.5 billion pieces of protective equipment as the virus swept the globe; that Xi’s regime blocked scientists from sharing findings about genome sequencing for weeks; that Xi’s regime continues to refuse to cooperate with international health agencies.

Xi’s intervention in Hong Kong and assertion of rule by remote-control is a brazen violation of an international treaty.

In and above the East China Sea, Beijing is constantly violating Japanese airspace and illegally loitering PRC coast guard vessels in Japanese waters. All the while, Beijing illegally claims some 90 percent of the South China Sea. Xi has backed up those claims by building 3,200 acres of illegal islands beyond PRC waters. These islands feature SAM batteries and warplanes. Xi promised the PRC wouldn’t militarize these islands. But as America and its allies learned at enormous cost last century, words don’t matter to men like Xi. Strength and the will to wield it are all that matters. Xi has both.

His goal is to control the resource-rich South and East China Seas, assert sovereignty claims in fait accompli fashion, and bring Chinese-speaking lands under his heel. Hong Kong—where only PRC-approved “patriots” are allowed to serve in government—was his first objective. Taiwan is next. Xi has made clear that democratic Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed by the communist Mainland. “We make no promise to abandon the use of force,” he warns. That explains Beijing’s ground-unit exercises, naval drills and bomber sorties around the island democracy.

Nor are Xi’s dreams and designs limited to his immediate neighborhood. Beijing is buying loyalty via development projects (see the Belt and Road Initiative), gaining a toehold in strategically located regions (see PRC control over ports in 18 countries), building an authoritarian bloc (see Russia, Serbia, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela), and fielding a power-projecting military capable of challenging the Free World across every region and every domain—land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Xi’s relentless cybersiege of the Free World is siphoning away inventions, discoveries, technologies and wealth, penetrating defense firms, and interfering in elections.

For those with eyes to see—who know about the laogai camps and brutalization of Muslims and oppression of Tibet and assault on Christianity—none of this comes as a surprise. What’s surprising is that for 40 years, the trade über alles caucus convinced itself that such a regime could somehow be reformed by access to Buicks and Kentucky Fried Chicken.

TAKING AIM

Xi vows to build what he calls “a more just and reasonable new world order”—one that would supplant the liberal democratic order the United States and its allies began building after World War II. Importantly, the PRC not only has the intent to build a new world order; it has the resources and capabilities to do so—which helps explain why those who designed and uphold the existing world order are answering China’s challenge.

The PRC is a country of 1.3 billion people. Its GDP is already $14.1 trillion. Its economic tendrils—trade, banking, manufacturing, logistics, shipping, technology, super-computing, artificial intelligence—stretch into every part of the globe. All of this is fueling the PRC’s relentless military modernization and buildup. The PRC’s annual military expenditure is at least $261 billion. (Beijing recently announced an increase in military spending of 6.8 percent for 2021). The PRC has a 2-million-man military, the world’s largest navy and an intense focus on its neighborhood.

None of this would be a particularly worrisome if China embraced the values of liberal democracy—the rule of law, individual freedom, religious liberty, free enterprise and free trade, majority rule with minority rights. These are the foundation stones of what Churchill and FDR envisioned when they drafted the Atlantic Charter in 1941. Their vision led to what some call the “rules-based democratic order,” others the “liberal international order,” still others the “free world order.” These terms aim to describe how the peoples of the West have tried to make the world work and indeed manage the world: They embraced and encouraged democratic governance; developed rules and norms of behavior; promoted liberal (freedom-oriented) political and economic institutions; and called upon governments to live up to the responsibilities of nationhood by respecting international borders and promoting good order within those borders. The result has been an unparalleled spread of prosperity, an unprecedented expansion of free government and an unexpected remission of great-power war (which had become an increasingly-destructive feature of the centuries leading up to 1945).

To be sure, many regimes reject the values of liberal democracy. But the PRC, like the USSR before it, not only rejects those values; it possesses the military-technological-industrial-economic assets to challenge those values, erode the liberal international order built upon those values, and forge a new international order or at least bend the existing order toward its own goals. But don’t take my word for it.

“Some seek to challenge the international order—that is, the rules, values and institutions that reduce conflict and make cooperation possible among nations,” Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin warn, pointedly adding that “China in particular is all too willing to use coercion to get its way.”

Former national security advisor Gen H.R. McMaster concludes that PRC “leaders believe they have a narrow window of strategic opportunity to…revise the international order in their favor.”

Before he retired as Indo-Pacific commander ,Adm. Phil Davidson told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Xi and his lieutenants are “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order.”

A NATO panel noted late last year that Beijing’s “approach to human rights and international law challenges the fundamental premise of a rules-based international order.”

These political, diplomatic and military leaders recognize that the liberal order has promoted the peace and prosperity of the Free World for nearly 75 years. But it doesn’t run on autopilot. If we want the benefits of a liberal order that sustains our way of life, we need to sustain the liberal order. As Robert Kagan of the Brookings Institution observes, “The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.” He adds, “Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers, and every international order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests.”

Indeed, the liberal order and its guarantors have arrived at a turning point or breaking point: Either they will marshal the means and will to update, strengthen and preserve the existing order, or Beijing will dramatically transform it. Xi’s callous treatment of his own subjects and contempt for international norms offer a glimpse of what his “more reasonable new world order” would look like.

### 1NC---Regs CP

#### The United States federal government should:

#### Expand its Doctrine of Trademark Misuse to ban economically harmful delegation of generic Top-Level Domains by the private sector;

#### Reshape its cyber posture by modernizing the grid, increasing network visibility, increasing information sharing, and implement cross-domain deterrence;

#### Foster a multistake holder process led by the Department of Commerce to identify the most pressing vulnerabilities that need to be remedied;

#### Work with the private sector to launch a global effort to develop and implement solutions to internet related challenges and communicate these proposals with the U.S. Global Connect Initiative; and

#### Expand its collaboration with industry to increase the technical and policy capacity of government officials, businesspeople, tech experts, and civil society activists abroad; including but not limited to increased tuition-free technology courses and training programs.

#### The counterplan PICs out of anti-trust legislation and the FTC and DOJ as enforcers---other agencies’ regulations solve

Lawrence Fullerton et al. 08. Joel M Mitnick, William V Reiss, George C Karamanos and Owen H Smith. Sidley Austin LLP. Vertical Agreements The regulation of distribution practices in 34 jurisdictions worldwide. “United States.” https://www.sidley.com/-/media/files/publications/2008/03/getting-the-deal-through--vertical-agreements-2008/files/view-united-states-chapter/fileattachment/united-states-21.pdf

5 What entity or agency is responsible for enforcing prohibitions on anticompetitive vertical restraints? Do governments or ministers have a role?

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DoJ) are the two federal agencies responsible for the enforcement of federal antitrust laws. The FTC and the DoJ have jurisdiction to investigate many of the same types of conduct, and therefore have adopted a clearance procedure pursuant to which matters are handled by whichever agency has the most expertise in a particular area.

Additionally, other agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Communications Commission, maintain oversight authority over regulated industries pursuant to various federal statutes, and therefore may review vertical restraints for anti-competitive effects.

### 1NC---FTC Trade-Off DA

#### FTC’s increasing enforcement in privacy now---it’s focused on algorithmic bias.

James V. Fazio 21. Special counsel in the Intellectual Property Practice Group at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, with Liisa M. Thomas, 3/11. “What Is FTC’s Course Under Biden?” https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-ftc-s-course-under-biden

The new acting FTC chair, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, recently signaled that the FTC may increase enforcement and penalties in the privacy and data security realm. Slaughter pointed to several areas of focus for the FTC this year, which companies will want to keep in mind: Notifying Consumers About FTC Allegations: Slaughter referred favorably to two recent cases: (1) the Everalbum biometric settlement from earlier this year (which we wrote about at the time); and (2) the Flo Health settlement over alleged deceptive data sharing practices (which we also wrote about at the time). In drawing on these two cases, Slaughter indicated that in future cases the FTC intends to include as part of any settlement a requirement to notify customers of any FTC allegations. This, she said, would allow consumers to “vote with their feet” and help them decide whether to recommend their services to others. FTC Intent to Plead All Relevant Violations: According to Slaughter, another lesson the FTC is taking from the Flo case is to include in the cases it brings all potentially applicable violations of all relevant privacy-related laws. In the Flo case, Slaughter said the FTC should have pleaded a violation of the Health Breach Notification Rule, which requires that vendors of personal health records notify consumers of data breaches. Focus on Ed Tech and COPPA: Given the explosive growth of education technology during COVID-19, the FTC is conducting an industry sweep of the industry. Related to this, the FTC is reviewing its Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act Rule. This goes beyond the refresh the agency did of their FAQs earlier in the pandemic (which we wrote about at the time). For now, Slaughter reminds companies that parental consent is needed before collecting information online from children under the age of 13. Examination of Health Apps: The FTC will take a closer look at health apps, including telehealth and contact tracing apps, as more and more consumers are relying on such apps to manage their health during the pandemic. Overlap Between Competition and Privacy: Slaughter also indicated that it is worth looking at situations where there may be not only privacy concerns, but antitrust as well. Because the FTC has a dual mission (consumer protection and competition) she notes that it has a “structural advantage” over other regulators in that it can look at these issues, especially since -she states- “many of the largest players in digital markets are as powerful as they are because of the breadth of their access to and control over consumer data.” Racial Equality and AI/Biometrics/Geotracking: Slaughter noted that COVID-19 is exacerbating racial inequities. She pointed to the unequal access to technology, as well as algorithmic discrimination (the idea that discrimination offline becomes embedded into algorithmic system logic). The FTC intends to focus on algorithmic discrimination, as well as on the discrimination potentially embedded into facial recognition technologies. (This mirrors concerns that gave rise to the recent Portland facial recognition law, which we recently wrote about). Finally, Slaughter commented on the use of location data to identify characteristics of Black Lives Matter protesters, and said she is concerned about the misuse of location data to track Americans engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Putting it Into Practice: Companies that operate health apps, that are in the education technology space, or that use algorithms or facial recognition tools will want to keep in mind that these are areas of focus for the FTC. And for everyone, keep in mind that the FTC has indicated it will beef up privacy law penalties and will ask for more notification to injured consumers.

#### Antitrust enforcement saps up FTC resources and personnel, which are finite.

Tara L. Reinhart, et al. 21. \*\*Head of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*Steven C. Sunshine, Co-head of Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP’s Antitrust/Competition Group. \*\*David P. Whales, antitrust lawyer with over 25 years of experience in both private and public sectors. \*\*Julia Y. York, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP. \*\*Bre Jordan, associate at Skadden, Arps, Slat, Meagher & Flom LLP focusing on antitrust law. “Lina Khan’s Appointment as FTC Chair Reflects Biden Administration’s Aggressive Stance on Antitrust Enforcement.” 6/18/21. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/06/lina-khans-appointment-as-ftc-chair

Second, like all antitrust enforcers, Ms. Khan and the FTC will face resource constraints. Bringing antitrust litigation is an expensive and laborious process, often requiring millions of dollars for expert fees and a large army of FTC staff attorneys and taking many months or even years to accomplish. Typically, the FTC can only litigate a handful of antitrust matters at a time. It seems likely that Congress will provide more funding to the FTC in the current environment, but even with these extra resources, the FTC will still have to pick its cases carefully and cannot challenge every deal or every instance of alleged unlawful conduct.

#### That trades off with the necessary resources for privacy enforcement.

John O. McGinnis\* and Linda Sun\*\* 20. \*George C. Dix Professor, Northwestern University, and Associate-Designate, Wilmer Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP. “Unifying Antitrust Enforcement for the Digital Age.” Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 20-20. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3669087

The FTC needs more resources to adequately address the nation’s growing privacy concerns. Currently, the FTC oversees both consumer protection—encompassing privacy—and antitrust,249 making the FTC the chief federal agency on privacy policy and enforcement250 and the nation’s de-facto privacy agency.251 The agency has long-standing experience in enforcing privacy statutes252 and also has special privacy assets, such as an internet lab capable of high-quality tech forensics to track invasions of privacy.253 The FTC, however, has failed to keep pace with the massive growth of privacy concerns—a phenomenon also driven by modern technology. Very few Americans feel conﬁdent in the privacy of their information in the digital age.254 According to a 2019 study, over 80% of Americans feel that they have little to no control over the data collected on them by companies and the government.255 To adequately address privacy concerns, the FTC needs more resources.256 The agency has been explicit that it needs more manpower to police tech companies. In requesting increased funding from Congress, FTC Director Joseph Simons said the money would allow the agency to hire additional staff and bring more privacy cases.257 A former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, which houses the privacy unit, has called the FTC “woefully understaffed.”258 As of the spring of 2019, the FTC had only forty employees dedicated to privacy and data security, compared to 500 and 110 employees at comparable agencies in the UK. and Ireland, respectively.259 Without more lawyers, investigators, and technologists, the FTC will be forced to conduct privacy investigations less thoroughly, and in some cases, forgo them altogether.260 Currently, the FT C’s resources are spread thin across multiple missions, to the detriment of its privacy efforts. Removing the agency’s antitrust responsibilities would reallocate resources from the antitrust department to its privacy unit and other areas of consumer protection. Further, it would free up the scarce time of the commissioners to oversee this essential effort.261

#### Unchecked algorithmic bias risks massive inequality and extinction.

Mike Thomas 20. Quoting AI experts including MIT Physics Professors, Senior Features Writer for BuiltIn. THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 7 ways AI can change the world for better ... or worse, Updated: April 20, 2020, <https://builtin.com/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-future>

Klabjan also puts little stock in extreme scenarios — the type involving, say, murderous cyborgs that turn the earth into a smoldering hellscape. He’s much more concerned with machines — war robots, for instance — being fed faulty “incentives” by nefarious humans. As MIT physics professors and leading AI researcher Max Tegmark put it in a 2018 TED Talk, “The real threat from AI isn’t malice, like in silly Hollywood movies, but competence — AI accomplishing goals that just aren’t aligned with ours.” That’s Laird’s take, too. “I definitely don’t see the scenario where something wakes up and decides it wants to take over the world,” he says. “I think that’s science fiction and not the way it’s going to play out.” What Laird worries most about isn’t evil AI, per se, but “evil humans using AI as a sort of false force multiplier” for things like bank robbery and credit card fraud, among many other crimes. And so, while he’s often frustrated with the pace of progress, AI’s slow burn may actually be a blessing. “Time to understand what we’re creating and how we’re going to incorporate it into society,” Laird says, “might be exactly what we need.” But no one knows for sure. “There are several major breakthroughs that have to occur, and those could come very quickly,” Russell said during his Westminster talk. Referencing the rapid transformational effect of nuclear fission (atom splitting) by British physicist Ernest Rutherford in 1917, he added, “It’s very, very hard to predict when these conceptual breakthroughs are going to happen.” But whenever they do, if they do, he emphasized the importance of preparation. That means starting or continuing discussions about the ethical use of A.G.I. and whether it should be regulated. That means working to eliminate data bias, which has a corrupting effect on algorithms and is currently a fat fly in the AI ointment. That means working to invent and augment security measures capable of keeping the technology in check. And it means having the humility to realize that just because we can doesn’t mean we should. “Our situation with technology is complicated, but the big picture is rather simple,” Tegmark said during his TED Talk. “Most AGI researchers expect AGI within decades, and if we just bumble into this unprepared, it will probably be the biggest mistake in human history. It could enable brutal global dictatorship with unprecedented inequality, surveillance, suffering and maybe even human extinction. But if we steer carefully, we could end up in a fantastic future where everybody’s better off—the poor are richer, the rich are richer, everybody’s healthy and free to live out their dreams.”

### 1NC---States CP

#### The 50 states, Washington, D.C., and all relevant territories should prohibit anticompetitive business practices in the delegation of generic Top-Level Domains by the private sector.

#### Solves the aff

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At the federal level, the U.S. antitrust laws—including the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, which governs mergers and acquisitions—are enforced by the FTC and DOJ. States also have antitrust laws, which are enforced by state AGs and are often patterned after their federal analogs, but can contain important differences. States frequently collaborate with the federal antitrust agencies and/or other states on merger investigations. However, the Supreme Court has recognized that states are not required to do so, and have the right to make enforcement decisions that differ from other federal and state authorities.[[3]](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trends-in-state-antitrust-enforcement-42950/#_ftn3) States have sometimes exercised this authority in order to “fill the gap” of perceived under-enforcement at the federal level. For example, in June 2017, the California AG sued to block Valero Energy Partners LP’s acquisition of two petroleum terminals in Northern California, despite the FTC’s decision not to challenge the deal. Several months later, the parties abandoned the transaction. More broadly, in recent years, there has been a growing trend of robust and autonomous state antitrust enforcement, as illustrated by major investigations and enforcement actions by state coalitions in the healthcare, pharmaceutical, telecom, and technology sectors, among others. Consistent with this trend, Colorado AG Phil Weiser—who previously served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ Antitrust Division under the Obama administration—has affirmed his commitment to “protecting all Coloradans from anticompetitive consolidation and practices…whether or not the federal government acts to protect Coloradans.” In keeping with this mandate, the Amendment will bring Colorado increasingly in line with states such as California and New York that have demonstrated an appetite for aggressive, independent antitrust enforcement, even where it may depart (or conflict) with federal action.

### 1NC---Cap K

#### Antitrust is a psyop used to pacify the working class and map competition onto subjectivity

Lebow 19 [David Lebow – Lecturer on Social Studies at Harvard University and lawyer, “Trumpism and the Dialectic of Neoliberal Reason,” Perspectives on Politics 18(2):380-398, doi:10.1017/S1537592719000434]

I. Neoliberal Reason

As Michel Foucault and others have argued, neoliberalism entails far more than an economic doctrine favoring deregulated markets.4 It is a novel form of governmentality—a rationality linked to technologies of power that govern conduct, not just through direct state action but through liberty itself.5 Not isolated to the traditionally demarcated sphere of economics, neoliberal society entails a whole economic-juridical order.

The central program of neoliberal governmentality is the absolute generalization of competition as a universal behavioral norm. Whereas in liberal thought, the root principle of capitalism was exchange of equivalents, for neoliberal reason it is competition entailing inequality. The key result of market processes goes from specialization to selection. The competitive market is the exclusive site of rationality. It processes information, indicated by price, and is the only mechanism of producing knowledge, defined as what is profitably utilizable. Because consumers are free to refuse inferior goods or services, the price mechanism of the market system ensures optimal solutions and maximal satisfaction of preferences.

Liberal capitalism, as Karl Polanyi argued, required the construction of “fictitious” commodities like land and labor.6 These abstract, exchangeable factors of production had to be disembedded from concrete non-market social relations, norms, and values. Instead of merely disembedding commodities, neoliberalism intervenes to make competitive mechanisms regulate every moment and point in society. It strives to build an empire of market choice that invades every domain of life, and deposes all other social, political and solidaristic institutions and values.

Neoliberalism does not allege that markets are natural; competition must be constructed. Rather than endorsing laissez-faire overseen by a night watchman, it stipulates a strong state engaged in permanent vigilance, activity, and intervention to maintain artificial competition. It must not plan outcomes, which would upset the market’s innate rationality, and must be insulated from political disturbances. Economic interventionism leads down the road to serfdom; fascism and unlimited state power are its necessary results. A “minimum of economic interventionism” on the “mechanisms of the market” must be accompanied by “maximum legal interventionism” on the “conditions of the market.”7 Fixed, formal rules make up an economic constitution that inhibits planning, repulses political disruptions, and impartially safeguards competition. The state is the executor of the market and growth is the basis of public legitimacy. Governance depoliticizes public power, promotes ostensibly post-ideological technical problem-solving by experts, and relies on “best-practices” that dissolve the distinction between public and private organization.8

Unlimited generalization of competition yields an enterprise society in which calculations of supply/demand and cost/benefit become the model of all social relations. Neoliberal reason renders homo economicus, based on this model of the enterprise, the exhaustive figuration of human subjectivity. The center of economic thought shifts from labor and processes of production, exchange, and consumption to human capital and rational decision-making under conditions of scarcity. Capital is everything that can generate future income; wages are reconceived as income from capital. Labor is no longer comprehended as a commodity exchanged for a wage, but as a combination of human capital (the worker’s education and abilities) and the income stream it generates. This neoliberal subject is an aggregate of human capital who invests in his own income-generating abilities.

Neoliberalism replaces the invariant identity of the moral person as a rights-bearing citizen with a formally empty receptacle filled up through enterprising choices. It brushes aside models of freedom as self-rule achieved through moral autonomy or popular sovereignty.9 In the neoliberal “democracy of consumers,” individual consumers together constitute the sovereign that monopolizes the issuance of legitimate commands.10 Sovereign will is expressed not through political channels, but by choices in the “plebiscite of prices.”11 Whereas producers have particular interests like protectionism, consumers have a consensual and common interest; all favor the impartial functioning of market processes. In the neoliberal free society, consumers exercise their right to choose in complete independence.

II. From Keynesian State Capitalism to Neoliberal Deregulation

Situating the 2008 crisis in a historical account of American political and economic development clarifies its broader significance. The early twentieth-century Progressives were disdainful of what they took to be the chaos and waste of fin de siècle laissez-faire society. They strove to build a new American state that would replace the structural and rights-based formalisms of the nineteenth century with direct democracy and expert administration. It took the Great Depression and New Deal to bring into full bloom the Progressive commitment to pragmatic rationality. Thereafter, the “policy state” was authorized to pursue designated social goals and develop the means to accomplish them.12 The slew of New Deal innovations included state oversight of labor negotiations, invigorated antitrust, Keynesian countercyclical deficits to stimulate demand and increase purchasing power, an expansive public sector sheltered from the business cycle, aggressive banking regulation, and social insurance. Regulation and redistribution ensured the conditions necessary for an economic system based on capital accumulation, private property, and corporate profit to endure.

To many, the differences between the New Deal and Nazi political economies appeared less significant than their common response to monopoly capitalism. Both erased boundaries between state and society by politicizing the private sphere and authorizing public bureaucracies to rationalize crisis-prone economies. Frankfurt School member Friedrich Pollock suggested that this common “state capitalism” had solved the contradiction between the forces and relations of production, and thus overcome the economy’s crisis tendencies. It seemed to him that management had become merely technical and “nothing essential” had been “left to the laws of the market.”13 Worries abounded that the private law sphere of property and contract was necessary for individual freedom. Despite salient differences between Nazi and New Deal state capitalism, many feared that intervention into society was a waystation to domination. Unease about the specter of American despotism motivated development of mechanisms to ensure that interventionism did not devolve into arbitrary rule.14 Expertise was one justification and limitation of the policy state. Authority could be safely delegated to a new corps of public-spirited administrators because their scientific knowledge would not only make them effective, but also counsel restraint. Enduring misgivings led later to new laws of administrative process. The procedural state was legitimated by its defenders as being a substantively value-neutral and instrumentally rational machine serving goals set by society. Regulatory decision-making was shunted into the abstruse procedures of courtrooms and bureaucracies. Defenders of the state emphasized that its processes of allocating authority were neutral, impartial, and open to all. The balanced accommodation of all interest groups seeking to exercise influence would yield an equilibrium corresponding to the public interest.15

The intermeshing of state and society through interest groups, agencies, and professionalized parties marginalized the public. The sovereign public opinion that Progressives had hoped would rationalize government gave way to the rationality supposedly inherent in processes of public law, public-private negotiation, and regulated markets. The state was endowed with a diffuse legitimacy in exchange for a growing economy, broad distribution, and ongoing household capacity to consume.16 The Keynesian welfare settlement pacified the working class, protecting the market economy from more radical political pressures. Newly available, mass-produced commodities encouraged leveled-down notions of citizenship as welfare clientelism and privatistic consumption. As the state expanded and routinized, the initial politicization of private property relations through public intervention developed into depoliticized economic management by lawyers and social scientists organized by administrative and judicial processes.

#### Capitalist tech developments cause extinction---degrowth solves

Salvador Pueyo 18. 8 Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology, and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona. 10/01/2018. “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence.” Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736.

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not independent. The changing 84 fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration2 85 . More directly, it is argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect 86 production technologies and also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the 87 socioeconomic and ecological context in which it develops. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario. Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current policies on a global level, which urges 93 governments to assume as their main role the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to 94 avoid interfering in their functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast 95 to degrowth views: the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have very undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere. It also 99 suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios is vast, but, if a non-negligible probability is assigned to 104 these two futures, little room is left for either complacency or resignation. 105 106 2. Thought experiment: Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 Neoliberalism is creating a very special breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives 109 to reduce the role of human agency in collective affairs. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans, because markets, 111 he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal 112 policies are actively transferring decisions to markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore, automated governance is a 116 foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology (Plehwe, 2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, most technological development can be expected to take place either in the context of firms or in support of firms3 118 . A number of institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary (Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, firms tend to maximize their growth rates (this principle is related 121 but not identical to the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize profits; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from a mechanism akin to natural selection 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10), (2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making 128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) human mentality 129 and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina oeconomica). 135 Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings (Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). Therefore, economic selection can be generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate retained earnings4 137 RE of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: 138 RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality). F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to 143 governments. 144 Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs among different parameters of 145 Eq. 1. The present thought experiment explores the consequences of economic selection in a 146 scenario in which two sets of constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market 147 dynamics are averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are overcome 148 by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI allowing for extreme technological 149 development also in other fields). The environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that this scenario is not defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by their 151 programmers: The goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings are assumed to 152 emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to capitalistic rules of 153 interaction and, therefore, to economic selection.

#### Vote neg for anti-capitalist commons---collectives should refuse commitments to the competitive principle

Rose 21 [Nick. PhD in Political Ecology from RMIT University. Executive Director of Sustain: The Australian Food Network. From the Cancer Stage of Capitalism to the Political Principle of the Common: The Social Immune Response of “Food as Commons.” Int J Health Policy Manag 2021. 3-31-21. DOI: 10.34172/ijhpm.2021.20 //shree]

Silvia Federici provides a longer historical perspective, noting that ‘commoning is the principle by which human beings have organised their existence for thousands of years;’ and that to ‘speak of the principle of the common’ is to speak ‘not only of small-scale experiments [but] of large-scale social formations that in the past were continent-wide.’87 Hence a commons-based society is neither a utopia or reducible to fringe projects, and the commons have persisted despite the many and continuing enclosures, ‘feeding the radical imagination as well as the bodies of many commoners.’87 Federici acknowledges that commons and practices of commoning are diverse, that many are susceptible to cooptation and many are consistent with the persistence of capitalism; indeed some, such as charities providing social services (including foodbanks) during the years of austerity budgets in the United Kingdom (2010-2015), reinforce and stabilise capitalism.87 What matters to Federici is the character and intentionality of the commons as anti-capitalist, as ‘a means to the creation of an egalitarian and cooperative society…no longer built on a competitive principle, but on the principle of collective solidarity [and commitments] to the creation of collective subjects [and] fostering common interests in every aspect of our lives.’87

Federici’s analysis resonates with the political thought and proposals developed by Dardot and Laval in their 2018 work, ‘On Common: Revolution in the 21st century.’11 For Dardot and Laval, the common is likewise understood as a principle of political struggle, a demand for ‘real democracy’ and a major driving force behind the emerging articulation of a political vision and programme that transcends and overcomes the straitjacket logic of neoliberal ideological hegemony and its ‘policy grammar’ which appears to foreclose all alternatives and lock us forever into a capitalist realism in which ‘it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism.’89 Eschewing Bollier’s ‘triarchy’ of a market/state/ commons coexistence, Dardot and Laval argue for a politics of the common based on an engaged citizenry that directly participates and deliberates in all decisions which impact it, and in the process not merely transforms the institutions responsible for the management of services and allocation of resources, but creates new institutions and new ways of being in the world.11

Dardot and Laval describe this form of politics as ‘instituent praxis’: the common, they argue, is ‘not produced but instituted.’11 This acknowledges the conventional understanding of Ostrom, Bollier and others of ‘the commons’ as residing in the rules – the laws – that a community establishes for the collective management and use of shared resources, but extends it much further and in a more radical direction. The essence of the commons, they argue, is not in the goods per se such as land or a forest or a seed bank ‘held in common,’ but rather in the process of their establishment as well as the ongoing negotiation that will surround their use and governance. Hence, Dardot and Laval distinguish the commons from the ‘rights’ tradition of property, arguing that ‘the commons are above all else matters of institution and government…the use of the commons is inseparable from the right of deciding and governing. The practice that institutes the commons is the practice that maintains them and keeps them alive and takes full responsibility for their conflictuality through the coproduction of rules.’90 To ‘institute’ in this context should not be misunderstood as ‘to institutionalise [or] render official;’ rather it is ‘to recreate with, or on the basis of, what already exists.’ 90 This messy, conflictual and evolving process is what Dardot and Laval insist will ultimately bring about a revolution, not in the form of a violent uprising or insurrection, but rather through the ‘reinstitution of society’ via the transformation of politics and economy from its current state of ‘representative oligarchy’ to full participatory and deliberative democracy.11 Such a vision is premised on a mass politicisation of society; in effect a return of mass popular political contestation and a turn away from the postpolitical era of the neoliberal consumer.91-92

### 1NC---T-Subsets

#### ‘Core antitrust laws’ are economy-wide---the aff is particular

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

#### Prefer it---

#### 1---Limits---sectors are unbounded, permitting any procedural change to all industries

#### 2---Ground---centralizes generics with literature prominence

### 1NC---Delegation CP

#### The United States federal government should delegate antitrust rulemaking authority to a new expert agency. The agency should begin notice-and-comment rulemaking to ban anticompetitive delegation of generic Top-Level Domains by the private sector.

#### Solves the aff---engages in notice-and-comment

Rebecca Haw 11. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2008; M. Phil, Cambridge University, 2005; B.A., Yale University, 2001."Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal." Texas Law Review, vol. 89, no. 6, May 2011, p. 1247-1292. HeinOnline.

Without the informational benefits of expertise and notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court may be a poor choice to define the broad proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Framed this way, the problem has an obvious solution: give the power to interpret the Act to an expert agency.240 This idea has academic support already, 241 and the case for it is strengthened by this Article's observation that the Court has tried to approximate administrative decision making by relying on amicus briefs. The obvious candidates for reallocation are the two existing antitrust agencies: the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division and the FTC.

A. The Agency Solution

Using agencies to give specific meaning to American antitrust's most important statute means avoiding the problems with the Court's current quasi-administrative process for rulemaking. As adjudicators, agency experts would know what kind of economic evidence is necessary for an efficient solution and would be better able to understand it when it is presented by the parties. Repeat exposure to antitrust cases would only reinforce this advantage, while also giving the administrative judges a broader perspective on what kinds of conflicts commonly arise in competition law, a perspective necessary for efficient policy making in the first instance. A Supreme Court Justice hears about one antitrust case a year, hardly the cross section of controversies necessary to make efficient economic policy writ large.

Agencies could take policy making a step further using notice-and-comment rulemaking. Unlike in adjudication, regulation by rulemaking can be initiated without the formal requirements of a case or controversy and a proper appeal to the Supreme Court. Informal letters of complaint could spark an investigation. A rule-making agency could announce its intention to regulate publicly and provide a convenient venue for, or even solicit, expert opinions on the economic impact of the proposed rule. Not only would it have the benefit of these numerous perspectives, but it would also have the obligation to respond to them in a reasoned manner. Its rule would be subject to judicial review, affording an opportunity to catch mistakes 242 or invalidate rules that do nothing but deliver rents to special interests.

Another advantage of rulemaking, an option for agencies but not for the Court, since it only operates through adjudication, is that rulemaking regulates behavior ex ante, while resolution of economic policy through cases is necessarily ex post. Antitrust courts worry obsessively about "chill"--deterring procompetitive behavior with overly broad rules for liability.2 43 In fact, the overruling of Dr. Miles in Leegin implies that the entire twentieth century was a period of inefficient business practices and stunted innovation in distribution because of an early misunderstanding of RPM. Only after a long and expensive period of litigation was Leegin redeemed for breaking the law by effecting a change in the law, and only after Leegin was issued were similar firms, perhaps walking the Colgate line better than Leegin, redeemed for wanting some control over their product's ultimate retail price.24 4 The problem of ex post rulemaking is made worse by the treble damages afforded successful plaintiffs suing under the Sherman Act.2 4 5 To create a new form of liability, the Court has to punish a firm threefold for complying with standing antitrust norms. Thus Supreme Court lawmaking in antitrust is a kind of one-way ratchet.246

The result of the current ex post scheme is that "antitrust law leaves considerable gaps between what is permissible and what is optimal." 2 47 With judges making the rules one case at a time, this gap is justifiable. As discussed above, when judges are not economically sophisticated enough to know where "optimal" lies, 24 8 laissez-faire is a very inexpensive regulatory regime for courts to follow, and raising the level of regulation would effect a kind of taking of property from firms operating under the status quo. So if the Court is making antitrust policy, laissez-faire may be the only sensible approach. But that is not to say that it is the most sensible approach. An agency could provide firms with the necessary clarity-ex ante-that they need when conducting business in a world where competitive behavior so closely resembles anticompetitive conduct. The current state of affairs is that much more is illegal on the books than antitrust lawyers think is actually likely to be struck down in a court.24 9 Lawyers thrive in such a legally uncertain world, but firm efficiency suffers.

#### Key to democracy

Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller 13. Harry First, New York University School of Law. Spencer Weber Waller, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. “Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit”. Fordham Law Review, Volume 81 Issue 5 Article 13. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4890&context=flr

Redressing antitrust’s democracy deficit on the procedural side can be done with the tools of administrative law. Administrative law is the body of law that controls the procedures of governmental decision making.151 It allows interested persons to participate in decisions that affect their interests. Normally, it requires appropriate notice, the right to be heard, fair procedures, protection of fundamental rights, and judicial review of the resulting decision. These basic features are present in the administrative laws of most foreign legal systems and are part of a growing international consensus.152 The tradeoff is that the decisions of administrative agencies that properly follow these strictures normally are granted a degree of deference as to the interpretation of the laws they enforce.153 Frequently, but not inevitably, private parties also have the right to proceed with actions for damages against private parties who violate their regulatory obligations and even against the government itself when it acts unlawfully, either substantively or procedurally. These tools of administrative law are available to make antitrust enforcement decisions more transparent and more responsive to the interests that the antitrust laws were meant to serve, thereby promoting both better decision making and greater democratic legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

Free markets and free people cannot be assured by the efforts of technocrats. Ultimately, both come about through the workings of democratic institutions, respectful of the legislature’s goals and constrained from engaging in arbitrary action. Antitrust has moved too far from democratic institutions and toward technocratic control, in service to a laissez-faire approach to antitrust enforcement. We need to move the needle back. Doing so will strengthen the institutions of antitrust, the market economy, and the democratic branches of government themselves.

#### Solves war

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Despite Churchill’s famous quip—“Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time”2—democracy is seen as a source of both domestic and international flourishing. Democracy, understood roughly for now as a political system with wide suffrage in which power is allocated to officials by popular election, can solve or help solve a host of problems with stunning success. It can solve the problem of revolutionary violence that condemns autocratic regimes, because mass politics can work at the ballot box rather than the streets. It can help solve the problem of famine, because the systems of free public communication and discussion that are essential to democratic politics are the backbone of the markets that have made democratic societies far richer than their competitors. It can help solve the problem of environmental despoliation, which occurs when those operating polluting factories (whether private citizens or the state) do not need to answer for harms visited upon a broad public. And democracy has been famously thought to help solve the problem of war, in the guise of the idea of the “peace amongst democratic nations”—an idea emerging with Immanuel Kant in the Age of Enlightenment and given new energy with the wave of democratization at the end of the twentieth century.

## Internet Adv

#### Aff doesn’t solve---restricted gTLDs are net worse, no monopolization, and competition authorities solve.

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Some critics **oppose** ICANN’s authorization of **closed gTLDs**, claiming they could be **anticompetitive** because closed domain registry operators would have **monopoly control** over generic TLDs of potentially broad appeal. But **this misstates competition** on the **Internet**. But closed gTLDs would **provide** the **most innovative alternatives** — and **strongest competition** — not only to incumbent TLDs like .com, but also today’s most popular domain names. Today’s **market leaders won’t be beat** by simply **copying them**, no matter how much money is spent on ads. New entrants must **offer consumers** something **new and different**. Closing the TLD may sound nefarious, but it gives the registry operator the **incentive** **to invest** not only in marketing the TLD, but also in **innovative new business models** that may **change the paradigm** of how **TLDs function**. The operator of .hotels would **no more “monopolize”** the hotel booking market than the owner of hotels.com does today. But it could turn the **domain name system** into a more **useful** **and accessible** form of navigation, while offering new features like added security or thematic consistency across the TLD.

The **future** of the **domain space** will **inevitably** be **messy and unpredictable** in the best sense. But it is **precisely** that messiness — that **unpredictability**, that constant shifting of basic paradigms — that will **most benefit consumers**. Forcing new gTLDs to **replicate** the **paradigm of .com** will not. There may end up being **legitimate concerns** about particular registries’ abuse of market power, but **such concerns** should be handled by those **best positioned** to evaluate them: national competition authorities. There is **no justification** for ICANN to evaluate TLD applications on the basis of **speculative competition concerns**, as a practical matter conferring on ICANN the ability to enforce a per se rule against closed gTLDs; **competition authorities** are **far more capable** of making **proper determinations** ex post. ICANN should be a coordinator of the domain name space, not the global regulator of the Internet.

#### Multiple alt causes to privatization---the problem is Big Tech, not gTLDs---Emory in yellow.

Marietje **1AC** Schaake 21, International policy director at Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center, “Big Tech is trying to take governments’ policy role,” 1/27/21, https://www.ft.com/content/7f85a5ff-326f-490c-9873-013527c19b8f

Both events demonstrate an ever-growing trend: technology companies think they should be deciding public policy, not governments.

It is not just social media platforms, either. These days, all kinds of businesses set rules for how technology affects people’s lives. Encryption standards, for example, determine the extent of national security. Facial recognition systems deny the right to privacy.

Since all of society is touched by such digitisation, this puts companies in the position of policymakers — but without the governance mandate, independent oversight or checks and balances deemed vital in a democratic process.

In fact, tech groups’ governance powers are encroaching on the role of the state at ever greater speed. Minting digital currencies, verifying digital identities, even building cyberweapons — it is all under the direction of boardrooms, not parliaments.

One consequence of this private sector digitisation is that governments have, in effect, outsourced cyber security and personal data protection to companies — companies that do not always have duties of disclosure.

We witnessed as much in the hacking of SolarWinds’ networking software, to distribute malware. Had it not been for cyber security firm FireEye, we may never have learnt of the intrusions on companies and many US institutions. Software made by the likes of SolarWinds and Microsoft forms the backbone of digital operations globally, yet a decision to forgo proper security safeguards by SolarWinds was taken without anyone noticing. There are too few processes to ensure the public interest is systematically safeguarded.

That is why laws need to be updated fast. This is not about “regulating the internet” but rather about upholding existing principles, such as democracy — online or offline. And it is surely an erosion of democracy when the agency of an elected government is reduced proportionately to the pace with which private companies are empowered.

For technology groups wondering how they can avoid being accused of failing to protect democracy — as social media platforms have of late — there is a simple solution. Before the ink is dry on new rules granting regulatory oversight of digitised processes, such as search algorithms, companies can embrace the rule of law today.

Aligning with democratic and human rights principles can be done now.

The world over, the power of technology companies is becoming ever more apparent. That is why we must not limit our assessment of potential harms to democracy to just social media platforms or search firms. They may be the services that are most visible to internet users, but they are not the only ones in need of scrutiny. The privatisation of governance in the digital world is now a systems problem.

After the US Capitol riots of January 6, there is a growing awareness of the power of companies in providing a platform for the stagers of a coup. It should make us even more wary of that other coup: the privatisation of governance across the digital world.

#### NSFNET makes internet privatization inevitable.

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Had this plan come to fruition, the Internet would have remained under federal control until the late 1990s, potentially allowing time to upgrade security or create regulations to protect users. But before the NREN could get underway, the industry contractors providing the NSFNET infrastructure rushed ahead with plans to offer commercial network services, ultimately causing Congress to abandon the NREN.

The result was the de facto privatization of the Internet. The nonprofit organizations that had operated the NSFNET’s backbone and regional networks reinvented themselves as the first commercial Internet service providers, serving both the NSF and private customers. The NSF now had the option to outsource its networking needs to these commercial providers, which it did as it retired the old NSFNET in 1995. While this removed an administrative burden from the NSF, the hasty transition left little time to consider the policy implications. So a commercialized network developed without public oversight of the Internet’s operation.

Privatization opened the floodgates for new services: social media, gaming, e-commerce, and millions of personal websites and blogs. Industry advocates insisted that the Internet should not be regulated, lest innovation be stifled. Regulatory models that had been developed for common carriers, publishers and broadcasters did not fit a new medium that combined aspects of all these media and whose services and business models were in constant flux. Online businesses were free to experiment with ways to make money, eventually landing on the advertising-based business model that led to escalating surveillance and collection of user data to better target ads.

#### No catastrophic cyberattacks---25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory.

Lewis 20---senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). Lewis, James. 2020. “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. August 17, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe.

A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1 This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often? Some of the explanation for the emphasis on cyber catastrophe is hortatory. When the author of one of the first reports (in the 1990s) to sound the alarm over cyber catastrophe was asked later why he had warned of a cyber Pearl Harbor when it was clear this was not going to happen, his reply was that he hoped to scare people into action. "Catastrophe is nigh; we must act" was possibly a reasonable strategy 22 years ago, but no longer. The resilience of historical events to remain culturally significant must be taken into account for an objective assessment of cyber warfare, and this will require the United States to discard some hypothetical scenarios. The long experience of living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes American thinking and conditions the United States to expect extreme outcomes. American thinking is also shaped by the experience of 9/11, a wrenching attack that caught the United States by surprise. Fears of another 9/11 reinforce the memory of nuclear war in driving the catastrophe trope, but when applied to cyberattack, these scenarios do not track with operational requirements or the nature of opponent strategy and planning. The contours of cyber warfare are emerging, but they are not always what we discuss. Better policy will require greater objectivity.

## Multistake Holder Adv

#### Multistakeholder governance fails – corporate insularity

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Much about the change was uncertain. Some observers portrayed the transition as more ministerial than momentous. Others expressed grave concerns about the effect the change would have on the system’s political stability. Still others were more sanguine, and some were even enthusiastic at the prospect of empowering a new, international, multi-stakeholder organization, beholden to no national government, with authority to manage the network. But all who were engaged in the project were, self-evidently, projecting their best estimation of future events. Most policy decisions are made with such predictive judgments. It makes sense to pause now, as the fifth anniversary of the IANA transition approaches, to take a retrospective look and examine what has gone well with the transition and what has gone poorly. This post is an effort to make such an assessment in as neutral a way as practical. [Full disclosure: For more than eight years, my consulting company, Red Branch Consulting, has had clients with interests in the economic and technical stability of the Domain Name System, and we continue to do so today. In addition, at the time of the IANA transition, I went on record (including in congressional testimony) as one of the more skeptical observers of ICANN. The opinions expressed here are my own, but readers will want to assess the conclusions of this post with that background in mind.] A fair review suggests the following: Concerns about excessive government influence on ICANN have not proved to have been warranted. Conversely, concerns about corporate insularity and the lack of influence on ICANN decision-making by affected stakeholders through the multi-stakeholder process have proved to be well founded. ICANN, as an organization, is increasingly unconstrained by stakeholder influence and review.

#### Antitrust regulation doesn’t keep ICANN accountable.

1ac Szóka et al. 16, Berin Szóka is President of TechFreedom; Brett Schaefer is the is Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs at The Heritage Foundation; Paul Rosenzweig is a Visiting Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and formerly served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of Homeland Security, “ICANN Transition is Premature,” 9/8/16, http://docs.techfreedom.org/TF\_White\_Paper\_IANA\_Transition.pdf

D. Antitrust Litigation Will Be Used to Undermine ICANN

ICANN has always been in an awkward position. It was created to maintain a unified, globally interoperable Internet. Ensuring that domain names work the same way all over the planet is obviously a good thing. But it has also led to claims that ICANN is essentially a cartel. Those concerns have grown significantly as ICANN has become embroiled in fights over expanding the Domain Name space to create new Top Level Domains (TLDs). ICANN’s fundamental power is to decide who gets control over TLDs, both new ones like .CPA and old ones like .COM. As the amount of money at stake has increased overall, and ICANN’s budget exploded, fueled by auctions whose rules are set by ICANN, allegations over anti-competitive conduct abound. For instance, ICANN recently received a whopping $135 million for auctioning off the .WEB TLD.57 Under normal auction rules, the auction proceeds would have been split among all the bidders. But one bidder offered to give the auction proceeds directly to ICANN. ICANN gladly agreed to this windfall — more than its 2016 budget, $113 million, which is itself a staggering budget for an organization that was created to be a humble technical coordinating body. After winning the auction, that bidder was acquired by Verisign, operator of the .COM registry, raising concerns that Verisign had been willing to pay a huge premium for control of .WEB as the clearest threat to its .COM cash cow, and that ICANN was all too willing to play ball. In this and other such future fights, a plaintiff might well argue that ICANN was involved in a conspiracy to fix prices and perpetuate a Verisign monopoly over premium web properties. Despite claims by some, it appears likely that ICANN lost its antitrust immunity as a “state actor” in 2009, when NTIA significantly weakened its policy oversight of the IANA function.58 If so, the Transition wouldn’t change anything — legally: ICANN was subject to antitrust suit in the U.S. before, and will remain so — and could probably have been sued in certain foreign jurisdictions anyway where state actors are subject to suit. Nonetheless, other significant antitrust issues do remain unanswered. And the same basic concern remains: that antitrust litigation could be used strategically by those who want to move Internet governance to the ITU, or to a World ICANN. To start, it’s troubling that the Administration doesn’t seem to have thought through these issues. As a recent Wall Street Journal editorial notes, the Administration was sent a FOIA request regarding “all records relating to legal and policy analysis . . . concerning antitrust issues for [ICANN]” that have been raised about the Transition. The administration replied it had “conducted a thorough search for responsive records within its possession and control and found no records responsive to [that] request.” In response, ICANN’s General Counsel wrote a letter to the WSJ editor reiterating what Commerce said back in 1998, when it created ICANN: "Applicable antitrust law will provide accountability to and protection for the international Internet community." This is an important claim, because those defending the Transition point to antitrust law as one of the key means by which U.S. courts can discipline ICANN, punishing anticompetitive conduct and deterring it from happening in the first place. But it’s not clear how true it really is It’s a difficult question because it requires thinking through not just whether ICANN can be sued in the U.S. (it can) or even whether those suits would succeed, but whether they should succeed. Put differently, might ICANN be able to get away with anticompetitive conduct? Or would antitrust do what it’s supposed to: strike the right balance between over- and under-enforcement, recognizing pro-competitive justifications for what might look anti-competitive, but properly dismissing specious arguments. The most relevant law review article on point explains why ICANN likely lost its state actor immunity back in 2009, when the Affirmation of Commitments defined ICANN’s primary commitment as coordinating “the Internet DNS at the overall level”59— in other words, “greatly relax[ing] DOC’s policy oversight over ICANN.”60 Even if Lepp is right that the Transition won’t change ICANN’s technical legal status, it will at least make it easier for plaintiffs to overcome the state actor immunity defense if ICANN raises it. And that, in turn, will increase the likelihood of lawsuits against ICANN, at least on the margins — simply because lawsuits are expensive to manage and less worth bringing if the chance of getting tossed out is greater. But if you don’t see NTIA and ICANN rushing to cite this article on this point, it’ll be because the main thrust of the article is that ICANN, even without the state actor immunity, will be very difficult to constrain through the antitrust laws — hence the title, “ICANN's Escape from Antitrust Liability.” Lepp explains a number of reasons why U.S. antitrust lawsuits against ICANN would stumble. Most relevant is ICANN’s Byzantine governance structure. While that is, in theory, designed to diffuse influence of particular stakeholders to ensure that ICANN serves the overall community rather than particular interests (good), that structure could just as easily be used to mask such influence (bad). Since U.S. antitrust analysis hinges, in part, on the role of competitors in decision-making, this opacity could be fatal to antitrust plaintiffs — even the ones that have legitimate concerns. Moreover, while ICANN’s General Counsel definitively declared, in this WSJ letter to the editor, that “ICANN is not, and never has been exempted from antitrust laws,” there are major caveats to that claim. Under the same general counsel, ICANN invoked a different argument back in 2012, when it sought to dismiss an antitrust suit61 over failing to put .XXX up for competitive auction, arguing: “ICANN cannot, as a matter of law, be liable under the antitrust laws with respect to the conduct alleged in the Complaint because ICANN does not engage in ‘trade or commerce.’”62 That’s not the same as arguing that ICANN is completely exempt as a state actor, so the two arguments aren’t exactly inconsistent, but ICANN is likely to make this argument in all antitrust suits. To the extent it works, U.S. antitrust law won’t do much to keep ICANN accountable — or deter, let alone punish, anti-competitive behavior.

#### ICANN’s ability to impact human rights is very limited

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The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a non-profit organisation incorporated in California, established in 1998. It is responsible for the stable and secure operation of the Internet. Its work revolves around the management, operation and technical maintenance of the databases concerning both Internet “names” and “numbers”. In none-Internet speak, ICANN functions as the telephone book of the Internet by connecting domain names to their respective Internet protocol (IP) addresses. For example, when you type a URL into your browser, like https://www.article19.org, that is not actually the address of the web server. The domain name system (DNS) allows the translation between the URL and the actual IP address. This is done because people are much better at remembering words than numbers like IP addresses, which look like this: 85.118.235.222. ICANN’s work coordinating the policy making and distribution of domain names and IP numbers has a direct impact on human rights. There are many examples of ICANN’s work impacting on human rights. Think, for instance, about the allocation of generic top level domains (gTLD). Who gets to have the gTLD .amazon? Is it the Brazilian government, through whose territory streams the Amazon River, or is it the Seattle-based company? Or the .gay gTLD? And what about the privacy issues related to the WHOIS database, the ICANN database that keeps record of who registers which domain name and can be queried by anyone? It is clear that ICANN has an impact on human rights through many of its processes and policies. But considering the complicated nature of ICANN, it is often difficult to see where and how these impacts play out. Because of this, the Cross Community Working Party on Human Rights (CCWP-HR) – founded and chaired by ARTICLE 19 – decided to map ICANN and present its findings in this data visualisation. The initial scoping led to the identification of various ICANN policies or processes that might have a human rights impact. These were further analysed to identify various overarching themes, and from these themes seven rights directly involved in the ICANN work were distilled. The purpose of the infographic is to make visible how ICANN impacts human rights, both for the ICANN community and the broader public. One of the main issues hindering new voices – especially civil society voices – from being heard at technical bodies like ICANN is the amount of jargon, technical know-how and understanding needed to participate in the different procedures. With this visualisation we hoped to make ICANN more accessible and understandable for all those interested in the relation between its work and human rights.

#### Current ICANN regulation solves.

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While **ICANN** has so **far resisted** pressure to directly police legal content through its exercise of the IANA function,[[157]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-158) it has **nonetheless encouraged** efforts by other DNS intermediaries to do so[[158]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-159) and has even **instituted policies** **and procedures** that may contractually require registrars and registry operators to censor. Under ICANN’s **New gTLDs Program**, which governs how registry operators may apply to create and manage new top-level domains, third parties can object to any applied-for string, or the manner in which the applicant intends to operate the new top-level domain, as “contrary to **general principles** of **international law** for morality and public order,” or “detriment[al] to a broadly defined community.”[[159]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-160) Objections are reviewed by a panel of independent experts, which may approve or deny the application based on whether the applicant has demonstrated that it will police content under the top-level domain, either by restricting registration or by prohibiting certain forms of content.[[160]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-161) If the applicant is ultimately awarded the new string but fails to substantially enforce any “Public Interest Commitments” it made in its application—which may include commitments to enforce content-based restrictions—third parties can again challenge the delegation and cause **ICANN** to revoke the registry operator’s management of the top-level domain.[[161]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-162) Thus, an expectation of content regulation and mechanisms to enforce it have effectively been built into the structure of the New gTLDs Program, and it may not be long before such policies and procedures are extended to legacy top-level domains, such as the all-important .COM.[[162]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-163)

In the same manner, ICANN has **foisted** potential content **regulation responsibilities** onto registrars through its new Registrar Accreditation Agreement, which requires registrars to “take reasonable and prompt steps to investigate and respond appropriately to any reports of abuse.”[[163]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-164) Unfortunately, the RAA neither defines “abuse” nor prescribes the “reasonable and prompt steps” that registrars must take.[[164]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-165) But simply by forcing registrars to **maintain** such **contacts**, ICANN **increases the likelihood** that registrars will feel compelled to take action against a domain name if members of the public contact the registrar to allege that a given website is “abusive.”[[165]](https://ctlj.colorado.edu/?p=708#post-708-footnote-166) In that event, a registrar could very well conclude that ICANN’s term is **capacious** enough to include the same kinds of objectionable, but legal, behavior catalogued in registrar or registry operator morality clauses.

#### ICT Fails – 5 warrants

Devex, 13. Devex Impact Editor. “The five key challenges in implementing ICT for development.” December 12, 2013. https://www.devex.com/news/the-five-key-challenges-in-implementing-ict-for-development-82499

However, this new potential and opportunity is accompanied by significant challenges and possible threats for large established INGOs.

1. Sustainability and scale

The use of ICT in development programs supported by INGOs has, to date, been relatively ad hoc, with many examples of small initiatives or pilots but very few large-scale, sustainable, ICT-supported programs. To unleash the full potential of ICT in development programs, a new level of collaboration, both internally and with other organizations, and a new approach to scaling solutions to achieve a really material impact are needed. This will necessitate significant coordination between INGOs, technology companies, private sector organizations, universities, and government entities (central and local), as well as with traditional development partners.

2. Lack of knowledge

Many INGOs are not well equipped internally to support and nurture the effective exploitation of ICT to benefit development. They simply do not have the knowledge, expertise, or organizational capacity needed. The use of information technology is often seen as a thorny, problematic issue relating to back office systems. Furthermore, ICT often has a questionable reputation as a result of previous unsuccessful or costly initiatives.

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3. Pace of change

INGOs’ current structures, staffing, and ways of operating have a strong momentum that is not easy to halt or redirect. It is relatively easy to utilize ICT to sustain and improve current organizational constructs and approaches, making useful but incremental progress. It is incredibly difficult to conceive of new ways of working with organizational constructs that are fundamentally different from the status quo and require a shift in terms of strategy, competence, skills, and organizational structure.

4. Funding

There also is a significant challenge in adequately planning and financing the use of ICT in development programs.With cyclical donor funding and pressure to minimize administrative and management costs, it is often difficult for INGOs to properly plan and resource financial and human investments in ICT as a core capacity for development programs.

5. Changing roles and norms

The emergence of new ICT possibilities potentially presents some more fundamental and far-reaching questions, challenging or even undermining the assumptions on which INGOs came into being. When we reflect on why INGOs were originally founded, we can isolate a number of specific gaps between people and communities in poverty and those in more affluent, developed parts of the world. For example, if we think about gaps around understanding and information, traditionally INGOs helped us understand the dire need of communities in the poorest parts of the world. There are also gaps in terms of access, communication, and of course resources that INGOs have historically played an important role in addressing.

# 2NC

## Cap K

#### Development is rapid, opaque, and would cause universal extinction

James Daniel Miller 18. Based at Smith College, South Deerfield, Massachusetts. 10/11/2018. “When Two Existential Risks Are Better than One.” Foresight. Crossref, doi:10.1108/FS-04-2018-0038.

2. The dangers of unfriendly powerful artificial general intelligence Unlike with whatever wetware runs the human brain, it would be relatively easy to make changes to a PAGI’s software. PAGI could even make changes to itself. Such selfmodification could possibly allow PAGI to undergo an intelligence explosion where it figures out how to improve its own intelligence, then, as it gets smarter, it figures out new ways to improve its intelligence. It has been theorized that through recursive self-improvement a PAGI could go from being a bit smarter than humans to becoming a computer superintelligence in a matter of days (Good, 1965; Yudkowsky, 2008). If our understanding of the laws of physics is correct, the universe contains a limited amount of free energy, and this free energy is necessary to do any kind of work and most types of computing. Consequently, it has been theorized that most types of computer superintelligences would have an instrumental goal of gathering as much free energy as possible to further whatever ultimate goals they had (Omohundro, 2008). Humanity’s continued existence uses free energy. Consequently, if a PAGI did not have promoting human welfare as a goal, it would likely see humanity’s continuing existence as rival to its terminal values. A PAGI that wanted to maximize its understanding of, say, chess would further this end by exterminating mankind and using the atoms in our bodies to make chess computing hardware. A PAGI that wanted to maximize the number of paperclips in the universe would likewise kill us, not out of malice, but to align the atoms in our bodies with its objective. The term “paperclip maximizer” has come to mean a PAGI that seeks to use all the resources it can get for an objective that most humans would not consider worthwhile (Arbital Contributors, 2017). A PAGI that was smarter than humans, but not yet smart enough to take over the world, would have an incentive to hide its abilities and intentions from us if it predicted that we would turn the PAGI off if it scared us. Consequently, the PAGI might appear friendly weak, and unambitious right until it launches a surprise devastating attack on us, by taking what has been called a “treacherous turn” (Bostrom, 2014, pp. 116-119).

#### That outweighs on scope

Milan M. Ćirković 19. Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. 01/01/2019. “Space Colonization Remains the Only Long-Term Option for Humanity: A Reply to Torres.” Futures, vol. 105, pp. 166–173.

Perhaps a skeptic wants to believe (as a kind of anti-agent Moulder, of the X-Files’ fame) that extraterrestrial intelligence is nonexistent or vanishingly rare? To begin with, it would be strange to bet the long-term future of humanity on such a technical astrobiological issue, on which we can exert no influence whatsoever. Extraterrestrial life either exists or it does not, irrespectively of any amount of our ethical or political hand-wringing. So, lacking specific information for one or the other, we should certainly make strategies for both options. Further, the advances of astrobiology over the last quarter century offer many reasons for cautious belief in the conclusion that life and intelligence are reasonably abundant in astrophysically and astrochemically permissible ecosystems. Some of the arguments to that effect are summarized in Ćirković (2012).11 Even if, by some quirk of astrobiological evolution, humanity is the first intelligent species to arise in the Milky Way (as, for instance, per the well-known argument of Carter, 1983, 2008), following Torres’s advice and relinquishing space colonization will simply ensure that the second, third, or 275th intelligent species to evolve will indeed colonize the Galaxy instead of humans. If, on the other hand, Torres is wrong and it is possible to colonize the Galaxy in a peaceful and prosperous manner, humanity might survive on Earth in a kind of zoo or preserve, surrounded by friendly and considerate interstellar aliens – but obviously failing to realize its creative potential (which would also count as an existential catastrophe in Bostrom’s taxonomy).12 There is simply no way out of that quandary, unless one is a creationist who believes that humanity originated by Divine supernatural act and there is exactly zero probability of abiogenesis/noogenesis occurring elsewhere. In general, no naturalistic utilitarian calculus of various scenarios for the future of humanity could be complete if it does not take extraterrestrial intelligence into account.

#### 3---Challenging neoliberal mindsets precedes policies---key to alternate visions for global politics

Mathieu Hilgers 13. Laboratory for Contemporary Anthropology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and Centre for Urban and Community Research, Goldsmiths, University of London, [“Embodying neoliberalism: thoughts and responses to critics,” *Social Anthropology*, Vol. 21, No. 1, February 2013, p. 75-89, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

The implementation of neoliberalism goes far beyond the mere appearance of its policies. It cannot be reduced to the application of a programme or to institutional changes. This implementation is deployed within a triangle constituted by policies, institutions and dispositions. This last component has remained at the margins of our debate. If we wish to grasp the depth of the changes that neoliberalism causes, we cannot neglect its effects on systems of dispositions. To analyse this impact, it is necessary to describe the symbolic operations that give rise to government-enabling representations as well as to categories that support neoliberalism and are propagated by it. This task requires accounting for the historicity of the spaces in which policies are put into action, the intentional constructions but also involuntary historical formations in which they become entangled, and the transactions, negotiations, associations, working misunderstandings and chains of translation that give them their flexibility and support their deployment.

Neoliberalism is embodied in the agents and representations through which it is put into action. Through a historical process, the dispositions that it generates become, as Bourdieu would say, durable and transposable, as well as increasingly autonomous from their initial conditions of production. As such, when these conditions disappear or transform, or when policies are modified or abandoned, some of them spread into other social spaces and contexts and take on new meanings. Therein lies the importance of broadening the notion of ‘implementation’, so that we may appreciate the role of culture in the dynamics of neoliberal expansion. It is precisely (but not only) because of the embodiment of neoliberalism emphasized in this paper that at the moment we are nowhere near the end of the neoliberal era. Thus I arrive, by a different path, at the same observation that Kalb (2012) formulated in this debate: today it is capitalism that is in crisis, not neoliberalism.

In some parts of the world, information that helps people to stabilize their perceptions, practices and activities is mainly produced within a neoliberal context, forms and procedures. The figures, statistics, norms, audits and discourses that I evoke in this paper are fashioned by a constellation of institutions; they condition, train and shape a mental and practical space. They impact the way in which one conceives and carries out research. Indeed, academia is not outside of this neoliberal world; on the contrary, it is a centre of development and support for neoliberalism. While many academics are critical of neoliberalism, this does not mean that they have a permanent deconstructionist relation to the world and to themselves. In many parts of academia, a neoliberal way of functioning has become common sense. If neoliberalism is so present in our mind and in the way in which academia is designed and works today, it appears more than necessary for researchers to consider how this shapes their relation to production of knowledge.

If we wish to avoid the eviction of critical perspectives in this time of crisis, if we hope to have some chance to think within but beyond the neoliberal age, if we want to develop alternatives and different horizons, one of the first things to do is to decolonize our mind by objectifying our own neoliberal dispositions. The reflexive return to the tools of analysis is thus ‘not an epistemological scruple but an indispensable pre-condition of scientific knowledge of the object’ (Bourdieu 1984: 94), if we are to prevent the object and its definition from being dictated to the researcher by non-scientific logics, such as the necessity of being visible and marketable in the academy. To achieve a break with neoliberal common sense, anthropologists could follow Bourdieu (2003) in his will to engage in a ‘participant objectivation’.14 It is clearly this kind of objectivation even if not phrased in such terms that has led some researchers to call for a radical change in the academy, supported by new arguments and put into practice through the initiation of a ‘slow science’ movement.15 In some places, academia is still a space of critiques and alternatives.

#### 4---Invert your standard for solvency---“feasibility” concerns are propaganda

McCarraher 19 [Eugene; 11/12/19; Associate Professor of Humanities at Villanova University, PhD in US Cultural and Intellectual History from Rutgers University; The Enchantments of Mammon: How Capitalism Became the Religion of Modernity, p. 15-18]

Words such as “paradise” or “love” or “communion” are certainly absent from our political vernacular, excluded on account of their “utopian” connotations or their lack of steely-eyed “realism.” Although this is a book about the past, I have always kept before me its larger contemporary religious, philosophical, and political implications. The book should make these clear enough; I will only say here that one of my broader intentions is to challenge the canons of “realism,” especially as defined in the “science” of economics. As the master science of desire in advanced capitalist nations, economics and its acolytes define the parameters of our moral and political imaginations, patrolling the boundaries of possibility and censoring any more generous conception of human affairs. Under the regime of neoliberalism, it has been the chief weapon in the arsenal of what David Graeber has characterized as “a war on the imagination,” a relentless assault on our capacity to envision an end to the despotism of money.24 Insistent, in Margaret Thatcher’s ominous ukase, that “there is no alternative” to capitalism, our corporate plutocracy has been busy imposing its own beatific vision on the world: the empire of capital, with an imperial aristocracy enriched by the labor of a fearful, overburdened, and cheerfully servile population of human resources. Every avenue of escape from accumulation and wage servitude must be closed, or better yet, rendered inconceivable; any map of the world that includes utopia must be burned before it can be glanced at. Better to follow Miller’s wisdom: we already inhabit paradise, and we can never make ourselves fit to live in it if we obey the avaricious and punitive sophistry professed in the dismal pseudoscience.

The grotesque ontology of scarcity and money, the tawdry humanism of acquisitiveness and conflict, the reduction of rationality to the mercenary principles of pecuniary reason—this ensemble of falsehoods that comprise the foundation of economics must be resisted and supplanted. Economics must be challenged, not only as a sanction for injustice but also as a specious portrayal of human beings and a fictional account of their history. As a legion of anthropologists and historians have repeatedly demonstrated, economics, in Graeber’s forthright dismissal, has “little to do with anything we observe when we examine how economic life is actually conducted.” From its historically illiterate “myth of barter” to its shabby and degrading claims about human nature, economics is not just a dismal but a fundamentally fraudulent science as well, akin, as Ruskin wrote in Unto This Last, to “alchemy, astrology, witchcraft, and other such popular creeds.”25

Ruskin’s courageous and bracing indictment of economics arose from his Romantic imagination, and this book partakes unashamedly of his sacramental Romanticism. “Imagination” was, to the Romantics, primarily a form of vision, a mode of realism, an insight into the nature of reality that was irreducible to, but not contradictory of, the knowledge provided by scientific investigation. Romantic social criticism did not claim the imprimatur of science as did Marxism and other modern social theories, yet the Romantic lineage of opposition to “disenchantment” and capitalism has proved to be more resilient and humane than Marxism, “progressivism,” or social democracy. Indeed, it is more urgently relevant to a world hurtling ever faster to barbarism and ecological calamity. I wrote this book in part out of a belief that many on the “left” continue to share far too much with their antagonists: an ideology of “progress” defined as unlimited economic growth and technological development, as well as an acceptance of the myth of disenchantment that underwrites the pursuit of such expansion. The Romantic antipathy to capitalism, mechanization, and disenchantment stemmed not from a facile and nostalgic desire to return to the past, but from a view that much of what passed for “progress” was in fact inimical to human flourishing: a specious productivity that required the acceptance of venality, injustice, and despoliation; a technological and organizational efficiency that entailed the industrialization of human beings; and the primacy of the production of goods over the cultivation and nurturance of men and women. This train of iniquities followed inevitably from the chauvinism of what William Blake called “single vision,” a blindness to the enormity of reality that led to a “Babylon builded in the waste.”26

Romantics redefined rather than rejected “realism” and “progress,” drawing on the premodern customs and traditions of peasants, artisans, and artists: craftsmanship, mutual aid, and a conception of property that harkened back to the medieval practices of “the commons.” Whether they believed in some traditional form of religion or translated it into secular idioms of enchantment, such as “art” or “beauty” or “organism,” Romantic anticapitalists tended to favor direct workers’ control of production; the restoration of a human scale in technics and social relations; a sensitivity to the natural world that precluded its reduction to mere instrumental value; and an apotheosis of pleasure in making sometimes referred to as poesis, a union of reason, imagination, and creativity, an ideal of labor as a poetry of everyday life, and a form of human divinity. In work free of alienation and toil, we receive “the reward of creation,” as William Morris described it through a character in News from Nowhere (1890), “the wages that God gets, as people might have said time agone.”27

Rendered gaudy and impoverished by the tyranny of economics and the enchantment of neoliberal capitalism, our sensibilities need replenishment from the sacramental imagination. As Americans begin to experience the initial stages of imperial sclerosis and decline, and as the advanced capitalist world in general discovers the reality of ecological limits, we may find in what Marx called the “prehistory” of our species a perennial and redemptive wisdom. We will not be saved by our money, our weapons, or our technological virtuosity; we might be rescued by the joyful and unprofitable pursuits of love, beauty, and contemplation. No doubt this will all seem foolish to the shamans and magicians of pecuniary enchantment. But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of on Wall Street or in Silicon Valley.

#### 2---Global coop – inequality drives populism, innovation displaces jobs, globalization undercuts accountability – COVID magnifies all.

Milner 21 [Helen V. Milner is the B. C. Forbes Professor of Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where she is also the Director of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. International Studies Quarterly, 10 July 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab056> //shree]

How do Globalization and Democracy Interact?

The delineation of these essential elements of democracy is important because it tells us where to look for problems in the relationship with capitalism. If capitalism makes achieving these elements more difficult or impossible, then the two institutions will clash. Instead of reinforcing one another, they will undermine each other. Hence, one view is that without serious restrictions on capitalism, democracy will be imperiled. On the other hand, some claim that without restrictions on democracy, capitalism could be imperiled. From Marx onward, numerous scholars have claimed that democracy has been limited in order to preserve capitalism. For Marx, the institutions of the state were built to protect capitalism; democracy was just the “dictatorship of the bourgeois” hiding behind a veil. The capitalist state was designed to protect the collective interests of the capitalist class against the working class and against the short-sighted behavior of individual capitalists; thus the state had some autonomy.12 But for Marx and many Marxists, democracy itself was a sham set up to protect capitalism. More recently, Slobodian argues that the entire neoliberal system of international institutions set up since the 1950s has served to protect capitalism against democracy: the entire “neoliberal project focused on designing institutions–not to liberate markets but to encase them, to inoculate capitalism against the threat of democracy” (Slobodian 2018, 2). For many on the left of the political spectrum, capitalism makes democracy impure at best and impossible at worst.

For others from the right, government intervention in the economy even decided democratically can ruin capitalism and thus destroy individual freedom. Laissez-faire doctrine advocated the most limited interference of politics in the matters of the economy. Hayek (1976) among many feared that any government intervention corrupted capitalism and that only the most minimal state was desirable. “The system of private property is the most important guaranty of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not . . . If all the means of production were vested in a single hand, . . . whoever exercises this control has complete power over us” (Hayek 1976, 103). Freedom is the highest goal, but capitalism—not democracy—brings freedom. The protection of private property was necessary for democracy in the first place.13 Economic conservatives such as Hayek decried government intervention in the economy and the creation of large social welfare systems. The balance between unregulated markets and government intervention has long been a central issue in politics. This balance has been changing over time, especially as globalization has spread. Global capitalism seems to have given capitalists a stronger hand relative to either labor or the state (Bates and Lien 1985). Laissez-faire and austerity have gained in prominence as labor unions have shrunk, center left parties have declined, and social welfare spending and redistribution have fallen out of favor (Blyth 2013).

Political Equality and Economic Inequality

As noted above, an essential element of democracy is the idea of political equality. All adult citizens should be treated equally by the state and should have equal political rights. What political equality means may be debated, but citizens do expect some kind of equal treatment by their government. The problem this runs into is the economic inequality generated by capitalism (Piketty 2014).

Economic inequality has increased very substantially within countries across most of the world since the 1990s (Bourguignon 2015). This rise has been especially notable in the advanced industrial countries, particularly the United States and UK. While rates of absolute poverty across the world have plummeted, one particularly contentious issue is whether globalization has fueled the rise in within-country inequalities. For example, the Gini index for income distribution in the United States has worsened steadily from 0.36 in 1970 to 0.41 in 2015 (Lahoti, Jayadev, and Reddy 2016). By 2008, the level of inequality in the United States, as measured by the share of family income for the top 10 percent, had returned to the highest levels recorded in the early twentieth century (Bourguignon 2015, 48). The middle four deciles of the income distribution in the United States saw a similar decline in income share from 1980 (0.46) to 2014 (0.40). However, growth in inequality in Europe has been less pronounced with the income share of the middle four deciles sharply dropping in the UK and more moderately decreasing in Germany and France (Blanchet, Chancel, and Gethin 2019).

While unemployment in the United States has been low, wage growth especially in the middle and low skill occupations has been very limited in the past few decades. “Since 2000, [US] weekly wages have risen 3% (in real terms) among workers in the lowest tenth of the earnings distribution and 4.3% among the lowest quarter. But among people in the top tenth of the distribution, real wages have risen a cumulative 15.7%, . . . nearly five times the usual weekly earnings of the bottom tenth” (Desilver 2018).14 In the United States by 2010, the top 10 percent of the income distribution has received over half of all wage gains during the past 30 years, and the top 1 percent and 0.01 percent had received most of that (Bourguignon 2015, 49). In Europe, slow wage growth has been combined in many countries with high unemployment. In many of the OECD countries, the concentration of wealth, as opposed to income, is even more stark and has grown worse as well. International trade appears to have amplified inequality in developed countries by deepening the high-skill and low skill labor divide (Wood 1994; Ebenstein et al. 2013). Surprisingly, there is some evidence this is happening in the developing world as well (Harrison and Hanson 1999).

The problem is that this period of rising within country inequality corresponds to the period of globalization’s fastest growth. It looks as if, and perhaps is the case that, they are related.15 But the impression is that globalization has benefited a small elite and not the whole society or even the middle class. The majority is losing and this should not happen in a democracy. The sense that the system is rigged and only the rich benefit from openness is pervasive and growing. Anger and resentment are rising in publics as they see only a small segment of society gaining from globalization, and as everyone else becomes a relative loser (Galston 2018).16 The pervasive sense is that elites have captured the political system and opened up the economy to external forces that benefit only the rich and well connected. Inequality also seems to drive support for a main policy advocated by populist parties, that is, for protectionism, thus challenging the foundations of the liberal global order (Lü, Scheve, and Slaughter 2010).

Another issue is that any sense of political equality is hard to sustain when economic inequality is large. If the wealthy have, or are seen to have, special access to political leaders and more influence over elections because of their money, then political equality is undermined. As Przeworski says, “When groups compete for political influence, when money enters politics, economic power gets transformed into political power, and political power in turn becomes instrumental to economic power ....Access of money to politics is the scourge of democracy” (Przeworski 2016, 5). Research suggests that the rich do have more access and influence over politics (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012). As the rich become richer, their influence magnifies, policy diverges more from the median voter’s preferences, and democracy seems less and less legitimate to the average citizen. If globalization is linked to rising inequality, then we may fear for democracy because research shows that democracy does not do well in conditions of high inequality (Boix 2003; Ziblatt 2008).17 Globalization may then indirectly undermine support for democracy as it enables greater economic inequality (Elkjær and Iversen 2020).

It is important to note that the Covid-19 pandemic seems to be increasing inequality as it rages in different countries. High-skill workers have maintained their jobs and avoided the virus by telecommuting. Lower skill workers who are usually paid less have been more likely to lose their jobs and get sick (Davis, Ghent, and Gregory 2021; Deaton 2021). And large firms with abundant capital have expanded as their small rivals are driven out of business by the pandemic closures (Bartik et al. 2020) Capital is being concentrated even more by this plague. It has also increased individual insecurity and reduced social capital as people cannot congregate and socialize.

Creative Destruction and Economic Insecurity

Capitalism is marked by rapid change and technological advances. As many have noted, it is a very dynamic system that incentivizes change, upgrading, and innovation. In the process, however, it destroys the old, the familiar, and the once lucrative. Schumpeter termed this essential dynamic, creative destruction (Schumpeter 1942). There is also evidence that innovations and adoption of new technologies spread in waves over time, sometimes leading to deep and rapid changes (Milner and Solstad 2021). These technological revolutions then produce side effects in social and political life. The first industrial revolution from about 1760 to 1830 saw a spurt of activity around iron and steel, coal, and steam engines (Mokyr 2009). The second industrial revolution from the 1870s to early 1900s again brought a surge in new technologies including railroads, mass assembly, automobiles, telegraph and radio, and electricity (Gordon 2017). Recently we have witnessed another technological revolution, the so-called digital revolution, and it is now having widespread effects. It is not just disruptions to labor markets that matter, but also shocks to information and communications systems, changes in social organization and disruptions of existing institutions. These rapid changes create insecurity for people who are, or believe they will be, negatively affected.18 This personal insecurity is likely to have political ramifications, especially when social protection is weak (Mughan 2007; Margalit 2011; Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger 2013; Rehm 2016).

Capitalism has brought forth many changes in markets, especially in labor markets over time. Old industries die and new ones emerge, but labor and capital are often slow to keep pace with these changes. Boix (2019) argues that first period of globalization in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was accompanied by technological change which generated more jobs than it displaced. This earlier wave of disruption was job inducing, and the new technology then was complementary to labor. The second period of globalization occurring recently is different; the new technologies are job displacing and substitute for labor. These two conditions produce very different politics. Boix (2019), however, still thinks that democracy can persist in this second period, as do others who see democracy as extremely resilient (Iversen and Soskice 2019). But many others are more pessimistic, worrying that the effects of technology now are enhancing inequality and destroying decent jobs (Baldwin 2019).

A primary example has been the rise and fall of manufacturing industries, especially in the advanced industrial countries. Industrial employment as a percentage of the civilian labor force has dropped from 38.8 percent in 1970, 25 percent in 2007, and falling to 18.8 percent in 2016 among the original 23 OECD countries (Armingeon et al. 2019). Offshoring has been a main ingredient in this process, and more recently the development of global value chains across borders has accelerated these changes. This deindustrialization has generated much economic insecurity as higher wage-paying, blue-collar jobs have disappeared with it (Hacker 2008; Milberg and Winkler 2013).

In addition, the new jobs produced have often been inferior to the old ones lost; this inferiority concerns not just wages but also the terms of employment, which have become less secure and more temporary in the so-called gig economy. “Employment precariousness,” or the lack of a “decent job,” is another aspect of this technological revolution (Lorey 2015). “Fixed-term employment contracts, temporary work and part-time work in developed countries, and informal jobs with irregular working hours, low earnings and uncertain futures in developing countries” (Bourguignon 2015, 63), which are the telltale indicators of this precariousness, have grown greatly. “In France, employment precariousness has increased significantly over the last twenty years, from 8% in 1990 to 12% of total employment in the 2000s” (Bourguignon 2015, 63–64). Skill-biased technological change and trade with the developing world have been largely responsible, as they have helped fuel offshoring and global value chains (Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014; Doraszelski and Jaumandreu 2018). Hence, despite the fact that unemployment in many developed countries had fallen to low levels before the pandemic, personal insecurity has been pervasive because wages and working conditions have worsened, especially for lower skilled workers.

Global capitalism produces a double dose of technological change. Capitalism itself is very disruptive, but on a global scale it accelerates this change. Research shows that few countries innovate and that most adopt innovations from elsewhere (Keller 2004). The speed of this adoption varies from country to country and over time, but globally-integrated markets make these changes more rapid and widespread (Mokyr 1994; Taylor 2016; Milner and Solstad 2021). The third technological revolution then also is different because it is probably the fastest and most wide-ranging. It has brought even more economic anxiety and insecurity than past revolutions.

The insecurity generated by capitalism has long been noted. Furthermore, capitalism on a global scale seems to amplify this insecurity since international capital and labor flows may be ever more politically destabilizing (Scheve and Slaughter 2004). Economic crises like the global financial one of 2008–2009, which often are fostered by globalization, exacerbate this insecurity as well. Indeed, the creation of social welfare states was intended to help damp down this anxiety and reduce the frictions associated with economic change and crises. Polanyi (1957) long ago noted that left exposed to unregulated markets, people would turn away from democracy and toward extreme political solutions. The risks and insecurities generated by capitalism needed to be alleviated by social protection. The idea was to “embed” markets in social and political relations by having governments intervene to provide compensation to people affected by market volatility. After World War II, markets for capital and labor flows across borders were regulated as trade was slowly liberalized, and stability and growth with redistribution were paramount for the advanced industrial democracies until the 1980s.

After World War II, embedded liberalism in the Western world was the compromise that arose to make democracy and capitalism compatible (Ruggie 1982). As noted by Lim (2020, 67–68), “Studies of Western democratic countries have found that citizens who are exposed to the risks and uncertainties of global capitalism demand greater social protection from their government (Burgoon 2001; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006; Walter 2010; Margalit 2011). Empirical analyses also have revealed that more open economies tended to have larger public spending to compensate for and insure against the vagaries of an open economy (Garrett 1995; Rodrik 1997, 1998; Rickard 2012; Nooruddin and Rudra 2014).” Others show that technological adoption is faster and acceptance of new technologies is higher when welfare state generosity is greater (Lim 2020). Up to the 1990s, the embedded liberalism compromise seemed to be reconciling democracy and global capitalism.

Embedded liberalism, however, has come under sustained pressure as globalization has advanced. The combination of slowing or declining welfare efforts plus the growth of globalization have increased insecurity and reduced support for people facing it. Scholars have pointed to these changes as being a source of the rise of populism and the extreme right in various countries. Margalit (2011) shows that where job losses from foreign competition were high, incumbent politicians in the United States were more likely to lose and especially so if the job losses were not compensated. Autor et al. (2020) provide evidence that the trade shock from Chinese entry into the WTO led to increasing political polarization in the United States. Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth (2017, 1) demonstrate that “increasing imports (exports) [in a region] are associated with decreasing (increasing) [US] presidential incumbent vote shares.” Colantone and Stanig (2018a,b) provide data showing that support for right-wing, nationalist and populist parties and for Brexit came from areas hardest hit by globalization, in particular trade shocks and immigration. Burgoon (2001) points out that the backlash against globalization is less in areas where social welfare provision is highest. Milner (2018, 2021), on the other hand, argues that in areas with more trade flows support for extreme right parties is stronger and that social welfare provision does not seem to temper this political backlash against globalization any longer. As globalization has proceeded and welfare states have not expanded to match this, personal insecurity has grown and its political consequences are increasingly manifest. As Rodrik (1997) noted, increasing global economic integration produces more public demands on governments for social protection while concurrently undermining their ability to supply these policies because they require considerable public expenditure, which globalization may prevent.

Insecurity can also be a product of the new information technologies today. The gig economy is in part made possible by such technologies. Surveillance technology may make people feel safer, but it may also enable governments to monitor their citizens and create new fears. While social media may enhance accountability pressures, it may also generate confusion and fake news. Many new sources of information have become easily available, often creating political and social problems. There is deep concern that new information technologies have helped disseminate populist political views. Social media in particular can undermine confidence in and the legitimacy of mainstream parties and leaders by transmitting false and damaging views of them (Tucker et al. 2017). International interference to exert political influence may also be easier to accomplish and disguise with these technologies. Creating confusion about what the facts are, disseminating fringe views as if they were credible, and sowing doubt about the validity and legitimacy of key democratic practices like elections are all means for generating greater insecurity and boosting populist support.

Global Interdependence

Deep integration of national economies through trade, capital markets, and immigration poses direct challenges for democracy. Above, I noted the indirect ways that globalization might undermine support for democracy, first by increasing inequality and second by fostering faster technological change. But globalization may also have more direct effects. I discuss three such effects here: increasing economic policy constraints on the government; pushing convergence on economic policy choices; and creating more need for international cooperation and governance. Each of these means that governments have less control over the economy, less room for partisan competition, and less autonomy.

Globalization seems to produce three inter-related processes that might undermine support for democracy. As trade, capital, and labor flows grow in importance, governments become increasingly constrained; governments can always opt out of this but the costs of doing so rise as globalization proceeds. First, globalization can undercut the government’s ability to direct the economy. The government’s policy instruments become more limited and less effective. With an open economy, macroeconomic policy and exchange rate policy become more interdependent and less effective, especially for smaller economies (Frieden and Rogowski 1996; Broz and Frieden 2001). As countries joined the WTO and signed preferential trade agreements, trade policy and investment policy have become more constrained as well. Fiscal policy in an open economy also loses some of its effect as it flows across borders. While some scholars have noted that larger and more developed countries have more room to maneuver (Mosley 2003), others have noted the shrinking field of policy choice and autonomy open to countries (Rodrik 1997, 2011). Policy autonomy and efficacy matter for democracies because the public often judges governments and parties on the basis of economic outcomes (Kosmidis 2018; Duch and Stevenson 2010, 2008). When governments lose the ability to direct the economy, democratic accountability is weakened and so is its legitimacy (Hellwig 2001; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hellwig 2015).

A second process that might undercut democracy is the policy convergence and consensus that has grown with globalization. As governments around the world increasingly liberalized trade and opened their capital markets, policy converged and consensus grew across parties about the value of openness and to some extent deregulation as well as austerity. Differences among left and right centrist parties on their platforms diminished, and publics began to view all mainstream parties as very similar (Sen and Barry 2020; Ward et al. 2015). Globalization may force parties to converge on their economic policies, restricting parties’ ability to differentiate themselves and thus to effectively compete against other parties on economic issues.19 The consensus over economic policies and globalization has left many European Social Democratic parties losing vote share and public support (Mair 2000).

This convergence has created an opening for extreme right and populist parties to generate support.20 As (Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003, 619) points out,“By virtue of their commitment to economic internationalization, the established parties of government are blamed by populists for turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to workers’ legitimate concerns for their job security in an increasingly global, competitive, and volatile labor market. Blaming it on established parties’ commitment to economic globalization, in other words, right-wing populist parties have commonly sought electoral advantage by turning job insecurity into a political issue.” If vigorous party competition along programmatic lines is central to democracy, then globalization may be undermining it. And lack of partisan competition among centrist parties may enable more extreme parties to gain support.

The third element is that globalization has also raised pressure on governments to coordinate their polices to eliminate externalities (Milner 1997). A more open economy implies a greater need to cooperate and coordinate with other countries. The past 30 years have seen many international regimes and institutions created to deal with global problems, all of which have constrained governments even more. The IMF, World Bank, OECD, EU, WTO, regional development banks, and many preferential trade agreements are the major examples of these multilateral economic institutions; each of which produces norms, rules, and procedures that members are expected to follow. They constrain government policy choices domestically; they appear to impose decisions from unelected international elites on the public; and they push all parties who might be in government to adopt similar policies. Many of these have generated popular dissatisfaction and resentment, being seen as undemocratic and as undermining democracy and its legitimacy at home. The EU is a prime example of this complaint about “democratic deficits”; EU decision-making is often seen as too elite- and interest group-driven, and too distant from public preferences (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Mair 2007). Brexit as a vote against international cooperation and extensive coordination is a reflection of this public perception of the EU.

The nationalist backlash that has animated populist parties recently builds off of this anxiety over and distaste toward global governance. The cosmopolitan elites that supposedly direct international institutions are seen as having made bad decisions (e.g., the financial crisis) and as holding preferences far removed from those of the average national voter. Populist leaders thus call for a return to national priorities and a rejection of global cooperation, as the quote from Marine Le Pen at the start of this article illustrates. As Mughan, Bean, and McAllister (2003, 619) points out, “the economic basis of their [populist parties’] appeal [lies] in their rejection of the postwar social democratic consensus. Taking as a starting date the end of the Second World War we can, with a nod to national variations, pick out four elements that have characterised the domestic politics of Western Europe in the ensuing four decades: social democracy, corporatism, the welfare state and Keynesianism. It is on the fertile ground of the foundering of these four pillars that the new (populist) parties have taken root.” Globalization by making international cooperation ever more necessary thus contributes to legitimacy problems for mainstream political parties and may generate public dissatisfaction with their governments and democracy.

#### 4---The rhetoric of preserving competition cements neoliberalism

William Davies 14. Senior Lecturer at Goldsmiths, University of London [“How ‘competitiveness’ became one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture,” *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, May 19, 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-cult-of-competitiveness/]

The years since the banking meltdown of 2008 have witnessed a dawning awareness, that our model of capitalism is not simply producing widening inequality, but is apparently governed by the interests of a tiny minority of the population. The post-crisis period has spawned its own sociological category – ‘the 1%’ – and recently delivered its first work of grand economic theory, in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-first Century, a book dedicated to understanding why inequality keeps on growing.

What seems to be provoking the most outrage right now is not inequality as such, which has, after all, been rising in the UK (give or take Tony Blair’s second term) since 1979, but the sense that the economic game is now being rigged. If we can put our outrage to one side for a second, this poses a couple of questions, for those interested in the sociology of legitimation. Firstly, how did mounting inequality succeed in proving culturally and politically attractive for as long as it did? And secondly, how and why has that model of justification now broken down?

In some ways, the concept of inequality is unhelpful here. There has rarely been a political or business leader who has stood up and publicly said, “society needs more inequality”. And yet, most of the policies and regulations which have driven inequality since the 1970s have been publicly known. Although it is tempting to look back and feel duped by the pre-2008 era, it was relatively clear what was going on, and how it was being justified. But rather than speak in terms of generating more inequality, policy-makers have always favoured another term, which effectively comes to the same thing: competitiveness.

My new book, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Sovereignty, Authority & The Logic of Competition, is an attempt to understand the ways in which political authority has been reconfigured in terms of the promotion of competitiveness. Competitiveness is an interesting concept, and an interesting principle on which to base social and economic institutions. When we view situations as ‘competitions’, we are assuming that participants have some vaguely equal opportunity at the outset. But we are also assuming that they are striving for maximum inequality at the conclusion. To demand ‘competitiveness’ is to demand that people prove themselves relative to one other.

It struck me, when I began my Sociology PhD on which the book is based, that competitiveness had become one of the great unquestioned virtues of contemporary culture, especially in the UK. We celebrate London because it is a competitive world city; we worship sportsmen for having won; we turn on our televisions and watch contestants competitively cooking against each other. In TV shows such as the Dragons Den or sporting contests such as the Premier League, the division between competitive entertainment and capitalism dissolves altogether. Why would it be remotely surprising, to discover that a society in which competitiveness was a supreme moral and cultural virtue, should also be one which generates increasing levels of inequality?

Unless one wants to descend into biological reductionism, the question then has to be posed: how did this state of affairs come about? To answer this, we need to turn firstly to the roots of neoliberal thinking in the 1930s. For Friedrich Hayek in London, the ordoliberals in Freiburg and Henry Simons in Chicago, competition wasn’t just one feature of a market amongst many. It was the fundamental reason why markets were politically desirable, because it conserved the uncertainty of the future. What united all forms of totalitarianism and planning, according to Hayek, was that they refused to tolerate competition. And hence a neoliberal state would be defined first and foremost as one which used its sovereign powers to defend competitive processes, using anti-trust law and other instruments.

One way of understanding neoliberalism, as Foucault has best highlighted, is as the extension of competitive principles into all walks of life, with the force of the state behind them. Sovereign power does not recede, and nor is it replaced by ‘governance’; it is reconfigured in such a way that society becomes a form of ‘game’, which produces winners and losers. My aim in The Limits of Neoliberalism is to understand some of the ways in which this comes about.

In particular, I examine how the Chicago School Law and Economics tradition achieved an overhaul (and drastic shrinkage) in the role of market regulation. And I look at how Michael Porter’s theory of ‘national competitiveness’ led to a new form of policy orientation, as the search for competitive advantage. Both of these processes have their intellectual roots in the post-War period, but achieved significant political influence from the late 1970s onwards. They are, if you like, major components of neoliberalism.

By studying these intellectual traditions, it becomes possible to see how an entire moral and philosophical worldview has developed, which assumes that inequalities are both a fair and an exciting outcome of a capitalist process which is overseen by political authorities. In that respect, the state is a constant accomplice of rising inequality, although corporations, their managers and shareholders, were the obvious beneficiaries. Drawing on the work of Luc Boltanski, I suggest that we need to understand how competition, competitiveness and, ultimately, inequality are rendered justifiable and acceptable – otherwise their sustained presence in public and private life appears simply inexplicable.

And yet, this approach also helps us to understand what exactly has broken down over recent years, which I would argue is the following: At a key moment in the history of neoliberal thought, its advocates shifted from defending markets as competitive arenas amongst many, to viewing society-as-a-whole as one big competitive arena. Under the latter model, there is no distinction between arenas of politics, economics and society. To convert money into political power, or into legal muscle, or into media influence, or into educational advantage, is justifiable, within this more brutal, capitalist model of neoliberalism. The problem that we now know as the ‘1%’ is, as has been argued of America recently, a problem of oligarchy.

Underlying it is the problem that there are no longer any external, separate or higher principles to appeal to, through which oligarchs might be challenged. Legitimate powers need other powers through which their legitimacy can be tested; this is the basic principle on which the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary is based. The same thing holds true with respect to economic power, but this is what has been lost.

Regulators, accountants, tax collectors, lawyers, public institutions, have been drawn into the economic contest, and become available to buy. To use the sort of sporting metaphor much-loved by business leaders; it’s as if the top football team has bought not only the best coaches, physios and facilities, but also bought the referee and the journalists as well. The bodies responsible for judging economic competition have lost all authority, which leaves the dream of ‘meritocracy’ or a ‘level playing field’ (crucial ideals within the neoliberal imaginary) in tatters. Politically speaking, this is as much a failure of legitimation as it is a problem of spiralling material inequality.

The result is a condition that I term ‘contingent neoliberalism’, contingent in the sense that it no longer operates with any spirit of fairness or inclusiveness. The priority is simply to prop it up at all costs. If people are irrational, then nudge them. If banks don’t lend money, then inflate their balance sheets through artificial means. If a currency is no longer taken seriously, political leaders must repeatedly guarantee it as a sovereign priority. If people protest, buy a water canon. This is a system whose own conditions are constantly falling apart, and which governments must do constant repair work on.

#### Turns case---the drive to make companies competitive incents international expansion to escape enforcement

Enfu & Baolin 21 [Cheng Enfu and Lu Baolin. President of the World Association for Political Economy, and Chief Professor at the University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Monthly Review. Monthly Review. 5-1-2021. https://monthlyreview.org/2021/05/01/five-characteristics-of-neoimperialism/]

The Spatial Expansion of the Capital-Labor Relation: Global Value Chains and the Global Labor Arbitrage

Through mechanisms that include outsourcing, setting up subsidiaries, and establishing strategic alliances, multinationals integrate more and more countries and companies into the global production networks they dominate. The reason why capital accumulation can be achieved on this global scale is the existence of a large, low-cost global workforce. According to data from the International Labor Organization, the world’s total workforce grew from 1.9 to 3.1 billion between 1980 and 2007. Of these people, 73 percent were from developing countries, with China and India accounting for 40 percent.21 Multinational corporations are all organized entities, while the global workforce finds it exceedingly difficult to unite effectively and defend its rights. Because of the existence of the global reserve army of labor, capital can use the strategy of divide and conquer to discipline wage workers. Over decades, monopoly capital has shifted the production sectors of developed-world economies to the countries of the Global South, compelling workforces in different areas of the globe to compete with one another for basic living incomes. Through this process, multinationals are able to extort huge imperialist rents from the world’s workers.22 In addition, these giant corporations are well able to lobby and pressure the governments of developing countries to formulate policies that benefit the flow of capital and investment. Trying to secure GDP growth by inducing international capital to invest and set up factories, many developing country governments not only ignore the protection of social welfare and labor rights, but also guarantee various preferential measures such as tax concessions and credit support. The globalization of production has thus enabled the developed capitalist countries to exploit the less developed world in a more “civil” fashion under the slogan of fair trade. In order to launch their modernization, developing countries often have little choice but to accept the capital offered by the imperialists—along with the conditions and encumbrances that go with it.

#### 5---Technology inculcates a business ethic under capitalism that absorbs the accumulation of skill into capital – innovation becomes a method of social discipline and fracture along class lines.

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Marx pinpoints the fallacy of technology, even on its own terms. At first glance, new technology and machinery seem to raise productivity. By deploying new technology capitalists can gain an edge over competitors. Yet those effects are usually short-lived, lasting only until a competitor reciprocates. But there’s mystification here, too, because machinery, says Marx, while entering into the whole of the labour process, “enters only piece by piece into the process of valorisation. It never adds more value than it loses, on average, by depreciation.” Like every other component of “constant capital,” machinery creates no new value. Constant capital, Marx explains, is the part of capital turned into means of production, into the raw material and instruments of labour, into the machinery and auxiliary inputs that “don’t undergo any quantitative alteration of value in the process of production.”

Adopting new technology is a costly and risky business for any capitalist, invariably an upheaval that involves the destruction of old constant and fixed capital, the ripping out of archaic machinery, the transformation of former warehousing, casting everything past aside, into the dustbin of history, throwing in one’s lot with new devices, with new instruments of labour. It’s one reason why capitalists get twitchy when expensive machinery lies idle, isn’t functioning to maximum capacity. They want it operational day and night, without interruption, thrashing out productivity, maybe not realising that diminishing returns are already setting in.[2]

Marx suggests deterioration of machinery takes three forms. One arises from use, or rather from over-use, a piece of machinery that wears out just as coins wear out through being in active circulation. Another sort of deterioration is the flip side, that caused by lack of use, “as a sword rusts when left in its scabbard.” In addition to wear and tear or rusting up, Marx says machinery can undergo a third type of depreciation, more common under capitalism. And it’s nothing physical, not initially; more a conscious boardroom decision. Marx uses an odd term to describe it: “moral depreciation.” Here, he says, a means of production “loses exchange-value, either because machines of the same sort are being produced more cheaply than it was, or because better machines are entering into competition with it.”

Almost every aspect of deindustrialisation since the 1970s stems from moral depreciation. The rusted up machinery, the broken windows of the redundant town plant, the rats gnawing away inside the warehouses, the weeds pushing through the concrete forecourts, the forlorn sense of abandonment we’ve seen everywhere in the old manufacturing heartlands of Europe and America—rarely has any of it had anything to do with under- or over-use. It’s been a very capitalist morality play, the explicit devaluation of the means of production because those means of production weren’t valorising enough. Moral depreciation frequently means revaluation through relocation, since the value embodied in old constant and fixed capital can’t be rebooted without being destroyed. All that is solid melts into air.[3]

Innovation becomes compulsive for any competitive capitalist, the perpetual yearning to out-do a rival, to break a rival, to monopolise a market. Science is complicit in gaining this edge, in the technological expediency of production. Marx, accordingly, casts a justly skeptical eye over the institution of science, recognising its ability to promote life while knowing it is also a darker, Faustian force, yet-another element incorporated into the competitive process. In the Grundrisse, the raw notebooks eventually distilled into Capital, Marx notes how “the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain is thus absorbed into capital.” In Capital, footnote 23 of chapter 15, he says that, “generally speaking, science costs the capitalist nothing, a fact that by no means prevents him from exploiting it. ‘Alien’ science is incorporated by capital just as ‘alien’ labour is.” Production blossoms through the technological application of science, driving productivity onwards, yet ushering in moral depreciation around some not too distant corner.

Many of Marx’s visions of science in cahoots with industry have been wildly surpassed. Once upon a time, industry had its own “in-house” Research & Development (R&D) arm; now, it has universities, its off-site R&D arm. University science is little more than a hand-maiden for big corporate business. Indeed, universities are themselves big corporate businesses and university research an external department of industry. Biotech, software and pharmaceutical enterprises now cluster in and around major university campuses almost everywhere, blurring the boundary between scientific endeavour and capitalist commerce. The two are synonymous and the symbiosis is rarely questioned. It’s just as Marx thought: “Invention becomes a branch of business, and the application of science to immediate production aims at determining the inventions at the same time as it solicits them.”

Yet the business of science goes much further and much deeper than the university. It percolates through the whole fabric of our society, bringing a new kind of business ethic into our lives, especially into our cities, which now seem to be neo-capitalist factories for valorisation. Technology might have once powered the assembly line, and in scattered global cases still does; but more widespread is its engineering of the “science of cities,” with its own “unvarying regularity of the complex automaton.” In the old factory, the capitalist formulated an autocratic power over workers; now, in cities, technology becomes the new overseer, helping keep cities as profitable as possible, filling in the financial pores not only of time but also of space, of exploitable urban space.

This new science of cities sees “smart” techno-cities as bright and fresh, as vast isotropic planes and seamless webs of connectivity, where objects and entities circulate in a smooth, frictionless space, and where information flows and business flourishes. Such paradigms of urban life have been most energetically endorsed by big mainframe techie companies, like Cisco Systems and IBM, as well as by engineering and consultancy giants such as AECOM and McKinsey. Their unanimous mission is to embed wireless broadband and computerised sensors into urban infrastructure everywhere.

Every piece of street furniture, from lampposts and traffic lights, to bike racks and domestic appliances and home heating systems will comprise the “Internet of Things,” a global business niche said to be worth around 1.7 trillion dollars. Every credit card transactions, GPS usage, city street plan, subway and bus schedule, traffic flow pattern, graph of land and property prices, census tract, electricity consumption, etc., etc.—all this and much more can be fed into a model out of which algorithmic averages emerge, calculating our future “optimal” city, how best it should be organised and governed. Though by whom rarely gets a mention. Meanwhile, the enormous information database that ensues will be monetised by private capital in what may well be the most innovative development yet to extract relative surplus-value from the totality of daily life.

All this might be a new testing ground for Marx’s ideas around technology and science, the context in which we should perhaps update him, reread him, think through some of his ideas. Nevertheless, there’s one basic theme that remains timeless: Technology, in its capitalist guise, always has been, always will be, an innovative method to discipline working people. It quite fundamentally revolutionises the agency through which the capital relation is formally mediated, Marx says. Its deployment creates fear and division amongst workers, boosts production through bloating needless consumption. Conflict and dissent don’t figure within its algorithms, either, nor do democratic debates about its implementation. Technology pleads innocence, time-served at masking the social power lying behind its control and manipulation.

#### 1---Ag collapse---it’s short-term

Allinson et al ‘21 [Jamie Allinson is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at Edinburgh University and author of The Age of Counter-revolution. China Miéville is the author of a number of highly acclaimed and prize-winning novels including October: The History of the Russian Revolution. Richard Seymour is the author of numerous works of non-fiction, His writing appears in the New York Times, London Review of Books, Guardian, Prospect, Jacobin. Rosie Warren is an Editor at Verso and the Editor-in-Chief of Salvage. All are writing for the Salvage Collective. “The Tragedy of the Worker: Toward the Proletarocene.” Chapter 1: M-C-M’ and the Death Cult. July 2021. Verso EBook. ISBN: 9781839762963 //shree]

The Triassic-Permian ‘great dying’ was a megaphase change taking place through pulses lasting for tens of thousands of years, separated by interludes of hundreds of thousands of years, if not millions. The current mass extinction event is a megaphase change taking place in microphase time.

Mass extinction is punctuated by the production of what the environmentalist Jonathan Lymbery calls ‘dead zones’: the conversion of wild ecosystems into dead monocultures. In Sumatra, these dead zones are made by burning rainforest and, amid the stench of death, planting palm crop. The palm oil is used in foods and household items, while the nut is used in animal feed. It is secured with barbed wire, and treated with poison, to prevent the crop from being eaten. Surviving animal life, and surrounding human communities, are pushed to the edges, to the brink of extinction. Agricultural workers are abused, underpaid, even enslaved. This is an example of what Moore would call ‘cheap food’, where the ‘value composition’ of the goods, the amount of waged labour necessary to produce each item is ‘below the systemwide average for all commodities’. In this case, a ‘cheap nature’ is produced by a distinctly capitalist form of territorialisation, wherein forestry is converted through deforestation into palm monoculture, while ‘cheap labour’ is secured partly through the dispossession of neighbouring human communities. More calories with less socially-necessary labour-time is cheap food.

Cheap is not, of course, the same thing as efficient. Food production is, alongside fuel, a fulcrum of the capitalist organisation of work-energetics. It is one that, as with fossil fuels, wastes an incredible amount of the energy it extracts. According to the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), 30 per cent of cereals grown for human and animal consumption are wasted, along with almost half of all root crops, fruits and vegetables. To conclude from this grotesque squander that a ‘more efficient’ capitalism would ‘solve the problem’ of ‘the environment’ would be to fail to understand waste, capitalism and ecology: that the first is intrinsic to the second; that the second, whatever the degree to which it is inflected by the first, is inimical to the third.

Capitalism also directly undermines its own productivity, precisely through its industrially-produced biospheric destruction. According to the UN, for example, there are at most sixty harvests remaining before the world’s soils are too exhausted to feed the planet. This edaphic impoverishment is a product, not a byproduct. It is the predictable, and long-predicted, consequence of intensive agriculture, over-grazing and the destruction of natural features (such as trees) that prevent erosion. Likewise, the death-drop of insect biomass, the decline of pollinating bees, are hastened by the extensive use of pesticides and fertilisers. Capitalist food production can only evade the problem – a problem, in its terms, of accumulation – either by establishing new ‘cheap natures’ through such means as deforestation, or by extracting rent from competitor producers through such means as intellectual property rights. For instance, since 1994’s notorious TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), through the rules of UPOV (Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties), particularly the notorious UPOV 1991, and in the face of local fightbacks from Guatemala to Ghana, the World Trade Organisation has enforced property agreements outlawing the saving of seeds from one season to the next, thus sharply raising costs for farmers producing 70 per cent of the global food supply.

#### 2---Carbon bubble and peak oil

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The Carbon Tracker Initiative, a London-based think tank serving the energy industry, reports that the steep decline in the price of generating solar and wind energy “will inevitably lead to trillions of dollars of stranded assets across the corporate sector and hit petro-states that fail to reinvent themselves,” while “putting trillions at risk for unsavvy investors oblivious to the speed of the unfolding energy transition.”19 “Stranded assets” are all the fossil fuels that will remain in the ground because of falling demand as well as the abandonment of pipelines, ocean platforms, storage facilities, energy generation plants, backup power plants, petrochemical processing facilities, and industries tightly coupled to the fossil fuel culture.

Behind the scenes, a seismic struggle is taking place as four of the principal sectors responsible for global warming—the Information and Communications Technology (ICT)/telecommunications sector, the power and electric utility sector, the mobility and logistics sector, and the buildings sector—are beginning to decouple from the fossil fuel industry in favor of adopting the cheaper new green energies. The result is that within the fossil fuel industry, “around $100 trillion of assets could be ‘carbon stranded.’”20

The carbon bubble is the largest economic bubble in history. And studies and reports over the past twenty-four months—from within the global financial community, the insurance sector, global trade organizations, national governments, and many of the leading consulting agencies in the energy industry, the transportation sector, and the real estate sector—suggest that the imminent collapse of the fossil fuel industrial civilization could occur sometime between 2023 and 2030, as key sectors decouple from fossil fuels and rely on ever-cheaper solar, wind, and other renewable energies and accompanying zero-carbon technologies.21 The United States, currently the leading oil-producing nation, will be caught in the crosshairs between the plummeting price of solar and wind and the fallout from peak oil demand and accumulating stranded assets in the oil industry.22

#### 3---Resources---they’re finite and no substitutes

Jackson and Webster, 16—Professor of Sustainable Development and director of the Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity at the University of Surrey AND former policy analyst at Carbon Brief, masters from University College London in conservation and a degree in biology (Tim and Robin, “LIMITS REVISITED,” <http://limits2growth.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Jackson-and-Webster-2016-Limits-Revisited.pdf>)

What does this all mean for the future of our economy? In the standard run scenario, natural resources (for example oil, iron and chromium) become harder and harder to obtain. The diversion of more and more capital to extracting them leaves less for investment in industry, leading to industrial decline starting in about 2015. Around 2030, the world population peaks and begins to decrease as the death rate is driven upwards by lack of food and health services.21

The similarity between Limits to Growth’s standard run and the patterns observed over the last forty years doesn’t necessarily mean that the same trends will continue into the future. Some researchers argue that it’s possible, however. Author of the University of Melbourne studies, Dr Graham Turner, asked in 2014 whether global collapse could be “imminent”. Turner explicitly linked the global financial crisis, high commodity prices and the Limits to Growth projections.22

Another set of studies has modelled the availability of over 40 essential materials using an updated and expanded version of the Limits to Growth model. Based on US Geological Survey data, the authors analysed changing patterns of resource extraction. Using earlier work, which suggests there is a time delay of about 40 years between ‘peak discovery’ and ‘peak production’ across a wide range of different minerals, the authors aim to forecast when ‘peak production’ might arrive.

The work, led by Harald Sverdrup from the University of Lund in Sweden and Vala Ragnarsdottír from the University of Iceland, concluded that most of the resources they studied had either already reached peak production or will do so within the next 50 years.23 Phosphorous - which is critical to fertilising soil and sustaining agriculture - has already peaked, and will start declining around 2030- 2040, they said. Coal production will peak in around 2015-20 and ‘peak energy’ around the same period. From that point on, they concluded, “we will no longer be able to take natural-resource fuelled global GDP growth for granted’.24

A book published by the Club of Rome in 2014 also examined the future availability of a wide variety of mined resources, including chromium, copper, tin, lithium, coal oil and gas. The book included specialist contributions from experts across a wide range of fields. It concluded that the rate of production of many mineral commodities is already on the verge of decline.25

These analyses are understandably controversial. In a technologically optimistic world, it is often assumed that enough food, water energy and minerals will be available for the foreseeable future, with the only problems being those of distribution.26 Neo-classical economists also argue that when one resource runs out it can be substituted for another. But this is also controversial. In the case of some key elements (phosphorus is an example), there are no known substitutes.27

#### 4---Speculation---this time there are no fixes

Nick Beams 21. Member of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site and former longtime national secretary of the Socialist Equality Party in Australia. "Rampant Wall Street speculation: The fever chart of a terminally diseased system." World Socialist Web Site. 5-6-2021. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/05/07/pers-m07.html

Over the past year, the global financial system, above all Wall Street, has been in the grip of a speculative mania, the like of which has never been seen before in economic history. Two questions therefore immediately arise: how has this situation come about and what are its implications?

In March 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic began to make its effects felt and workers undertook wildcat strikes and walkouts to demand health measures to protect their lives and those of their families, the financial markets plunged.

Wall Street was concerned that any effective health measures to contain the spread of the pandemic would result in a collapse in the bloated price of financial assets, above all stocks, that had been boosted by the trillions of dollars poured into the financial system by the US Federal Reserve and other central banks following the crash of 2008.

The US government and the Fed rode once again to the rescue of Wall Street. The Trump administration organised a multi-billion-dollar bailout of the corporations under the CARES Act while the Fed stepped in to provide trillions of dollars of support for all areas of the financial system, including for the first time the purchase of stocks.

Since then, on the back of this $4 trillion intervention and rising, as the Fed continues to purchase financial assets at the rate of more than $1.4 trillion a year, the world has seen an unprecedented orgy of financial speculation.

Wall Street’s main stock index, the S&P 500, has risen by some 88 percent since its March 2020 lows, reaching record highs on multiple occasions throughout the past year. Margin debt, used to finance the speculation in shares, has reached record levels, and the yield on the lowest-rated corporate junk bonds—barely one step away from default—has fallen to historic lows.

But the most egregious expression of the speculation has been the rise of the cryptocurrency market. Over the past year the most prominent cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, has risen by 600 percent, rising from about $7,000 per bitcoin to $54,000, reaching a high of $65,000 in the middle of last month.

Last month Coinbase, a trading exchange for cryptocurrencies, launched itself on Wall Street with a floatation that put its market value at $85 billion, compared to its valuation of $8 billion in 2018, exceeding that of some of the world’s major banks and the valuation of the NASDAQ exchange on which it was launched.

However, in recent days, even the level of bitcoin speculation has been put in the shade by another cryptocurrency, Dogecoin.

It was created in 2013 as a joke. Whereas the promoters of Bitcoin insist that it has some intrinsic value because it may be used to organise financial transactions without the intervention of a bank or some other third party via a blockchain ledger system, no such claims are made for Dogecoin.

Despite being worthless, Dogecoin has risen in price 11,000 percent this year alone. This week its market value reached $87 billion compared to $315 million a year ago. And as one cryptocurrency enjoys a rapid rise, speculators start a search for the next “big thing.”

The Dogecoin phenomenon is not an isolated event. It seems to be an expression of what could be described as a new operating principle in the world of speculation—the more worthless the so-called asset, the higher its price.

A little sandwich shop in Paulsboro, New Jersey, with sales of just $13,976, has made financial news after it was revealed that its parent company, Hometown International, achieved a market valuation of $100 million last month. Two of its biggest shareholders are Duke and Vanderbilt universities.

The rise of Dogecoin also reveals the high-level intervention of hedge funds and other financial institutions seeking to take advantage of its price momentum.

Then there is the case of non-fungible tokens (NFTs). These are images of pieces of art, a sports photo, or even a tweet—the first ever tweet issued by Twitter founder Jack Dorsey was sold as an NFT for $2.9 million—that are stored on a blockchain ledger. They are like a collector’s item but are not stored physically but digitally.

The class dynamics of this speculative orgy, fuelled by the endless supply of virtually free money by the Fed, are revealed in the escalation of the wealth of the world’s billionaires.

In the last year, as COVID-19 brought untold pain, suffering and economic distress for billions of the world’s people, the combined wealth of the global billionaires rose by 60 percent, from $8 trillion to $13.1 trillion. The number of billionaires rose by 660 to 2,775—the highest rate of increase and the largest number ever.

In the US, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos and Tesla CEO Elon Musk have wealth of $177 billion and $151 billion respectively.

The speculative frenzy has extended into the broader economy. The prices of major industrial commodities, such as steel, lumber, copper, and soybeans, which feed into inflation for workers and consumers, are rapidly rising.

But the financial authorities, having created this frenzy by the endless outflow of cheap money since the crash of 2008 and the near collapse of March 2020, are caught in a trap of their own making. They fear that any move to try to bring it under control, with even a slight tightening of the financial spigots, will set off a financial crisis.

The extreme nervousness over such an outcome was revealed earlier this week when US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, a former Fed chief, raised the prospect that the central bank may have to tighten interest rates at some point. Almost immediately, fearing market reaction, she walked back the comment saying she was neither advocating nor predicting a rise in rates.

The incident has cast a revealing light on one of the most significant developments in the US—the open advocacy of unionisation of the workforce by the Biden administration.

Last month in an executive order, Biden created a “White House Task Force on Worker Organizing and Empowerment” which includes as members Yellen, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. The “empowerment” of government-sponsored unions takes place under the direction of cabinet officials responsible for military operations, economic policy and domestic repression.

The administration is fearful that the pent-up anger in the working class over the pandemic and the enrichment of the financial oligarchy at the expense of hundreds of thousands of lives, will be further fuelled by the escalation of inflation, leading to an uncontrolled eruption of the class struggle that will come into headlong conflict with the institutions of the capitalist state.

In times past, the Fed would have moved to contain such an upsurge by lifting interest rates and inducing a recession. But that road is now fraught with danger because even a relatively small increase threatens to bring down the speculative financial house of cards.

Hence the Biden administration has moved to set up a state-sponsored industrial police force, based on the trade unions, to carry out an organised suppression of the working class in the interests of finance capital.

The rampant speculation of the past year and the accelerated siphoning of wealth to the upper levels of society amid death and economic devastation must be the occasion for the drawing up by the working class of a balance sheet of the experiences through which it has passed.

There is no prospect for reform of the present capitalist socio-economic order towards meeting social need—the illusion peddled by the Democrats and their ardent supporters in the pseudo-left organisations. The past year has demonstrated that everything in society—including the very right to life itself—is subordinated to the insatiable demands of finance capital.

The present speculative bubble, like all others before it, is destined to burst. The financial oligarchs have already prepared their exit plans and golden parachutes as they have done in the past. The working class, however, has no escape. The collapse will bring an even greater economic disaster on top of what has already taken place.

The only viable, realistic solution to the terminal disease that has gripped the capitalist socio-economic order is the fight for a socialist program to wrest the commanding heights of the economy and its financial system out of the hands of the present-day ruling class and begin the economic reconstruction of society to meet social needs.

#### 1---Too small, failed tests, funneled money to petro-capital

Black 21 [Emma, Educational Background in continental philosophy and is a member of Socialist Alternative. Capitalism’s fake solutions to the climate crisis. 5-23-2021. https://redflag.org.au/article/capitalisms-fake-solutions-climate-crisis]

While the disappearance of the outright climate denialism of the Trump era might seem cause for celebration, the new trend for spruiking the magical power of technology to solve the climate crisis is cause for serious concern. When you look beyond the headline-grabbing announcements of increased long-term ambition, the Earth Day summit amounted to little more than another case of government greenwashing of the business as usual of fossil-fuelled capitalism.

Instead of detailing the changes to be made in the here and now to reduce emissions, Biden and other world leaders instead promoted faith in the capacity of science and technology to come to the rescue at an indeterminate point in the future.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison was among them. While the media highlighted the supposed gulf between a progressive, “green” Biden and the conservative, fossil-fuel-loving Morrison, they both promoted the same faith in the powers of technology. Like Biden, Morrison has vowed to invest tens of billions of dollars in developing carbon capture and storage technologies, “clean” hydrogen, “blue” carbon and “green” steel—among other colourful innovations.

In May’s federal budget, the Coalition allocated more than half a billion dollars to developing the first two of these technologies—$263.7 million for carbon capture and storage (CCS) and $275.5 million for “clean” hydrogen.

CCS mostly involves capturing C02 emissions at their source—in mines, power stations and so on—and pumping them deep underground (so the theory goes) to be permanently stored in appropriately porous and stable rock formations. But despite politicians and business leaders spruiking CCS as an easy fix for the climate crisis for decades, it has never been shown to work on anything near the scale required.

Australia already boasts the world’s largest, supposedly functional, CCS facility at Chevron’s Gorgon gas project in Western Australia. However, according to the Climate Council, “the Gorgon CCS trial has been a big, expensive failure ... capturing less than half the emissions needed to make CCS viable”. In what is only the latest in a series of problems since it became operational in 2019, Michael Mazengarb reported in Renew Economy earlier this year that pumping equipment required to clear water from the undersea formation into which the C02 is to be injected had become clogged with sand.

However, while CCS may be useless for addressing climate change, it remains an extremely useful political tool for the government—providing it with green cover while it continues to funnel money to Coalition supporters in the coal and gas industries. And of course, it’s also useful for those companies on the receiving end of the government’s “green” largesse.

Bernard Keane was right in his assessment of it as a scam in Crikey. “Fossil fuel interests”, he wrote in 2019, “sense the opportunity to extract some taxpayer funding from a government worried it might have to pretend it believes in climate change”. With this year’s budget, they hit the jackpot.

But if CCS is a scam, what about “clean” hydrogen? In his speech to the Earth Day summit, Morrison vowed to rival US innovation by investing billions in high-tech “hydrogen valleys”. “In the United States you have the Silicon Valley”, he said. “Here in Australia we are creating our own ‘Hydrogen Valleys’, where we will transform our transport industries, our mining and resource sectors, our manufacturing, our fuel and energy production.”

Hydrogen is potentially a clean energy source, but only if it’s produced using renewable energy. And to be produced at the scale required to transform the economy in the way Morrison is implying would require a lot of electricity.

In his recent contribution to the Quarterly Essay, Australia’s former chief scientist, Alan Finkel, calculates that to produce the equivalent volume of hydrogen to what Australia currently exports in liquefied natural gas would require “approximately 2,200 terawatt-hours” of electricity. This, Finkel notes, “is about eight times Australia’s total electricity generation in 2019”.

If Morrison genuinely believes the “hydrogen boom” he envisages will be based on production of renewable energy on that kind of scale, the government would have provided increased funding for renewables in the budget. None was forthcoming.

The reality is that Morrison sees the talk of “hydrogen valleys” as a way of greenwashing the same old “gas-fired recovery” he was promoting last year. The government doesn’t envisage producing hydrogen with electricity from renewables, but rather from gas. The focus on CCS gives the game away. The “hydrogen valleys” of the future will be criss-crossed with pipelines and peppered with gas-fired power stations with (we’re supposed to believe) the magic of CCS ensuring that the whole operation can nevertheless be run green and guilt-free.

“Clean” hydrogen then, just like CCS, turns out to be just another technological chimera designed to greenwash capitalism’s continuing addiction to fossil fuels.

What then of the other technological solutions being touted? Perhaps the most headline grabbing of them has been Biden’s proposed US$174 billion investment in the infrastructure for electric vehicles and their production. On the surface, again, this might sound like a good idea. Who wouldn’t want to live in a world in which we can all drive around in sleek, silent, powerful and “green” electric vehicles like Teslas?

Again, however, this is just another fake technological “fix” to the climate crisis that will help perpetuate the environmentally destructive status quo. A genuinely sustainable society won’t be built around the kind of car culture that exists today. What’s needed, among other things, is a massive investment in public transport and the transformation of cities to reduce the need for long commutes.

The promotion of electric vehicles as part of a technological “green” utopia is designed to forestall this kind of change, to protect as much as possible the car makers and other big business interests that profit from the status quo.

Elon Musk personifies this. In his authorised biography, Elon Musk: Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for a Fantastic Future, Ashlee Vance revealed that Musk’s California “hyperloop” proposal was aimed at quashing plans for a high-speed rail link between Los Angeles and San Francisco. “Musk had dished out the Hyperloop proposal just to make the public and legislators rethink the high-speed train”, wrote Vance. “He didn’t intend to build the thing ... With any luck, the high-speed rail would be cancelled. Musk said as much to me during a series of emails and phone calls leading up to the announcement.”

For those who can afford it (a base-level Tesla will set you back an eye-watering $73,900 in Australia today), driving an electric car might make you feel like you’re doing something to help save the planet. This is an illusion.

Even if your car is charged from electricity produced by renewable energy, you also have to consider all the emissions produced in the construction and maintenance of the roads and freeways on which you drive. Then there’s the material of the car itself, and the lithium needed for the battery. Already, the skyrocketing demand is causing major environmental problems for major lithium producers like China, Chile and Bolivia. Tellingly, Musk has already devised the ultimate escape plan for himself—moving to Mars. This is not an option for most people.

The long list of fake technological fixes to the climate crisis is nothing more than a delaying tactic, designed to create the impression of change to ensure the profits bonanza of the fossil fuel economy can continue for as long as possible. Only a total transformation of society, in which technological production is rationally designed and democratically organised and controlled, can ensure that we are able, in Marx’s words, “to bequeath the Earth in an improved state to succeeding generations”.

#### 2---Material inputs undo benefits

Mccollum 19 [John. Assistant professor of sociology at Minot State University. Limits of the Green New Deal. Section on Marxist Sociology. 12-11-2019. https://marxistsociology.org/2019/12/limits-of-the-green-new-deal/]

The treadmill of production idea becomes relevant in the context of the GND because of the gains in energy production efficiency, as well as the program’s proposed investments in the expansion of public transportation and “clean” manufacturing methods.  The efficiency gains of a nation-wide energy efficiency program can be undone by a total increase in material inputs.

Examining renewables in greater detail, wind turbines and solar panels produce a host of environmental externalities.  Both technologies rely on the availability of rare earth metals.  Their manufacturing and disposal generate other forms of toxic pollutants.  Also, converting land from either “natural” usage to land for renewables will also have a variety of environmental externalities, exemplified by solar farms in California’s deserts, which have displaced native species like the desert tortoise.

Another issue resulting from this practice will be a widening of the “metabolic rift” between global regions and between the natural metabolism of the earth and humanity’s production and consumption of natural resources.  John Bellamy Foster’s work on the “metabolic rift” derives from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Marx’s attendant interest in the widening gap between “town and country.”  Marx studied the developments in agricultural science and soil chemistry during his era and noted the tendency of capitalism’s material demands to outstrip nature’s restorative capacities.  As the natural fertility of soil declined, agricultural producers came to rely on distant sources of nitrogen-based fertilizers.  This shift led to a “metabolic rift” in the spatial distribution of soil nutrients and a temporal rupture in the earth’s natural cycles of soil fertility.

The GND threatens to reproduce this gap.  To use a single example, though the US has some deposits, the rare earth metals used in solar panels and wind turbines will come from Global South states where mining and processing these minerals poses great risks to human health and the environment.  The benefits of using these materials in renewable technologies will not be seen by the citizens of those countries where extraction occurs.  The GND’s agricultural methods hold some promise of making major gains in de-carbonizing the US’s agricultural system, but the movement of soil fertility around the US as agricultural goods made in one region move to another still would widen the spatial and temporal elements of the metabolic rift.

At present, it does not appear that the GND is dealing with the contradictions of the treadmill of production and a widening metabolic rift.  The “treadmill of production” poses yet another problem though:  the contradiction of continually expanding production to meet the systemic demands of capital to accumulate and workers’ attendant dependence on this cycle for wages.  Production of “green” things may need to expand continually to generate employment and welfare benefits for workers.  Workers in a new state sector could find themselves dependent on this expansion, just as they would have under private capital.  Although “green”, this expanded production will recreate the environmental problems the GND is meant to end.  Getting off this treadmill is going to require more than just vigorous investment by the state in green infrastructure.  Next, I turn to the GND’s potential to create a state-sponsored green capitalism.

#### **EKC hypothesis is garbage**

Alexander 15. Scott, Lecturer at the University of Melbourne, Australia, co-director of the Simplicity Institute and research fellow at the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute. Prosperous Descent. 2015. The Simplicity Institute. book

The EKC hypothesis might have some initial theoretical plausibility based on the three lines of argument listed above, but the hypothesis should only shape policy, of course, if it can be empirically substantiated. The empirical foundations of the hypothesis, however, are dubious, at best. A comprehensive review of the literature on EKC hypothesis is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Stern, 2004; Bradshaw, Giam, and Sodhi, 2010), but in broad terms the empirical status of the EKC can be expressed as follows. Some studies have shown that where certain types of environmental damage are generated and suffered locally (or within adjacent cooperating nations) an EKC can indeed be seen (Dinda, 2004; Bo, 2011). These limited circumstances include wastewater discharge, sulphur dioxide emissions, and carbon monoxide emissions. On the other hand, when the environmental problems cross national boundaries or have longer-term impacts, studies conclude that the EKC does not hold (Stern, 2010). Most importantly, an EKC exists neither for carbon dioxide (Luzzati and Orsini, 2009) nor biodiversity loss (Mills and Waite, 2009; AsafuAdjaye, 2003), two of the most significant environmental crises. It is hard to defend a growth model of progress based on the limited cases of environmental improvement, if sustained growth in GDP fails to address (and indeed exacerbates) problems such as climate change or biodiversity loss. As Brian Czech (2013: 200) puts it, the EKC represents ‘a grain of truth embedded in a fallacy’. The environmental costs of growth also tend to impact most on the poorest parts of the world (Woodward and Simms, 2006), at least at first, providing further grounds for questioning whether growth is really the path of progress.

Furthermore, a study by Holm and Englund (2009) has done much to debunk the widely held belief that a movement toward a ‘service’, ‘information’, or ‘post-industrial’ economy leads to reduced environmental impacts. In a review of the evidence on this matter, they show that despite growth of the service sector during the last decades in the world’s wealthier countries, overall resource consumption has increased (see also, Fourcroy et al., 2012; Henriques and Kander, 2010). Moreover, to the limited extent that some ‘service’ economies do seem to be decoupling growth from impact per capita (an issue considered in more detail below), it is arguably due to the outsourcing of manufacturing to developing nations, especially China. Accordingly, any apparent decoupling can often be attributed to dubious or at least incomplete accounting. For example, it is no good claiming a reduction in national deforestation, say, if a nation is simply importing more wood from abroad rather than cutting down its own trees (Asici, 2013); and it is no good claiming a reduced carbon footprint per capita if it simply means China or other industrialising nations are serving as a ‘pollution haven’ (Cole, 2004) for carbon-intensive manufacturing (see Wiedmann et al., 2013). That would be not so much ‘decoupling’ as ‘recoupling’.

This accounting issue is slowly being recognised even by mainstream institutions like the United Nations, which recently noted, albeit in an understated way, that ‘a certain amount of material burden and the associated environmental impacts are being “externalized” from importing countries… Countries may improve their decoupling performance most easily by outsourcing material-intensive extraction and processing to other countries and by importing concentrated products instead’ (UNEP, 2011: 60-61). While it may be possible to ‘externalise’ impacts from any particular nation, the planet as a whole, of course, is a closed system. Accordingly, when ‘externalised’ manufacturing is ‘internalised’ from an accounting perspective, much of the perceived dematerialisation of rich nations disappears (Wiedmann et al., 2013).

In one of the most comprehensive reviews of the data and methodologies used to estimate the EKC hypothesis, David Stern (2004: 1435) concludes that ‘the statistical analysis on which the EKC is based is not robust. There is little evidence for a common inverted U-shaped pathway that countries follow as their income rises.’ This general conclusion finds much evidential support (see Wang et al., 2013; Wiedmann et al., 2013).

Even in those limited cases where the EKC can be shown to exist, it is far too simplistic to suggest that this is solely or primarily because a nation has become rich. Often it can be shown that environmental improvements are associated with new laws, policies, or institutions (see Magnani, 2001). This raises the question of whether such improvements were due to increases in GDP, as the EKC hypothesis holds, or simply due to better regulations. It could not credibly be argued that getting rich is the only relevant variable. Reductions in harm do not happen automatically when nations become rich. Policies are usually needed – such as regulations about factory pollution, land use, the fuel efficiency of cars, or the treatment of rivers – and it is at least arguable that the regulations could have been produced at much lower levels of income and achieved the same or even more positive environmental outcomes.

Perhaps the most damming criticism of the EKC hypothesis, however, comes from the ecological footprint analysis (White, 2007; Caviglia-Harris et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2013; Global Footprint Network, 2013). The EKC, if valid, would suggest that nations should seek growth in GDP if they want to reduce their environmental impact. But when this extraordinary claim is considered in the context of ecological footprint analysis, the hypothesis is simply and obviously wrong. The US is the richest nation on the planet, but if the US way of life were globalised we would need more than four times the biocapacity of Earth (Global Footprint Network, 2013). On that basis, who could possibly argue that environmental degradation decreases as wealth grows? For a further example, take Australia – another of the richest nations – which has the highest per capita carbon footprint in the OECD and one of the highest in the world (Garnaut, 2008: Ch. 7). This strongly suggests that the EKC hypothesis is embraced for political reasons, not scientific foundation.

Even the somewhat less resource-intensive Western European nations – the so-called ‘green’ economies like Germany, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden – are grossly exceeding their ‘fair share’ of the planet’s biocapacity (Vale and Vale, 2013). We would need approximately three planets if the Western European way of life were globalised, and that is assuming no population growth (Global Footprint Network, 2013). So even if there were an EKC, the turning point in the curve would be occurring much too late in the process of development to validate anything like the conventional development path. Accordingly, the argument that sustainability will arrive when the entire world gets rich or ‘developed’ is patently wrong, and it is intellectually irresponsible to pretend otherwise (White, 2007). It is a view that simply lacks any evidential foundation.

In sum, one must not get caught up in the smoke and mirrors of isolated studies that show certain aspects of environmental damage or pollution have declined as a nation has gotten richer. Such analyses totally miss the bigger picture, which is that it would be ecologically catastrophic if the entire world tried to become affluent as a means of environmental protection (Turner, 2012; Smith and Positano, 2010). If the EKC hypothesis sounds too good to be true, that is because, on the whole, it is false.

#### 1---History

Walt 20. [Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and a columnist for Foreign Policy. Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?. Foreign Policy. 5-13-2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### 2---Alt solves

Kallis et al 18 [Giorgos. ICTA, Autonomous University of Barcelona. Vasilis Kostakis. ICREA. Steffen Lange. Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance and Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society, Harvard University. Barbara Muraca. Institute for Ecological Economy Research. Susan Paulson. College of Liberal Arts, Oregon State University. Matthias Schmelzer. Center for Latin American Studies. Research On Degrowth. Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 2018. 43. 298-299]

Although literature explicitly addressing degrowth economics is young (65), economists have long raised similar questions. Classical economists considered the concept of a stationary state, where economic growth eventually and unintentionally ends, be it due to limits to the division of labor (Smith) or a confined supply of land (Ricardo). Whereas Smith and Ricardo painted a dark picture of the stationary state in contexts with high levels of economic inequality, Mill argued that distributional policies could lead to a high degree of social welfare (66). Economists may share politicians’ obsession with growth, but there is nothing in neoclassical models to suggest that zero or negative growth is incompatible with full employment or economic stability. In recent years, several authors have investigated no-growth economies in the context of established macroeconomic theories. From a neoclassical supply-side perspective, Irmen (67) shows that market economies do not always generate growth, nor do they need growth to function. Lange (68) tests several models and shows that the major condition for stable degrowth is a decline in the supply of production factors—labor and/or natural resources—and a reduction of working hours (51). Heikkinen (69) and Bilancini & D’Alessandro (70) develop neoclassical models in which decreases in labor supply lead to stable degrowth with increasing social welfare, as consumption losses are overcompensated by more free time, allowing enjoyment of nonmaterial relational goods. In Keynesian models, the primary condition for an end of growth is constant aggregate demand. Fontana & Sawyer (71) emphasize the role of investments: If firms invest less, wage income stabilizes and growth is low. Exploring conditions for a stable steady-state, Lange (68) examines the economic circle the other way around: The central condition for zero growth is nonincreasing demand by households and government, which leads to low levels of investment by firms. In this model, nongrowing economies have zero net investments and savings and a constant sum of consumption and government spending. Lack of growth does not mean lack of change. Zero change in net investments may entail increased investments in one sector (e.g., renewable energies), compensated by disinvestment in another (e.g., coal). Fontana & Sawyer (71) show that with government deficit, private savings can still be positive. High levels of employment can be achieved in nongrowing economies by reducing average working hours, shifting employment toward labor intensive sectors, and/or redirecting technological change to increase resource rather than labor productivity (68).

#### 1---Resources

Wills et al 20 [Wills. Professor of History, Brooklyn College, CUNY. Joseph Entin, Professor of American Studies, Brooklyn College, CUNY. Richard Ohmann, Professor Emeritus of English, Wesleyan University. “’Resist, Rethink, and Restructure’: Teaching About Capitalism, War, and Empire in a Time of COVID-19.” *Radical Teacher* (117): 5-6. DOI: 10.5195/rt.2020.792]

Moreover, endless spending on war has had dire consequences for those living within the United States and its territories. With monopoly capitalists, systems integrators, and military-intelligence contractors exercising undue influence over both federal and state spending, the United States has created international chaos and a “Homeland Security Bubble” on the verge of collapse. With the Bush administration gutting the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and increasing its military-surveillance-prison budget year-after-year, the world has watched in horror as the United States fails to protect people within its own borders, beginning with Hurricane Katrina and thereafter showing its inability to meet the challenges of the next in a series of climate disasters. As the ongoing deregulation of the financial services sector continued during the first decade of the 21st century, George W. Bush also called upon Americans to mortgage their futures on consumption as a patriotic duty. When combined with risky financial instruments, and billion-dollar markets opened up for small- and medium-sized “Homeland Security” providers in North America, Internet and other forms of consumption also created the context for a real-estate bubble that collapsed in 2006 and ushered in the Great Recession of 2008. To make U.S. war-making less visible as the Obama administration focused on restoring an economy teetering on the brink of another depression, drone strikes became more common even if spending on the military declined from a then-high of $824 billion in 2008 to $621 in 2016.9

Over the past twenty years, the response to every crisis, at both the federal as well as state and local levels, has consistently centered on funding for war, policing, and surveillance, tax cuts for the ultra-wealthy, and austerity programs that have eviscerated budgets for public health, transportation, education, and other social-essential services. The Trump administration has merely made things much, much worse: “re-branding” the United States from a mythological nation of immigrants who welcome all-comers to a walled society intolerant of anyone other than those who are white, fomenting what Americans have described under right-wing dictatorships as “death squads” (white nationalists, the police, the military, second amendment revisionists, and others) to engage in an all-out war against black and brown people, and advancing a more rabid doctrine of private property rights at the expense of Americans, the undocumented, the global population, and other “barriers” to expansion as the country plunges more deeply into the authoritarian state Trump and his enablers fetish, no matter the cost. The 25 May 2020 public lynching of George Floyd by members of the Minneapolis Police Department is symptomatic of a much longer history, one we desperately need to unpack, not only for those who already understand that this nation needs structural change, but also for those who still refuse to come to terms with the United States’ catastrophic trajectory.

Drawing on his 20-year experience in studying, writing, and teaching about war, Vine provides a thoughtful and comprehensive list of suggestions about how we might more effectively engage people from a variety of backgrounds, respecting those we meet in the classroom where we find them, then gently guiding them through the mythology, misinformation, and mystification of the post-9/11 rationale for militarization, and on to alternative visions of the future. In addition to the many proposals and resources he offers, Vine suggests that we need to show how much wars have cost, and the trade-offs of war spending, including comparisons of military spending versus spending on universal free education and the eradication of student debt. He additionally cautions that we need to focus on the system rather than the soldier, making capitalism, settler-colonialism, Native Americans and indigenous communities, people of color, U.S. territories and overseas colonies and military bases, and the human toll of war and empire visible in ways that expose militarization as neither natural nor inevitable no matter the time period. Employing intersectionality more broadly also allows us to make displacement, racism, sexism, and hypermasculinity more visible, along with the militarization of policing in communities of color and poor neighborhoods, along the U.S.-Mexican border, and within white supremacist militia movements. At the same time, it offers the opportunity to connect these phenomena to dissent and anti-war, civil rights, and other social movements focused on “climate justice, universal health care, labor, racial justice, gender equality, and LGBTQI+ rights.” Doing so will have the added benefit of countering the historical amnesia and clouds of forgetfulness that have infused education in the United States.

Much of this work can be done, Vine suggests, by assigning research projects focused on investigating the long arm of institutions involved in the military-industrial-academic-prison-surveillance complex, and by turning classrooms into “war clinics,” ones that take people out of the classroom to work with various groups, including but not limited to Code Pink, the Costs of War Project, the Institute for Policy Studies, veterans groups, and anti-recruitment/war/military base movements. We would also suggest that readers of Radical Teacher delve into Vine’s latest book—The United States of War: A Global History of America’s Conflicts, from Columbus to the Islamic State (University of California Press, 2020)—along with Daniel Immerwahr’s How to Hide an Empire: A Short History of the United States (Vintage, 2020), both excellent primers about how the United States—along with the global capital markets, multinational corporations, and international organizations it has long dominated—has deepened the integration of an increasingly globalized military-industrial-intelligence complex.

All of this might seem like a heavy lift, but as we know from our own experiences on campus and beyond it, those who embrace capitalism as an article of faith do not necessarily know what it means or implies. Once defined and unpacked, however, capitalism’s profit motive, insatiable appetite for expansion, and internal contradictions make clearer the ways in which inhabitants of the United States, particularly since World War II, have slowly but surely acquiesced to the “privatization and militarization of everything,” to the belief that the nation’s imperial ambitions are for the greater good of humanity, that the benefits and conveniences of surveillance technologies developed for the military (the computer, the Internet, GPS tracking, drones, and so on) outweigh the costs; that is, until they learn about the provenance of the U.S. command economy, examine the numbers, and realize that they can never again unsee the bedeviling trade-offs they have unwittingly sanctioned: warmaking for profit versus healthcare and education; resource extraction versus environmental protections; surveillance versus convenience; and the snare and delusion that technologies can solve our larger political, social, and economic problems versus actually tackling them through structural change. As sociologist Vincent Mosco observed after the dot.com bubble burst at the turn of the 21st century, “Myth is not a gloss on reality; it embodies its own reality. These views are especially difficult for people to swallow as the chorus grows for the view that we are entering a new age, a time so significant that it merits the conclusion that we have entered ‘the end of history.’” But he also asserted that such myths fail “to consider the potential for a profound contradiction between the idea of a liberal democracy and the growing control of the world’s political economy by the concentrated power of its largest businesses.”10 As the rest of the essays in this volume make clear, we may live in the present, but we carry our histories with us; and therefore need to confront those histories, make them more visible, if we hope to change course.

As a complement to Vine’s piece, William J. Astore shares his decades-long experiences as a retired lieutenant colonel, professor of history, academic administrator, author of books on Vietnam and the aerospace industry, and regular contributor to various publications, including TomDispatch.com, CounterPunch, and Truthout. His “Militarism and Education in America” makes another vital pedagogical intervention. Astore emphasizes the need for critical thinking about and resistance to what he describes as the “soft militarism” of American society, including but hardly limited to the commodification of an education “infused with militarism,” and a popular culture of films, literature, and performative acts that celebrate war and spectacular feats of violence. He also unveils many of the other ways in which the military influences education, including the hiring of retired generals and admirals to run universities “even though they have no experience in education,” military fly-overs at football games and other militaristic displays and celebrations, ROTC recruiting at high schools and on college campuses, funding to universities that push them to become “feeders to the military-industrial complex and the wider intelligence community,” pension plans heavily invested in military expansion, and every other act that sells education as a commodity “for private gain rather than a process of learning for the public good.” Among the antidotes he recommends, Astore suggests antiwar comic/graphic books that can reach wider audiences, “impact maps” that show the military suppliers who have entered states in which campus communities live, research into the “revolving door” between senior military officers and major defense contractors, and collaborative projects with organizations such as Veterans for Peace and About Face: Veterans Against the War.

As the rest of the essays in this volume make clear, we may live in the present, but we carry our histories with us; and therefore need to confront those histories, make them more visible, if we hope to change course.

#### 2---Asymmetry

Levy & Thompson 10 (Jack S & William R; Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, former president of the International Studies Association, Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Thompson is Distinguished Professor and the Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University; 2010; “The Dyadic Interactions of States”; *Causes of War*; pp. 72-75, published by Wiley-Blackwell)

Realist and rationalist critiques Realists, who share the economic nationalism and statist orientation of the old mercantilists, criticize the liberal economic theory of peace on a number of grounds. First of all, they argue (as do some non-realists) that even if it were true that trade has a pacifying effect, the magnitude of the impact of trade on decisions for war and peace is small relative tothat of military and diplomatic considerations (Buzan, 1984 ; Levy, 1989b ). Realists, like mercantilists, argue that states are motivated primarily by power and that economic opportunity costs of war are minor in the context of the long-term struggle for power. Were the Western liberal democracies seriously concerned about the short-term loss of trade when they made decisions to go to war against the hegemonic threats posed by Germany in 1914 and again in 1939? Realists also argue that trade and other forms of economic interdependence can actually increase the level of militarized conflict rather than reduce it (Barbieri, 2002 ). As Rousseau (cited in Hoffmann, 1963 :319) argued, “…interdependence breeds not accommodation and harmony, but suspicion and incompatibility. ”Among other things, interdependence creates increased opportunities for conflict. The greater the interdependence between states, the greater the number of things to argue about. In addition, whereas liberals argue that economic interdependence creates mutual dependence and incentives to avoid war, realists argue that interdependence may also be asymmetrical. Each is dependent on the other, but the degree of dependence is uneven. The less dependent party may be tempted to use economic coercion to exploit the adversary’s vulnerabilities and influence its behavior relating to security as well as economic issues. 32 These can lead to retaliatory actions, conflict spirals, and war. 33

## States CP

## Internet Adv

#### They can’t solve the internet freedom impact---their internal link is about business competition which is irrelevant to internet access and connectivity which is what 1AC Blair is talking about. Here’s their ev for reference.

Tony **1AC** Blair 21, Former prime minister of Great Britain and founder and executive chairman of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “The Progressive Case for Universal Internet Access: How to Close the Digital Divide by 2030,” 3/2/21, https://institute.global/policy/progressive-case-universal-internet-access-how-close-digital-divide-2030

Today, the internet is the beating heart of the world. And just as the roads, railways and canals provided the arteries for commerce in the Industrial Revolution, today’s network infrastructure is the circulatory system on which much of modern life depends. Without it, the ramifications of Covid-19 would have been far more severe.

That we have been able to use the internet to mitigate the impact of the pandemic is a small relief, but the Covid-19 crisis has emphasised the importance of everyone being connected in the future. Eradicating extreme poverty, solving the global education crisis, building better health-care systems and responding to pandemics effectively all require connectivity. For low-income countries, being largely excluded from the exponential potential of the internet means that they cannot transform their nations. It is extraordinary that today half the world remains offline.

Closing the digital divide by 2030 should be one of the primary global policy priorities. Accelerating internet expansion will drive economic growth and enable progress and – as this report from my Institute demonstrates – the benefits of investment vastly offset the costs. It outlines the urgent action required on stimulating demand, regulatory reform and greater global coordination, and how a new digital coalition needs to be formed to transform opportunity and access for billions of people.

But prioritising internet access is not only about poverty alleviation. During these past years of isolationist and unilateralist policymaking by Western governments, China has been taking a more dominant role in developing economies. It has been investing in digital hardware infrastructure, taking an active role within international bodies and influencing the standards and values that underpin the internet.

This requires strong global leadership. Collaborating with China, as well as competing. Stewarding the right global coalitions around investment to achieve universal internet access. Leadership with the vision, commitment and confidence to establish the internet for a prosperous and inclusive global society.

We’ve lost our way on this in recent years, but an open and connected world will be the lifeblood for our future growth. It’s time that we make it a reality.

#### They won’t

Dr. Afsheen John Radsan 12, Professor at the William Mitchell College of Law, Assistant General Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 to 2004; and Dr. Richard Murphy, AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, 2012, “The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted Killing,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Volume 5, p. 439-463

Most of the charges leveled against the CIA drone campaign turn on the interpretation and application of international law in the form of either treaties or custom. One should recall that international law binds American officials only if it is also U.S. law. This fact leads to the problem of determining just which international laws convert into U.S. law. Some cases are easy: A treaty approved by the Senate constitutes a type of U.S. law, although making it domestically enforceable may require additional legislation.17 Some cases are hard: determining the binding force of customary international law, for example

.18 Moreover, even if some piece of international law has become U.S. law, there is always the possibility that the United States, as a sovereign power, might change it – e.g., by withdrawing from the treaty. Coupling this point with an aggressive understanding of the President’s foreign affairs and commander-in-chief powers, Michael Paulsen says that the President may freely abandon or suspend the United States’ international law obligations, even many enshrined in domestic law.19 Professor Paulsen offers an admonition that the force of law on a sovereign is on some level always up to the sovereign and is fraught with policy considerations. The Obama administration, however, is not bogged down in academic debates; the Administration states that the United States should (and indeed does) follow all relevant international law.20 Both proponents and opponents of the CIA drone campaign thus largely agree on the framework of the discussion.

Part of the reason they can agree is that many norms of international law are vague and even border on the vacuous. International humanitarian law (IHL), for instance, forbids attacks that cause “disproportionate” or “excessive” collateral damage to peaceful civilian interests. No responsible party is likely to defend its attacks by claiming a right to cause “excessive” collateral damage. No, that party will contend that its attacks honor proportionality – though critics will claim the contrary. The norms of international law, no doubt, leave room for major disagreements about interpretation and application. This wiggle room helps ensure international law’s existence by reducing incentives for nations to withdraw from a regime they might otherwise regard as too restrictive. But it also limits the power of international law to compel agreement from all interested parties on whether an attack was legal, particularly in light of uncertain facts and a lack of neutral observers. Unanimity over the legality of the CIA drone campaign is thus highly unlikely. This said, as detailed below, international law leaves ample room for the Obama administration to defend the campaign’s legality.

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## Internet Adv

#### Finishing Radsan

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#### Global coop doesn’t solve anything

Young et al 13 Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24 13, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation", <http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation>[Modified for ableist language]

The Doha round of trade negotiations is deadlocked, despite eight successful multilateral trade rounds before it. Climate negotiators have met for two decades without finding a way to stem global emissions. The UN is [destroyed] paralyzed in the face of growing insecurities across the world, the latest dramatic example being Syria. Each of these phenomena could be treated as if it was independent, and an explanation sought for the peculiarities of its causes. Yet, such a perspective would fail to show what they, along with numerous other instances of breakdown in international negotiations, have in common. Global cooperation is gridlocked across a range of issue areas. The reasons for this are not the result of any single underlying causal structure, but rather of several underlying dynamics that work together. Global cooperation today is failing not simply because it is very difficult to solve many global problems – indeed it is – but because previous phases of global cooperation have been incredibly successful, producing unintended consequences that have overwhelmed the problem-solving capacities of the very institutions that created them. It is hard to see how this situation can be unravelled, given failures of contemporary global leadership, the weaknesses of NGOs in converting popular campaigns into institutional change and reform, and the domestic political landscapes of the most powerful countries. A golden era of governed globalization In order to understand why gridlock has come about it is important to understand how it was that the post-Second World War era facilitated, in many respects, a successful form of ‘governed globalization’ that contributed to relative peace and prosperity across the world over several decades. This period was marked by peace between the great powers, although there were many proxy wars fought out in the global South. This relative stability created the conditions for what now can be regarded as an unprecedented period of prosperity that characterized the 1950s onward. Although it is by no means the sole cause, the UN is central to this story, helping to create conditions under which decolonization and successive waves of democratization could take root, profoundly altering world politics. While the economic record of the postwar years varies by country, many experienced significant economic growth and living standards rose rapidly across significant parts of the world. By the late 1980s a variety of East Asian countries were beginning to grow at an unprecedented speed, and by the late 1990s countries such as China, India and Brazil had gained significant economic momentum, a process that continues to this day. Meanwhile, the institutionalization of international cooperation proceeded at an equally impressive pace. In 1909, 37 intergovernmental organizations existed; in 2011, the number of institutions and their various off-shoots had grown to 7608 (Union of International Associations 2011). There was substantial growth in the number of international treaties in force, as well as the number of international regimes, formal and informal. At the same time, new kinds of institutional arrangements have emerged alongside formal intergovernmental bodies, including a variety of types of transnational governance arrangements such as networks of government officials, public-private partnerships, as well as exclusively private/corporate bodies. Postwar institutions created the conditions under which a multitude of actors could benefit from forming multinational companies, investing abroad, developing global production chains, and engaging with a plethora of other social and economic processes associated with globalization. These conditions, combined with the expansionary logic of capitalism and basic technological innovation, changed the nature of the world economy, radically increasing dependence on people and countries from every corner of the world. This interdependence, in turn, created demand for further institutionalization, which states seeking the benefits of cooperation provided, beginning the cycle anew. This is not to say that international institutions were the only cause of the dynamic form of globalization experienced over the last few decades. Changes in the nature of global capitalism, including breakthroughs in transportation and information technology, are obviously critical drivers of interdependence. However, all of these changes were allowed to thrive and develop because they took place in a relatively open, peaceful, liberal, institutionalized world order. By preventing World War Three and another Great Depression, the multilateral order arguably did just as much for interdependence as microprocessors or email (see Mueller 1990; O’Neal and Russett 1997). Beyond the special privileges of the great powers Self-reinforcing interdependence has now progressed to the point where it has altered our ability to engage in further global cooperation. That is, economic and political shifts in large part attributable to the successes of the post-war multilateral order are now amongst the factors grinding that system into gridlock. Because of the remarkable success of global cooperation in the postwar order, human interconnectedness weighs much more heavily on politics than it did in 1945. The need for international cooperation has never been higher. Yet the “supply” side of the equation, institutionalized multilateral cooperation, has stalled. In areas such as nuclear proliferation, the explosion of small arms sales, terrorism, failed states, global economic imbalances, financial market instability, global poverty and inequality, biodiversity losses, water deficits and climate change, multilateral and transnational cooperation is now increasingly ineffective or threadbare. Gridlock is not unique to one issue domain, but appears to be becoming a general feature of global governance: cooperation seems to be increasingly difficult and deficient at precisely the time when it is needed most. It is possible to identify four reasons for this blockage, four pathways to gridlock: rising multipolarity, institutional inertia, harder problems, and institutional fragmentation. Each pathway can be thought of as a growing trend that embodies a specific mix of causal mechanisms. Each of these are explained briefly below.

Growing multipolarity.

The absolute number of states has increased by 300 percent in the last 70 years, meaning that the most basic transaction costs of global governance have grown. More importantly, the number of states that “matter” on a given issue—that is, the states without whose cooperation a global problem cannot be adequately addressed—has expanded by similar proportions. At Bretton Woods in 1945, the rules of the world economy could essentially be written by the United States with some consultation with the UK and other European allies. In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 crisis, the G-20 has become the principal forum for global economic management, not because the established powers desired to be more inclusive, but because they could not solve the problem on their own. However, a consequence of this progress is now that many more countries, representing a diverse range of interests, must agree in order for global cooperation to occur.

Institutional inertia.

The postwar order succeeded, in part, because it incentivized great power involvement in key institutions. From the UN Security Council, to the Bretton Woods institutions, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, key pillars of the global order explicitly grant special privileges to the countries that were wealthy and powerful at the time of their creation. This hierarchy was necessary to secure the participation of the most important countries in global governance. Today, the gain from this trade-off has shrunk while the costs have grown. As power shifts from West to East, North to South, a broader range of participation is needed on nearly all global issues if they are to be dealt with effectively. At the same time, following decolonization, the end of the Cold War and economic development, the idea that some countries should hold more rights and privileges than others is increasingly (and rightly) regarded as morally bankrupt. And yet, the architects of the postwar order did not, in most cases, design institutions that would organically adjust to fluctuations in national power.

Harder problems.

As independence has deepened, the types and scope of problems around which countries must cooperate has evolved. Problems are both now more extensive, implicating a broader range of countries and individuals within countries, and intensive, penetrating deep into the domestic policy space and daily life. Consider the example of trade. For much of the postwar era, trade negotiations focused on reducing tariff levels on manufactured products traded between industrialized countries. Now, however, negotiating a trade agreement requires also discussing a host of social, environmental, and cultural subjects - GMOs, intellectual property, health and environmental standards, biodiversity, labour standards—about which countries often disagree sharply. In the area of environmental change a similar set of considerations applies. To clean up industrial smog or address ozone depletion required fairly discrete actions from a small number of top polluters. By contrast, the threat of climate change and the efforts to mitigate it involve nearly all countries of the globe. Yet, the divergence of voice and interest within both the developed and developing worlds, along with the sheer complexity of the incentives needed to achieve a low carbon economy, have made a global deal, thus far, impossible (Falkner et al. 2011; Victor 2011).

Fragmentation.

The institution-builders of the 1940s began with, essentially, a blank slate. But efforts to cooperate internationally today occur in a dense institutional ecosystem shaped by path dependency. The exponential rise in both multilateral and transnational organizations has created a more complex multilevel and multi-actor system of global governance. Within this dense web of institutions mandates can conflict, interventions are frequently uncoordinated, and all too typically scarce resources are subject to intense competition. In this context, the proliferation of institutions tends to lead to dysfunctional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral institutions to provide public goods. When funding and political will are scarce, countries need focal points to guide policy (Keohane and Martin 1995), which can help define the nature and form of cooperation. Yet, when international regimes overlap, these positive effects are weakened. Fragmented institutions, in turn, disaggregate resources and political will, while increasing transaction costs. In stressing four pathways to gridlock we emphasize the manner in which contemporary global governance problems build up on each other, although different pathways can carry more significance in some domains than in others. The challenges now faced by the multilateral order are substantially different from those faced by the 1945 victors in the postwar settlement. They are second-order cooperation problems arising from previous phases of success in global coordination. Together, they now block and inhibit problem solving and reform at the global level.

## Multistake Adv

**America is not a norms setter. The collective action problem prevents effective internalization.**

**Knopf, 18** - professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies (Jeffrey, After diffusion: Challenges to enforcing nonproliferation and disarmament norms, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 39, Issue 3, February 9th, pages 367-398)

A second challenge that **complicates efforts to enforce** international **norms** is the well-known **collective action problem** (Olson, 1965). In many cases, effective enforcement will require the participation of more than one actor. Unless one state has unusual economic leverage, for example, economic sanctions usually **require multilateral enforcement** to be effective. Otherwise, the target state can evade sanctions by trading with those states that choose not to participate in the sanctions effort. **Even military enforcement** often **depends on** the involvement of **multiple states**. Take the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 for example. Although often seen as a case of U.S. unilateralism, this is not entirely accurate. The United States relied on earlier UN Security Council resolutions for legal justification, so at minimum the United States needed other members of the Security Council to have voted in favor of relevant resolutions. It also sought a so-called second resolution that would have explicitly authorized the use of force, and the U.S. failure to obtain Security Council passage of this authorization reduced international support for the U.S.-led operation (Thompson, 2009). In addition, the United States sought to enlist other partners in the “coalition of the willing” that conducted the military operation. The United States could have gone it alone if it chose to, but it clearly had a strong preference to obtain as much legitimacy as it could from the presence of coalition partners. In short, effective unilateral enforcement is likely to be **rare**; norm enforcement will typically be more effective as a multilateral enterprise.

**Multilateral cooperation is not automatic** however. By the familiar logic of collective action, states will be tempted to **free ride** on the enforcement efforts of others. As long as others enforce the nonproliferation or disarmament norm in question, free riders still enjoy the benefits. But free riders do not have to pay the costs of enforcement, in trade forgone, in diplomatic frictions with the target or its friends, or in potential casualties should military force come into play. If all states give in to the temptation to free ride, however, then **effective enforcement will not happen.**

In some cases, a lack of participation in collective action may arise less from states deliberately free riding than from a **lack of consensus** about whether or not a particular state is actually violating a particular norm. There can be ambiguity about the standards for ascertaining norm compliance or about the evidence of a violation. When this occurs, states can come to **different interpretations** of whether the situation even calls for an effort at enforcement (for examples involving NPT safeguards, see Goldschmidt, 2010) The end result will be similar to when free riding occurs, in that many **states will choose not to join in collective action**.

The collective action problem is accentuated by **global power asymmetries**. The **U**nited **S**tates is so much more powerful than most other states, and has demonstrated such an obvious commitment to enforcing nonproliferation in certain cases, **that other states may hope that the** **U**nited **S**tates **will shoulder the entire burden** of enforcement. This creates an especially strong temptation to free ride. To the extent that the **U**nited **S**tates cannot on its own bring about **norm compliance**, however, the collective action problem will become a major barrier to enforcement of nonproliferation norms.

#### Multistakeholder governance fails – not a complete solution to internet governance

Chris Riley, 21. Resident Senior Fellow, Internet Governance. “Applying Multistakeholder Internet Governance to Online Content Management.” SEP 15, 2021. https://www.rstreet.org/2021/09/15/applying-multistakeholder-internet-governance-to-online-content-management/

The content moderation policies of online platforms and Section 230 dominate many modern tech policy news cycles. Little wonder, since these laws and rules impose a specific balance of free expression and online harm mitigation with regards to technical freedom and responsibility. Yet, despite the significance and subtlety of such calculations, debates on these issues are too often conducted through op-ed pages and paid advertisements, not through open dialogue. Currently, few processes and structures seek to catalyze constructive dialogue among all of the relevant stakeholders. It is also increasingly clear that the depth required for any level of resolution is far beyond the scope of a single effort.

Against this backdrop, R Street’s multi-stakeholder internet governance project on content management endeavors to make progress toward a shared understanding of foundational content management concepts through an inclusive and bottom-up process. The project sets out to identify a set of concrete and specific intellectual buttresses for further discussion—including proposals that are the subject of active debate—by exploring specific challenges, opportunities and ambiguities.

The full report describes this effort, its philosophy of engagement, and the substantive output developed throughout the process. The hope is that platform managers’ and policymakers’ future actions will benefit from greater insight into the challenges and opportunities associated with content moderation and recommendation.

Point of Consensus

Identifying points of consensus was not the primary objective of this exercise, but was a consequence of the process itself. Below are broadly shared perspectives that emerged:

1. The standard for successful content management must not be the perfect and total prevention of online harm, as that is impossible.

2. Content management does not resolve the deeper challenges of hatred and harm. At best, it works to reduce the use of internet-connected services as vectors.

3. Automation has a positive role to play in content moderation, but is not a complete solution.

4. Automation carries its own risks for internet users’ rights, including rights to privacy, free expression and freedom from discrimination.

Propositions for Areas of Further Attention

Each of the following seven propositions represents a specific area that could potentially receive more attention from stakeholders in the content ecosystem, including from industry, civil society, academia and government; though as the report details, each carries its own challenges to realizing the potential benefits.

PROPOSITION 1: Down-ranking and Other Alternatives to Content Removal

Alternative methods of mitigation for content or accounts in violation of an online service’s policies, such as “down-ranking” or reducing priority and visibility, beyond a full removal or block. The result is continued accessibility but with reduced visibility.

PROPOSITION 2: Granular/ Individualized Notice to Users of Policy Violations

An increase in granularity and detail in the provision of individualized notices to users whose accounts or content are affected by mitigation methods triggered by policy violations.

PROPOSITION 3: Use of Automation to Detect and Make Classifications of Policy Content

The use of automation to evaluate content transactions and detect potential policy violations in real-time, particularly by smaller platforms.

PROPOSITION 4: Clarity and Specificity in Content Policies to Improve Predictability at the Cost of Flexibility

In contrast to Proposition 2 (regarding increased granularity in individualized ex post notices of policy violation), increased specificity and detail in the generalized ex ante statements of content policy themselves.

PROPOSITION 5: Friction in the Process of Communication at Varying Stages

Intentional introduction of friction into communications pathways, such as pausing automated sharing or re-purposing of content and prompting for additional input.

PROPOSITION 6: Experimentation and Transparency in Recommendation Engine Weightings

Modification of and visibility into back-end recommendation engines and presentation algorithms as a means of mitigating online harm, including in combination with other propositions, such as the use of automation (Proposition 3) to engage in down-ranking.

PROPOSITION 7: Separate Treatment for Paid or Sponsored Content

Application of different standards to content that potentially violates policies based on whether the content is organic, paid or sponsored by the speaker, including payment for placement or prioritization in various forms.

Key Takeaways

The process reached consensus on some points, and greater consensus could be possible with further articulation of each of the propositions and associated consideration.

A multi-stakeholder process will not reach consensus on every issue through any process, as there are asymmetric assumptions and normative considerations, which is to be expected and accepted as inherent to inclusive processes.

#### ICT fails---sustainability and scale, lack of knowledge, pace of change, and funding, that’s Devex---I’ll finish here

Devex, 13. Devex Impact Editor. “The five key challenges in implementing ICT for development.” December 12, 2013. https://www.devex.com/news/the-five-key-challenges-in-implementing-ict-for-development-82499

3. Pace of change

INGOs’ current structures, staffing, and ways of operating have a strong momentum that is not easy to halt or redirect. It is relatively easy to utilize ICT to sustain and improve current organizational constructs and approaches, making useful but incremental progress. It is incredibly difficult to conceive of new ways of working with organizational constructs that are fundamentally different from the status quo and require a shift in terms of strategy, competence, skills, and organizational structure.

4. Funding

There also is a significant challenge in adequately planning and financing the use of ICT in development programs.With cyclical donor funding and pressure to minimize administrative and management costs, it is often difficult for INGOs to properly plan and resource financial and human investments in ICT as a core capacity for development programs.

5. Changing roles and norms

The emergence of new ICT possibilities potentially presents some more fundamental and far-reaching questions, challenging or even undermining the assumptions on which INGOs came into being. When we reflect on why INGOs were originally founded, we can isolate a number of specific gaps between people and communities in poverty and those in more affluent, developed parts of the world. For example, if we think about gaps around understanding and information, traditionally INGOs helped us understand the dire need of communities in the poorest parts of the world. There are also gaps in terms of access, communication, and of course resources that INGOs have historically played an important role in addressing.

## Delegation

#### Public engagement is key to prevent monopoly power---participation is the only way to promote competition and decenter dominant firms.

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

Lastly, the current approach deprives both the public and market participants of any real opportunity to participate in the creation of substantive antitrust rules.23 The exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise, except through one-off amicus briefs.24 Nascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out—despite the vital role they play in the competition ecosystem—given that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters, and they usually lack the resources to engage in amicus activity. Furthermore future entrants, whose interests should be carefully considered in all aspects of competition law and policy, have no voice.

Firms, entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers across our economy vary wildly in their experiences and perspectives on market conduct. Enforcement and regulation of business conduct can more successfully promote competition when it incorporates more voices and evidence from across the marketplace.

The ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry. For example, when courts disagree with one another on the legality of particular conduct, new entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents, by contrast, will be more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it. Continued ambiguity and complexity also create business opportunities for lawyers, economists, and lobbyists, who effectively profit from the lack of clarity.

#### The turn outweighs solvency---process is more important than law

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Reversing the second age of monopoly power requires a complete re-thinking of both what antimonopoly law should achieve and how it should be enforced. This includes reforming the ideology that drives antimonopoly policy and the substance of the laws, as well as rethinking the structure of antitrust agencies and the role of other arms of government in promoting antimonopoly policy. There is an emerging body of work on the substance of antitrust laws, but little thought has been given to how the structure of antitrust policymaking and enforcement should change. Even the best antitrust laws will fail if we do not reverse the unaccountable and diffuse system of implementation and enforcement.

This report offers a blueprint for reforming the structural aspects of antitrust lawmaking. The central philosophy behind these reforms is to replace the common-law, court-centered process of making antitrust policy with a politically-accountable process that relies on expertise and transparent, reasoned decision-making through an agency. Taking antitrust away from the courts means reforming the structure of the antitrust agencies and clarifying the authorities those agencies have. Power and accountability should be aligned, as is the case in most other parts of the Executive Branch, and the agency that makes competition policy should have both the authority to act and should be held more readily accountable for its actions.

#### Participation must be prior and considered

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

And third, rulemaking would enable the Commission to establish rules through a transparent and participatory process, ensuring that everyone who may be affected by a new rule has the opportunity to weigh in on it, granting the rule greater legitimacy.49 APA procedures require that an agency provide the public with meaningful opportunity to comment on the rule’s content through the submission of written “data, views, or arguments.”50 The agency must then consider and address all submitted comments before issuing the final rule. If an agency adopts a rule without observing these procedures, a court may strike down the rule.51

#### Admin law is precedent setting---genuine consultation now becomes inalienable---the plan and perm signal nullification is legitimate

Giulio Napolitano 14. Professor of Administrative Law, Law Department, University of Roma Tre. "Conflicts and strategies in administrative law". OUP Academic. 8-1-2014. https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/12/2/357/710357

Conflicts in administrative law are not a single-battle war. Every move of an actor responds to the moves made by others. That’s why administrative law is a repeated interactions game. Each move is incremental and path-dependent. Devices and mechanisms set up in the previous round cannot be easily and fully dismantled.

Let’s take the example of independent authorities. Once they are established in order to insulate the implementation of specific policies from the influence of the government or from the pressure from local interests, it becomes difficult to abolish them: even when the rule-making power comes back into the hands of national legislators or executives. As a consequence, reactions must be fine-tuned and sophisticated. The preferred solutions will be, for instance, the transfer of a specific power from the regulatory agency to the executive, or the submission of some sensible prerogatives of the independent body to ex ante directives or ex post approval by a political actor.36

Further, procedural rights are difficult to withdraw: even more than organizational devices. Once they have been recognized, even if sometimes for purely instrumental reasons of fire-alarm signaling, they become sanctified as inalienable rights.37 That’s why adjustments and reactions must be interstitial: the right to be heard and other prerogatives of private actors cannot be nullified. Changing time limit for comments, enlarging or restricting addressees of participatory rights, shifting the burden of proof from the acting agency to private parties, and vice-versa, are among the most preferred solutions.

#### Severs the mandate of the plan---counterplan doesn’t fiat antitrust law but recommends

Justia 21. "Notice and Comment Process for Agency Rulemaking". Updated: May 2021. Accessed: 8/26/2021. https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/rulemaking-writing-agency-regulations/notice-and-comment/

Agencies must consider all “relevant matter presented” during the comment period, and they must respond in some form to all comments received. They are not, however, required to take any specific action with regard to the rule itself. The publication of the final rule must include analyses of any relevant data or other materials submitted by the public and a justification of the form of the final rule in light of the comments the agency received.

If opposition to the proposed rule is exceptionally large or strident, the agency may decide to make substantial modifications and start the process over by publishing a new notice and opening a new comment period. Otherwise, the agency will publish its final findings along with the rule, which is codified in the Code of Federal Regulations.

#### 1---“Resolved”

Webster’s Revised Dictionary 1996 ((1.) RESOLVED MEANS “HAVING A FIXED PURPOSE; DETERMINED; RESOLUTE”)

#### 2---“Should”

Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### 3---“Substantial”

Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)

The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### 4---“Law”

Anu Bradford and Adam Chilton 19. Anu Bradford, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School. Adam S. Chilton, Assistant Professor of Law and Walter Mander Research Scholar. “Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets.” Codebook for Version 1. “Comparative Competition Law Dataset”. “CCL\_Law\_Data\_Ver1.dta”. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 16(2): 411-443.

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| Threshold for a “law” that triggers coding | Code all laws, regulations, and constitutional provisions on competition that appear to be legally binding. Ask yourself whether the competition agency could rely on this particular document as a legal basis for bringing an enforcement action or reaching a certain decision. If the document is a mere notice of enforcement priorities, a white paper on planned (future) changes in remedies, or a guideline elaborating on how the agency approaches the questions of market definition, etc., exclude the document from the set of laws that you code. As the name of the document (Regulation v. Guideline) is not always conclusive in revealing its legal status, this may require you to read through the text of a document, or do some additional background investigation to determine whether it should be coded. If you are uncertain, reach out to Lead Coders for guidance – this can be very tricky to determine, particularly as you get used to the survey instrument and coding procedure. |

#### Counterplan uses Chevron to develop the law, which answers any ‘law key’ argument

Royce Zeisler 14. J.D. Candidate 2014, Columbia Law School; B.S., B.A. 2012, University of British Columbia. “Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC Should Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement”. 2014 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 266 (2014).

V. CONCLUSION

In order to properly explore the FTC's current potential, this Note looks to the modern agency tool of norm-creation-Chevron deference-and explains how the FTC could use this doctrine to form a more optimal antitrust system. This examination is important because while commentators have renewed previous debates regarding rulemaking and technocracy, they have failed to fully account for the modern administrative law regime. In short, commentators who focus on the content of antitrust law have missed an effective tool for actually developing that law. From a broader antitrust perspective, this is symptomatic of the fact that while the correct antitrust presumptions have been long debated, the choice of which institution and method should be used to form these presumptions remains ad hoc.

From an administrative law perspective, this Note considers two aspects of Chevron deference that merit further examination. First, agencies are not confronted with a binary choice between rulemaking and adjudication-these methods interact in complex ways. In some cases, this is obvious: many agencies undertake both practices in the regular course of regulation. Fewer agencies, however, explore the effects of one format or the other in the creation of an overall legal regime. Second, an agency can use the Chevron framework as a method to transmit information. While commentators have long explored the role of expertise in justifying the Chevron framework, less focus has been placed on understanding the extent to which the framework provides a unique way to express an agency's expertise to the judiciary. 173 In this way, an agency which regulates in a manner that receives Chevron deference can be viewed not as grabbing power, but as taking the critical step in explaining otherwise inexpressible agency knowledge to generalist courts.

The Chevron doctrine has impacted many agencies, but not the FTC's Bureau of Competition. Given the retrenchment of antitrust law during the rise of the Chevron framework, this is unsurprising. But now that antitrust has settled on clear goals, the FTC, as an expert agency, is at times best-suited for developing the correct presumptions for achieving these goals. Unfortunately, so long as the FTC limits itself to being a "norm taker and not a norm maker," the competitive and judicial process will continue to suffer. 174 For this reason, the FTC should issue formal interpretations of section 5 of the FTC Act and work to create a more optimal antitrust regime.

#### 1---Overwhelmingly support the plan---public, thinkers, scholars, and activists will vote yes

David Dayen 20. Prospect’s executive editor. "It’s Not a Big Tech Crackdown, It’s an Anti-Monopoly Revolution". American Prospect. 12-18-2020. https://prospect.org/power/its-not-a-big-tech-crackdown-its-an-anti-monopoly-revolution/

Just look at what’s happening across the spectrum. The Federal Trade Commission is seeking information about data collection from nine social media companies. California Attorney General Xavier Becerra, who’s about to join the Biden Cabinet, is suing to compel Amazon’s compliance with an investigation into the company’s workplace protocols and level of coronavirus cases. Amazon warehouse workers in Alabama are voting on unionization with the Trump Labor Board’s blessing. App seller Cydia is suing Apple for creating a monopoly with its App Store. Researcher Zack Maril single-handedly implanted the notion of Google’s web-crawler monopoly in the public consciousness with one report. Northeastern University professor John Kwoka and Imperial College London’s Tommaso Valenti revised the history on firm breakups, showing them to be far superior to behavioral or conduct remedies. And across the pond, the European Union’s new rules on digital services and markets reflect a stronger and more confident challenge to tech firms, which feels like a direct consequence of the flurry of lawsuits.

This rethinking of antitrust policy and the actions it has spawned couldn’t come at a more critical time. As the pandemic consolidates markets, new mergers—from regional banks to big pharmaceutical firms to the world’s largest cannabis company—are being announced every day. The level of mergers and acquisitions is “extraordinary,” says Goldman Sachs’s top M&A banker Stephan Feldgoise, and he expects those mergers to come with job loss, as is typical with concentration.

The lawsuits against Google and Facebook will last for years. Big Tech’s defenders and lobbyists will defame them and bargain for a settlement of the anti-monopoly strife. The cases might even fail. It doesn’t matter. The policy center of America has now been convinced that the situation in corporate America has grown out of control. Public opinion supports that perspective. The network of anti-monopoly thinkers and scholars and activists has grown. The arguments for enabling monopoly power have been revealed as weak. Nothing is going to stop this evolution away from the laissez-faire of the Chicago school and toward the preservation of liberty and democracy.

#### 2---Notice and comment is consensus building---their ev doesn’t assume the process

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The public antitrust agencies—the DOJ, the FTC, and the state attorneys general—from time to time have convened public gatherings to examine developments in antitrust law.175 The agencies could apply their capability as convenors to conduct periodic assessments of the operation of per se rules of illegality and to build a consensus about what types of behavior are appropriate subjects for categorical prohibition.176 They could host proceedings in which academics, business officials, judges, policymakers, and practitioners analyze the existing set of per se prohibitions and discuss possibilities for expanding or reducing the set. One could imagine that such proceedings might take place on a regular basis—perhaps every five years. As a recent example, the FTC in 2020 held a public workshop on noncompete covenants as part of a larger set of deliberations on modern competition law and policy.177

An important aim of the periodic reassessment would be to take stock of ongoing advances in economic theory and in learning about business practices. This stock-taking would help illuminate the impact of existing per se rules and help interpret the experience that courts use as a basis for adjusting the class of conduct subject to per se condemnation. The agencies could prepare reports that distill the results of the reassessment proceedings and thus provide accessible means for courts to consider future adaptions to the per se rule.

#### 3---Supporters will get more weight

Marissa Martino Golden 98, University of Pennsylvania. “Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART , Apr., 1998. Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 245-270. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1181558

To return to our theoretical concerns, there is little evidence of agency capture in these data. With the exception of the electric vehicle regulation, all three agencies ignored the often impassioned pleas of their clientele and stuck with their initial proposals, albeit with some modifications.

The question of whose voices get heard remains. Here, the weight given to the comments received may compensate for the imbalance in the rates of participation that are documented above. In other words, it may not matter if there is only one public interest group commenting on a given rule if its voice is heard above the din of the larger number of industry commenters. It turns out, however, that the answer to the question, Whose voices get heard? has less to do with agencies favoring business over public interest groups or with the number of commenters (the squeakiest wheel gets the grease) than it has to do with the degree of conflict among commenters, the sides in the conflict, and the paucity of repeat players.

With respect to the specific issue of agency responsiveness to citizens' groups, the best sources of evidence are the three regulatory rules for which public interest groups submitted comments. In two cases (one at EPA, one at NHTSA), the lone public interest group was virtually ignored. In one case, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) wanted a stronger rule than that proposed by the EPA; in the second case, the Center for Auto Safety raised the sole objection to a rule supported by manufacturers. However, in the third case (EPA's acid rain rule), the NRDC and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) supported the EPA's definition of thermal energy, with which commenters from industry, utilities, and municipal govern- ments all found fault. In that case, the agency's final rule granted what the public interest groups sought.

The conclusion to be drawn from these fmdings is not that agency responsiveness to public interest groups varies. It is that when there is conflict rather than consensus among the commenters (as there was in six of the ten rules examined), the agency tends to hear most clearly the voices that support the agency's position.9 In the acid rain case, the public interest commenters were supportive of the NOPR. In the other two cases, the public interest groups sought change. The voices of critics tend to be heard less clearly than the voices of rule supporters, even when there are more critics than supporters. This finding applies not just when there is conflict between citizen's groups and business but when the conflict is among business commenters. For example, in NHTSA's proposal to issue a rule regarding safety standards for air brakes, the voice of the lone air brake manufacturer who supported the rule was heard over the voices of the six spring brake manufacturers and trade associations who objected to the standards set by the rule.

I did not find undue business influence in the rules I examined. This is in part because in a number of cases, business did not present a united front. There were frequently divisions within the business community. To use the example mentioned above, the air brake rule pitted air brake manufacturers against spring brake manufacturers. Accordingly, not all business inter- ests could be accommodated. In other cases, particularly at the EPA, business influence was limited because industry opposed the agency's proposals, and the agency made only minor conces- sions to the commenters. Finally, influence was limited by the absence of repeat players. Since different groups commented on each rule, few groups, corporations, or industries were in a position to influence more than one rule, even within the same agency. The rule's beneficiaries were different in each case, making capture unlikely.

The primary bias that I detected in my examination of ten federal rule-making procedures was the agencies' tendency to favor supporters of its rules over critics. It did not matter if the critics were the big three automakers or the Center for Auto Safety, those who submitted comments in support of a rule were likely to get the final rule they desired, and those who objected were likely to get only minor concessions. 10

In sum, there appear to be two consistent findings regarding interest group influence via notice and comment. First, significant influence is limited. Only one of the ten rules examined was changed significantly from the NOPR. Second, with respect to whose voices get heard, no clear pattern emerges. Citizens' influ- ence was obviously limited to those rules where there was citizen group participation. Where there was public interest participation, voices on all sides appeared to be taken into account. Of equal interest, in the case of those rules without citizen participation, business influence was nonetheless variable, due to conflict within the business sector and the tendency on the part of federal agencies to favor supportive commenters over critics. I submit that these nonpatterns make sense if they are viewed in an issue network framework.

#### 4---Changes will only be major if there is unanimous opposition

Marissa Martino Golden 98, University of Pennsylvania. “Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?”. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART , Apr., 1998. Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1998), pp. 245-270. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1181558

As exhibit 6 depicts, eight of the ten final rules were changed, at least minimally, from the proposed rules in response to interest group comments.8 However, in only one case did the agency change a rule "a great deal." In that case (NHTSA's electric vehicle rule), in response to objections from all seven commenters, NHTSA abandoned altogether its proposal to require electric powered vehicles to contain a gauge and symbol to warn drivers when their batteries are in need of recharging. In the other cases-although commenters had requested more substantial changes-changes were limited to definitional changes, changes in deadlines, and changes to procedural issues such as record-keeping requirements. In short, in the majority of cases the agency made some of the changes that were requested by commenters, but it rarely altered the heart of the proposal. In only two of the ten cases did the agency refuse to make any modifications to its NOPR; moreover, in one of those two rule makings, only one comment was submitted regarding the rule.

#### 2---Required rule changes would be good---key to solvency

C. Scott Hemphill 09. Associate Professor and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School. “An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition”. Columbia Law Review. https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=588125096113080096106002107108097121035031077054017013065114020077027104102087029081118107106002104019004112030074020109103121006086087059083005011081071001076076040034056104112070118104110067012020072022093015084126127025065066072121017026087065093&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

Rulemaking has significant, familiar advantages over the adjudicatory route. Rulemaking permits affected parties to test aggregate data in an open way, with ample opportunity for rebuttal.209 The opportunity for input and testing tends to produce superior policy.210 The resulting rule thus has a superior claim to judicial deference, compared to judicial review of a single case: The rule has been thoroughly vetted under notice and comment, after a broad, deep review of the full terrain of behavior by regulated parties. It is this superior breadth and greater vetting, rather than the doctrinal force of Chevron itself,211 that presents the strongest reason to think that a rule might succeed where adjudication has failed.

Rulemaking helps in another way. The FTC Act is broader than the Sherman Act, as noted above, but the degree of its additional breadth has been a subject of controversy. Some lower courts have regarded with skepticism the FTC’s efforts to regulate behavior not already governed by the Sherman Act.212 A powerful way for the FTC to overcome this skepticism would be to support its claim to authority with aggregation, buttressed by notice-and-comment rulemaking. In this manner, the FTC could combine, in a mutually reinforcing manner, the two ways in which its authority stands out relative to ordinary, judicial antitrust policymaking: in having a statute with broader reach than the Sherman Act, and in possessing the power to collect information beyond the reach of the judiciary.

#### 3---Public engagement is key to prevent monopoly power---participation is the only way to promote competition and decenter dominant firms

Rohit Chopra and Lina Khan 20. Rohit Chopra, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. And Lina M. Khan, Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Legal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. “The Case for "Unfair Methods of Competition" Rulemaking”. The University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 87, No. 2 (March 2020), pp. 357-380. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26892415

Lastly, the current approach deprives both the public and market participants of any real opportunity to participate in the creation of substantive antitrust rules.23 The exclusive reliance on case-by-case adjudication leaves broad swaths of market participants watching from the sidelines, lacking an opportunity to contribute their perspective, their analysis, or their expertise, except through one-off amicus briefs.24 Nascent firms and startups are especially likely to be left out—despite the vital role they play in the competition ecosystem—given that they do not comprise a significant portion of the parties represented in litigated matters, and they usually lack the resources to engage in amicus activity. Furthermore future entrants, whose interests should be carefully considered in all aspects of competition law and policy, have no voice.

Firms, entrepreneurs, workers, and consumers across our economy vary wildly in their experiences and perspectives on market conduct. Enforcement and regulation of business conduct can more successfully promote competition when it incorporates more voices and evidence from across the marketplace.

The ambiguity of the laws, the administrative and resource burdens of enforcing them, and the exclusivity of the current process tend to advantage incumbents and suppress market entry. For example, when courts disagree with one another on the legality of particular conduct, new entrants are likely to eschew the practice, since the threat of litigation could prove fatal at an early stage. Incumbents, by contrast, will be more likely to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of engaging in a potentially unlawful practice, since they are likely to have higher tolerance for protracted litigation and deeper pockets to fund it. Continued ambiguity and complexity also create business opportunities for lawyers, economists, and lobbyists, who effectively profit from the lack of clarity.

#### Counterplan solves clarity and certainty

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Rulemaking would advance clarity and certainty about what types of conduct constitute—or do not constitute—an “unfair method of competition.”64 Commission studies of specific industries and business practices would guide which practices the FTC should use rulemaking to address. Indeed, as an enforcer and regulator across industries, the Commission is uniquely positioned to identify practices that it determines are anticompetitive. Below we offer two other considerations that could weigh in favor of FTC rulemaking.

#### it takes Less than 60 days---their ev isn’t about notice and comment.

Prepared by the Office of the Federal Register. “A Guide to the Rulemaking Process”. https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the\_rulemaking\_process.pdf

What is the time period for the public to submit comments?

In general, agencies will specify a comment period ranging from 30 to 60 days in the “Dates” Section of the Federal Register document, but the time period can vary. For complex rulemakings, agencies may provide for longer time periods, such as 180 days or more. Agencies may also use shorter comment periods when that can be justified.